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APPLICATION  OF TITLE  VII  TO JOBS  IN
HIGH  PLACES
By  Elizabeth Bartholet*
Employers  of blue  collar workers  have  seen their employment
practices exposed to the brilliant light of title  VII inquiry.  When
selection methods involving tests, degree requirements, and the like
have effectively  shut out minorities, courts have insisted that em-
ployers either justify the  methods or abandon them.  In  contrast,
when plaintiffs have challenged methods for choosing teachers, law-
yers,  or managers, courts have  left  those  methods largely in  the
shadows, unexamined and undisturbed - even when they exclude
minorities and are as little justified as the methods condemned at
the  lower level.  Professor Bartholet argues that this emerging dis-
tinction  between upper and  lower level jobs is  indefensible  as a
matter of either law or policy.  She concludes that title VII has had
a salutary effect on lower level employment and that courts should
use title VII  to further racial equality at the upper level as well.
T  HE federal courts have developed standards  defining race
discrimination  in lower  level  employment  that have  cast
doubt  on  many  of our  traditional  methods  of job  allocation.
Since  the  mid-i96o's,  written  tests  and  informal  subjective
systems  have  regularly  been  ruled  unlawful.  Indeed,  any em-
ployment scheme with a racially exclusionary  impact has  been
treated  as  suspect.  As a result,  employers  have been  forced  to
revise traditional  methods of selection,  and  blacks  have made
significant  gains in  employment  status.
Many  courts  appear  reluctant  to  apply  comparable  stan-
dards  to  the  upper  level jobs  that  have  increasingly  become
the  focus  of  litigation.  This  Article  argues  that  there  is  no
legal  basis  for  distinguishing  between  upper  and  lower  level
selection  methods.  Application  of traditional  standards  would
encourage  the  full racial  integration  contemplated  by title VII
* Assistant  Professor of Law,  Harvard University.  Radcliffe College,  B.A.,  1962;
Harvard  Law School,  LL.B.,  1965.
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of the Civil Rights  Act of  1964.  It  would also  expose irration-
alities  in  our job  allocation  systems  and  open  up  possibilities
for improved  selection.
I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  The Problem
Courts  have gone  far during the last fifteen years to ensure
black  participation'  in  the  ranks  of  the  work  force.  Blacks
have gained  access to industries  and crafts  traditionally closed
to them,  and  to  responsible  blue  collar  supervisory  positions.
Blacks  have  made  only  limited progress,  however,  in gaining
access  to  "upper  level"  jobs - jobs  with  high  pay  or  status,
or  with  significant  social  or  political  power.2  Relatively  few
blacks  have entered  the  more elite  professions or attained  pol-
l For  simplicity,  this  Article  refers  primarily  to  blacks,  but the  discussion  is in-
tended  to apply to  other racial  or ethnic groups  historically subject to  extreme  inten-
tional discrimination.  Although the  discussion  is  limited  to racial  or ethnic  discrimi-
nation,  it has  obvious  relevance to  other forms  of discrimination,  such  as that  based
on  sex,  handicap,  or  age.  Indeed,  many  of  the  upper  level  cases  discussed  here
involved  women  charging sex discrimination.
It  is important  to  focus  on  race separately,  because  the  issues are  not necessarily
the same  for all the groups protected  by  antidiscrimination legislation.  For example,
the  disparate  impact  doctrine  adopted  in Griggs  v.  Duke  Power  Co.,  401  U.S.  424
(i974),  is  of  central  significance  in  upper  level  employment  discrimination.  That
doctrine  was  developed  in  the  context  of  race discrimination  and  has  only  recently
begun  to  be applied  in  other contexts.  See,  e.g.,  Dothard v.  Rawlinson,  433  U.S.
321  (1977)  (applying impact  doctrine  to  sex discrimination  claim).  Griggs was predi-
cated  on  the assumption  that blacks  and  whites  are  inherently  equal  in  ability  and
that,  but for historical discrimination,  they  would be equally well situated  in employ-
ment.  See Griggs, 401  U.S.  at 430-31.  Similar assumptions  cannot be  made for  all
other  protected  groups.  Indeed,  some - such  as the  aged  and the  handicapped  -
may  be protected,  in part,  because  they are  likely  as groups  to  be  less  qualified  for
employment  than  others.  Moreover,  one  might conclude  that the  impact doctrine  is
justified for race because of a combination  of factors that include the social importance
of  achieving  a  racially  integrated  work  force.  The  question  whether  the  impact
doctrine  should  be similarly  applied  in other  areas  would  then  turn  in  part  on  the
perceived  importance  of achieving  full  integration  of a particular  protected  group  in
the work force.
2 This Article  makes  no  attempt  to  define  precisely  the  line  between  upper  and
lower  level  jobs.  The  argument  developed  in  Part  II  is  that  many  courts  apply
differing  legal  standards,  depending  on the  socioeconomic status of the job involved.
Courts  have  tended  to  apply strict  standards  to  systems  involving  blue  collar  jobs,
including  supervisory  jobs  and  highly  skilled  craft  jobs.  The  courts  have  applied
similar standards to systems involving white  collar jobs with limited status and  power.
All such jobs are  considered  lower  level for  purposes  of this discussion.  Courts  have
tended  to  apply  more  relaxed  standards  to  systems  involving  middle  and  upper
management  jobs,  professional  positions,  and  other jobs  requiring advanced  educa-
tional  degrees.  All of these  are here  termed  upper level positions.
[VOL.  95:945
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icymaking  positions  at major  industrial  and  financial  institu-
tions.
It  is  not surprising that  integration  of the  work  force  has
taken  place  primarily  on  the  blue  collar  level.  Aggressive
efforts to combat discrimination  did not begin until the passage
of title VII  of the Civil Rights  Act of  1964, 3  and  early efforts
were  aimed  at lower  level  jobs,  which  represented  the  great
bulk  of employment  opportunities.  Not until  1972  did  Con-
gress expand title VII to cover  academic  institutions4  and pub-
lic as well  as private  employment.5  Furthermore,  blacks  have
found  it  harder  to  satisfy  education  and  experience  require-
ments  for upper level jobs than to satisfy similar requirements
for less  prestigious jobs.  Only in the last few years,  therefore,
have  significant numbers  of challenges  been  brought to  upper
level employment  decisions.
Recent  legal  developments  call  into  question  whether  the
principles  applied to open up blue  collar jobs to blacks  will be
applied  to upper level jobs.6  The courts  have tended  to show
far greater  deference  to upper  than  to  lower level  employers,
as  is  discussed  in  Part II.  While  the  Supreme  Court has  not
explicitly  differentiated  between  upper  and  lower  level  em-
ployment systems,  it has hinted, just as  upper level job  issues
are  coming  to the  forefront,  that  it  may be  prepared  to  relax
title VII standards  for  employers  on  all levels. 7
3 Pub. L. No. 88-352,  §  701-716,  78 Stat. 241,  253-66 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42  U.S.C.  88 2oooe  to 2ooe-17  (1976  & Supp. Ill  1979)).
4 Equal  Employment Opportunity Act of  1972,  Pub.  L.  No.  92-261,  § 3,  86  Stat.
103,  103-04  (codified at 42  U.S.C.  § 2oooe-i  (1976)).
5 Id.  § ii,  86  Stat. at iii (codified  at 42  U.S.C.  §  2oooe-i6 (1976)).
6 For  discussion  of  upper  level  employment  discrimination  issues,  see  D.  BELL,
RACE,  RACISM  AND  AMERICAN  LAW  § 9.9  (2d ed.  I98O); Bardeen,  The Legal Profes-
sion: A  New  Target for Title VII?,  55  CAL.  ST.  B.J.  360  (198o);  Devine,  Women  in
the  Academy:  Sex  Discrimination in  University Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5
J.L. & EDUC.  429 (1976); Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-Based Employment
Discrimination in Higher Education: A  Tale of Two  Titles,  34  VAND.  L.  REV.  37
(x9i8i);  Hunt  & Pazuniak,  Special Problems in Litigating Upper Level  Employment
Discrimination  Cases, 4  DEL.  J.  Cop.  L.  114  (1978);  Paone  & Reis,  Effective  En-
forcement of Federal  Non-Discrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers,  40 S.
CAL.  L.  REV.  615  (1967);  Waintroob,  The  Developing Law  of Equal Employment
Opportunity at the White Collar  and Professional  Level,  21  Wm.  & MAXR'  L.  REv.  45
(1979);  Yurko, Judicial  Recognition of Academic Collective Interests:  A  New Approach
to  Faculty Title  VII  Litigation, 6o  B.U.L.  REV.  473  (I98O);  Note,  Title  VII  and
Employment Discrimination  in  Upper Level Jobs, 73  COLUM.  L.  REv.  1614  (1973);
Note, Tenure and Partnership  as Title  VII Remedies,  94  HARV.  L.  REV.  457  (1980);
Note,  Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to  the Selection of a
Law Partner,  76  MICH.  L.  REV.  282  (1977);  Comment,  Subjective Employment Cri-
teria and the Future of Title VII  in Professional Jobs, 54  U.  DET.  J.  URB.  L.  I65
(1976).
7 See,  e.g.,  Texas  Dep't of Community  Affairs  v. Burdine,  450 U.S.  248  (1981);
1982]
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Courts  have  tended  to  obscure  the  extent  to  which  they
have  applied  a differential  standard,  presumably  because,  as
discussed  in Section  B  of Part III, title  VII appears  to provide
no basis for distinguishing between lower and upper level jobs.
The message  that blacks  may  be excluded  from  proportionate
participation  in  upper  level jobs  has  consequently  been  com-
municated in a singularly obnoxious  form.  Because the  courts
have  been  reluctant  to  state  that  upper  level  employment
should be subject to a more lenient standard, they have tended
to  endorse  racially  exclusionary  upper  level selection  systems
by  finding  that  these  systems  meet  the  stringent  standards
applied  to  lower  level  jobs.  Employer  policies  that  exclude
blacks  from  positions  of  responsibility  in the  most  important
institutions  in  our  society  have  been  found  reasonable  and
necessary  to  maintain  the  quality  of  those  institutions.  De-
mands for  access  by blacks  have  been  rejected  as  equivalent
to demands  for the lowering  of standards.
B.  Development and Meaning of the Business Necessity Test
on the Lower Level
The  issue  of  how  title  VII's  antidiscrimination  principle8
should  be  interpreted  in  upper  level  job  discrimination  cases
must be  approached  with  an  understanding  of how the  prin-
ciple  has been  interpreted  in  lower  level  cases.  Only because
that principle  came to mean  more  than the mere  outlawing of
intentional  discrimination  could  any  question  arise  about  the
propriety  of applying  essentially  the  same  standards  to  upper
level cases.
Title  VII clearly  bans  intentional  discrimination  on  all job
New  York  City Transit Auth.  v.  Beazer,  440  U.S.  568,  582-87  (1979);  Washington
v.  Davis,  426  U.S.  229,  248-52  (1976).
It  may  be  significant  that some of the  Court's  most restrictive  rulings  have been
handed  down  in  cases  involving  upper level job discrimination.  See,  e.g.,  Board  of
Trustees  v.  Sweeney,  439  U.S.  24  (1978),  vacating and remanding per curzam 569
F.2d  169  (ist Cir.  1978);  National  Educ.  Ass'n  v.  South  Carolina,  434  U.S.  1026
(1978),  affg mem.  United  States v.  South  Carolina, 445  F.  Supp.  1094 (D.S.C.  1977).
The police department jobs at issue in  Washington v.  Davis did  not involve  the kind
of status typical  of most upper level jobs.  They did, however,  involve  considerable
power over citizens within the department's jurisdiction,  power of which  the Supreme
Court, located  within that jurisdiction,  would have  been well  aware.
It  may  also  be significant that the  Court has  chosen  to uphold affirmative  action
programs  in  a  case involving  blue  collar  industrial  workers,  United  Steelworkers  v.
Weber,  443  U.S.  193  (1979),  while striking down  such a  program  in  a  case involving
medical  school  applicants,  Regents  of  the  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.  Bakke,  438  U.S.  265
(1978).
8 The  focus  throughout  this  Article  is  on  title  VII,  since  it  is  the  key  federal
legislation banning race  discrimination  in employment.
[Vol. 95:945
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levels.  Radical  expansion  of  the  antidiscrimination  principle
came  with judicial  development  of the  disparate  impact  doc-
trine.  Adopting  this  doctrine  in  Griggs v.  Duke Power Co., 9
the  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  employment  policies  having  a
disparate impact on blacks  were unlawful  unless the employer
could  show  that  those  policies  were  job-related  and  justified
by  "business  necessity."  Absence  of discriminatory  intent  on
the  employer's  part was  deemed irrelevant.
Employers  found it hard to satisfy the Griggs standard.  An
employer  could  not rest  on  proof that  its selection  practices 10
reflected  a  legitimate  business  purpose  and  were  consistent
with  general  practice  in  the  relevant  industry.  Instead,  the
business  necessity  doctrine  required a  demonstration  "that the
practice  [was]  necessary  to  the  safe  and  efficient  operation  of
the business."'"  Moreover,  job-relatedness  had  to be  demon-
strated  under  strict  standards  resembling  those set  by profes-
sional  associations  of  industrial  psychologists12  and  by  the
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Commission  (EEOC),' 3  the
agency  with chief responsibility  for enforcing  title VII.  These
standards  required  at  a  minimum:  (i)  a "job  analysis"  - an
examination  of the  actual  tasks  involved  in  the  job  at issue;
(2)  a  test and scoring scheme  designed to predict the ability  to
perform  those  tasks;  and  (3)  "validation."  Courts  have  gen-
erally held that validation requires  either a demonstration  that
success  on the  employment  test correlates  with success  on the
9  401 U.S.  424  (1971).
10  "Selection"  is  used  throughout this  Article to cover  not  only initial  hiring,  but
also other job-allocation  and salary-determining  decisions  covered  by title  VII,  such
as promotion  and transfer.  See generally 42  U.S.C.  §  2oooe-2 (1976)  (comprehensive
description of unlawful  employment  practices).
11  Robinson v.  Lorillard Corp.,  444 F.2d 791,  798 (4th Cir.),  cert. dismissed, 404
U.S.  ioO6 (1971).
12  Most  influential  is  the  American  Psychological  Association  (APA),  and  its Di-
vision of Industrial-Organizational  Psychology  (Division  14).  See AMERICAN  PSYCHO-
LOGICAL  ASS'N,  AMERICAN  EDUC.  RESEARCH  ASS'N  &  NAT'L  COUNCIL  ON  MEA-
SUREMENT  IN  EDUC.,  STANDARDS  FOR  EDUCATIONAL  AND  PSYCHOLOGICAL  TESTS
AND  MANUALS  (rev.  ed.  1974) (ist ed.  1966)  [hereinafter  cited  as APA  STANDARDS];
DISION  OF  INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY,  AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL  ASS'N,  PRINCIPLES  FOR  THE  VALIDATION  AND  USE  OF  PERSONNEL  SELECTION
PROCEDURES  (2d  ed.  1g8o) (specifically  addressing  employment  selection  issues) [her-
einafter cited as  DIVISION  14  PRINCIPLES].  For a discussion  of professional  standards
and  their  development,  see  B.  SCHLEI  & P.  GROSSMAN,  EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIMI-
NATION LAv  68-70  (1976).
13  The  1970  EEOC  Guidelines  on  Employee  Selection  Procedures,  35  Fed.  Reg.
12,333  (1970)  (original version  promulgated  Aug.  24,  1966),  have been  superseded by
the  Uniform  Guidelines  on  Employee  Selection  Procedures,  29  C.F.R.  §§  1607.1  to
.18 (198o)(first  published at 43  Fed.  Reg.  38,290 (1978)) [hereinafter  cited as Uniform
Guidelines];  the  latter were  promulgated  in  1978  by the  four federal  agencies  chiefly
involved  in  enforcement  of title V1I.
1082]
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job ("empirical validity"),  or a demonstration  that the test itself
is  so  comparable  to  the  actual job  that  it constitutes  an  ade-
quate  sample  of  job  performance  ("content  validity"). 14  Fi-
nally,  even  if  a selection  system  was  valid,  it  could  be  held
unlawful  if  there  was  a  comparably  valid  system  with  less
adverse  racial  impact.
Application  of these standards  resulted in the outlawing  of
challenged  employment  tests on  a nearly wholesale  basis dur-
ing  the  late  196o's  and  the  early  197o's.  Almost  all  written
tests had an adverse impact on blacks,  and relatively few such
tests had been  adopted in  accord  with the tenets of the  indus-
trial  psychologists.  Employers,  for  the  most  part, had  never
tried to  articulate  their job  performance  goals  in  a systematic
fashion, to develop  selection devices  carefully targeted  to serve
those  goals,  or  to  measure  the  success  of  such  devices  by
validity studies.  And  employers  were  not  in  the  habit  of  ex-
amining  alternative selection  devices  to discover  which  would
have the smallest adverse  impact on  blacks while still ensuring
a qualified  work force.
The  Griggs doctrine  was  applied  to  all  objective  selection
devices  commonly  used  on  the  lower  level.  Many  cases  fo-
cused on written tests,  because such tests posed a major barrier
to  black  employment.  And  the  courts  went  furthest  in  de-
manding  evidence  of  validation  in  connection  with  written
tests.  But the  courts  looked  with  like  suspicion  at  other  ob-
jective  criteria  that  had  a  racial  impact,  such  as  employer
requirements  that  employees  have  prior  related  work  experi-
ence,  that they  be  free  of arrest or  conviction  records,  or that
they  have  high  school  diplomas.  Such  requirements  were
struck  down unless the  employer  demonstrated  that they were
required  by "business  necessity."'' 5
Courts also looked with suspicion at the subjective  selection
systems  commonly  used  to  hire  and  promote  workers  on  the
blue  collar  level.  These  systems  were  almost  uniformly  con-
demned,  usually on the  theory that they lent themselves to the
expression  of conscious  or unconscious  bias.16
Specific  cases  illustrate  the  real-life  meaning  of the  legal
standards  that  courts  imposed  in  lower  level  job  cases.  In
Griggs, the  defendant company was involved in the generation
and  distribution  of electric  power.  At issue  were jobs as  lab-
oratory technicians  and jobs in departments  dealing with gen-
erating  and  other  electrical  equipment,  crushers,  and  other
14 See generally infra pp.  1016-23.
Is  See infra pp.  965-67.
16 See infra pp.  973-75-
[VOL.  95:945
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heavy  machinery.  The employer  required  that applicants  for
promotion  or  transfer  either  have  a  high  school  degree  or
equivalency  certification,  or  achieve  certain  scores  on  mental
and mechanical  aptitude  tests;  the  cutoff  on  the  mental  apti-
tude test was at approximately the level expected  of an average
high  school  graduate.  The  employer  claimed  that  these  re-
quirements  were  justified  by  the  growing  complexity  of  the
work involved; the company also argued that the requirements
were  essential  for jobs  at the  top  of the various  lines  of pro-
gression  and  that  it  was  important  to  morale  and  efficiency
that  workers  have  the  capacity  to  rise  to  the  top. 17  Noting
that the  general  intelligence  test was  designed  to measure  the
"ability  to  understand,  to  think,  to  use  good  judgment"  and
that the mechanical  ability test was  designed  to  assess under-
standing  of simple  machines,  the  district court found  these  to
be  qualities  that the  defendant  "would  logically  want to  find
in  his  employees."'i s
There  was  ample  room  for  argument  in  Griggs that the
company's  requirements were  motivated not by any legitimate
business purpose,  but rather by illicit discrimination;  however,
the  Supreme  Court  specifically  refused  to  rely  on  such  an
argument.  Assuming  employer  good  faith,  as  did the  Court,
an uncritical commonsense  approach  would seem  to have com-
pelled  a  finding  that the  requirements  were job related.  Cer-
tainly  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  know  enough  about  the
running  of  a  power  plant  to  find  the  employer's  arguments
irrational.  And  it  was  a  common  business  practice  to  use
entry  level  tests  to  select  employees  suitable  for  future  pro-
motion.  But  the  Supreme  Court rejected  defenses  based  on
apparent commonsense  and rationality, finding that acceptance
of  such  defenses  would  be  incompatible  with  congressional
intent. 1 9 Instead, the Court demanded evidence demonstrating
job-relatedness  and  business  necessity, 20  presumably  because
the  social  cost  of  excluding  blacks  from  employment  was
thought to warrant  this  higher standard of justification.
A  recent  Second  Circuit  case,  Grant v.  Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,21 illustrates the  courts'  similarly  strict approach  to sub-
jective selection procedures that have an adverse racial  impact.
At  issue  was  the  system  for  selecting  foremen  to  supervise
ironworkers  engaged  in  the  construction  of steel  frameworks
17 420  F.2d  1225,  1231,  1232  n.2 (4th Cir.  i970),  rev'd, 401  U.S.  424  (1971).
18  292  F.  Supp.  243,  250  (M.D.N.C.  1968).
19  401  U.S.  at 432,  436.
2 0 Id.  at 431.
21  635 F.2d  1007  (2d  Cir.  198o),  cert. denied, ioI S.  Ct. 3083  (981).
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for  bridges,  skyscrapers,  air terminals,  and the  like.  The  dis-
trict  court  upheld  the  system,  noting  that foremen  must  nec-
essarily  be  hired  according  to  subjective  evaluations  of their
ability to  promote  safety  and productive  work,  because  there
were  no  readily  identifiable  objective  criteria  for  determining
this  ability.22  The  Second  Circuit  reversed  and  remanded,
holding  that the  employer  nonetheless  had  to demonstrate  the
business  necessity  of its  particular  subjective  evaluation  pro-
cess. 
23
The  legal  standards  developed  in  these  and  other  lower
level job  cases  have  put significant  pressure  on  employers  to
change  their  hiring  and  promotion  systems.  When  courts
strike  down  old  systems,  they  typically  order  employers  to
develop  job-related  selection  methods.  In  addition,  courts
sometimes  order  particular  changes  in  existing  systems  and
often  order implementation  of temporary selection  systems  de-
signed  to remedy  the  effects  of the  unlawful  system.  Finally,
the potential  for litigation has prompted  lower level  employers
to  assess  the  validity  of  their  systems  and  to  develop  new
systems  more  likely to prove  valid.
Employers  have  also  been  under  some  pressure  to  avoid
the  costs of litigation - or of validation  - by adopting  selec-
tion systems that have no adverse racial impact.  Absent racial
impact,  there  is  no  title  VII  obligation  to  validate  selection
procedures.  Griggs has thus encouraged  employers  to develop
hiring and  promotion  systems that select on  a racially  propor-
tionate basis from among qualified candidates. 24  The Supreme
Court's approval  in  United Steelworkers v.  Weber25 of a race-
conscious  employment scheme  was  the logical  consequence  of
the  Griggs doctrine.  Employers  - compelled  by  Griggs to
22 See  id. at  1012.
23  Id. at IO8-I9.
24 A  number  of  commentators  have  argued  that  the  difficulty  of  satisfying  the
Griggs demand  for  justification  produces  pressure  for  race-conscious  hiring.  E.g.,
B.  SCHLEI  &  P.  GROSSMAN,  supra note  12,  at  ii;  Belton,  Discrimination and
Affirmative Action:  An Analysis  of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber,  59
N.C.L.  REV.  531,  551-52  (i98o);  Fallon,  To Each According to His Ability, from
None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination,
6o B.U.L.  REV.  815,  841,  853  (I98O);  Freeman,  Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A  Critical  Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN.  L.  REV.  1049,  1099  (1978);  Meltzer,  The Weber  Case: The Judicial  Abrogation
of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,  47  U.  CHI.  L.  Rav.  423,  426,
434  (1980);  Schatzki,  United  Steelworkers  of  America  v.  Weber:  An  Exercise  in
Understandable Indecision, 56  WASH.  L. REv.  51,  61-63 (i98o);  see Comment,  The
Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact  Liability Under Title VII, 46  U. CHI.
L.  REV.  911,  913  (1979).
25  443  U.S.  193  (1979).
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eschew  policies  that had  an  unnecessary  adverse  impact  on
blacks - could not be penalized  for adopting policies designed
to ensure that blacks  were employed  on a proportionate basis.
C. Implications  for the  Upper Level: The Meritocratic  Myth
The radical  implications  of Griggs for  upper level  employ-
ment  systems  are  obvious  when  one  examines  the  objective
criteria  and  subjective  processes  that  such  systems  involve.
They  place  a  premium  on  educational  accomplishment  and
prior  relevant  experience.  For  candidates  who  satisfy  mini-
mum  objective  qualifications,  the  final  decisionmaking  tends
to be largely subjective, based on evaluations of the candidates'
previous work  and potential  for future  performance.
Selection  systems  of this sort are  likely to  have an  adverse
racial impact.  Blacks as a group are far less likely than whites
to have had the education  and experience  that have  tradition-
ally been  the prerequisites for these jobs.  Use  of such creden-
tials - either  as  minimum  objective  requirements  or  as  part
of  a  subjective  evaluation  process  - seriously  limits  black
access  to  upper  level  positions.  Subjective  systems  may,  of
course,  be used to further "affirmative  action"  goals.  But they
also allow for the expression  both of conscious  bias  and of the
unconscious  bias  that  is  likely  to  result  in  the  exclusion  of
persons  who  are  visibly  different  from  those  doing the  select-
ing.
Although  employers  may be able to generate  commonsense
justifications  for their  systems  and demonstrate  that they mir-
ror  those  of comparable  employers,  such  defenses  are  insuffi-
cient  under Griggs.  Upper  level  employers  will find  it hard to
provide  the  proof  of  job-relatedness  and  business  necessity
demanded  in  lower  level  cases.  Upper  level  selection  devices
have  only rarely  been  developed  and  validated in  any kind  of
systematic  manner.  Testing  experts26  have  found  them  sus-
pect, just as  they found  suspect the standardized  written  tests
commonly  used  in lower  level  selection. 27  Thus,  if  disparate
26 "Testing experts"  is  used here  to indicate  the  type  of people  accepted  by  courts
as expert witnesses  on employment  selection  issues.  Their training would typically  be
in  industrial  psychology,  testing  and  measurement,  behavioral  science,  and  related
fields.
27 The  testing  literature  indicates  that selection  on  the  higher  levels  is  generally
done in an  extremely  unscientific  fashion,  that research  done by industrial  psycholo-
gists is rarely applied to refine the  selection devices  actually used,  and that the devices
most  relied  on  are  supported  by  extraordinarily  little  evidence  of  validity.  See
J.  CAMPBELL,  M.  DUNNETTE,  E.  LAWLER  &  K.  WEICK,  MANAGERIAL  BEHAVIOR,
PERFORMANCE,  AND  EFFECTIVENESS  127-45,  469-70  (1970)  [hereinafter  cited  as
MANAGERIAL  BEHAVIOR];  see  also  R.  GUION,  PERSONNEL  TESTING  458  (1967)  (the
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impact  on  the  upper  level  is  to  trigger  the  traditional  Griggs
burden  of justification,  a  significant  rethinking  of traditional
selection  methods  will  be required.
Two  questions  are  central  in  considering  what legal  stan-
dards should be applied to upper level job selection.  The first
is  whether there are differences  between upper and lower level
selection  that  call  for  differences  in  legal  treatment.  Various
courts  and  commentators  have  argued  for  relative  immunity
for  upper  level  employers  on  the  grounds  that  at  this  level
employees  are not  fungible,  subjective  evaluation  is essential,
and job-relatedness  is difficult if not impossible to demonstrate.
Part IH of this Article  argues that differences in legal treatment
of upper  and lower  level selection  systems  cannot be justified
on the  basis  of such  distinctions.
A  second  question  is  whether  the  Griggs  doctrine  has
proven  inconsistent with meritocratic  principles.  The  doctrine
was initially expounded  and defended on meritocratic  grounds.
The  avowed  goal  was  to  get  employers  to  eliminate  the irra-
tional factor  of race from  employment  selection  schemes - to
do  no  more than  follow  their  economic  self-interest  by devel-
oping truly merit-based  selection  systems. 28  But if it was  not
obvious  when  Griggs was  decided  in  i971,  it  has  become
apparent  since  then that  developing  "valid"  selection  systems
is no  simple matter. 29  Some commentators have  criticized  the
Griggs approach,  arguing that it has resulted  in  wasteful val-
idation  costs, 30  a movement  away  from  merit-based  employ-
same validation  principles apply  to managerial  selection  systems  as to  other selection
systems,  although  effective  performance  may  be  harder  to identify  and  measure  on
the  managerial  level);  infra pp.  986,  988-89.
28 See,  e.g.,  Cooper  & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair  Employment Laws:
A  General Approach to Objective  Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82  HARv.  L.
REv.  i598,  1678  (i969).  This  is  the  leading  article  setting  forth  the  theoretical
groundwork for  Griggs.
29 Many  have  commented  on  the  difficulties  of satisfying the  legal  standards  es-
tablished  by  Griggs and  related  cases.  See,  e.g.,  Holt,  A  View front Albemarle,  30
PERSONNEL  PSYCHOLOGY  65,  73-77  (977);  Johnson,  Albemarle  Paper Co.  v.  Moody:
The Aftermath of Griggs  and the Death of Employment Testing,  27  HASTINGS  L.J.
1239  (1976);  Wilson,  A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke  Power Company: Ruminations
on Job Testing, Discrimination,  and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.  L.  REv.
844,  873-74  (,972);  Note, Employment Testing and Proof of Job-Relatedness:  A  Tale
of Unreasonable Constraints,  52  NOTRE  DANTE  LAW.  95,  95-96  (1976);  Note, Business
Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach,
84  YALE L.J.  98,  117-18  (1974).
30  On  the costs of validation,  see  Gwartney,  Asher,  Haworth  & Haworth,  Statis-
tics, the Law and Title VII: An Economist's View,  54  NOTRE  DAME  LAW.  633,  643
(1979);  Lerner,  Employment Discrimination:  Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality,
1979  SUP.  CT.  REv.  17,  i8  & n.6;  White  & Francis,  Title  VII and the  Masters of
Reality: Eliminating Credentialism  in the American Labor  Market, 64  GEo L.J.  1213,
1234-35  (1976).
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ment  toward  quota hiring,  and  a  consequent  lowering  of  the
quality of job performance. 31
These  concerns  have  led some  to  call  for  a general  retreat
from  Griggs - a  softening  of the  burden  of justification  im-
posed  on  employers at all job  levels.  Alternatively,  such con-
cerns  may  be  thought  to  justify  development  of  a  two-tier
standard.  Courts  may  have  felt  fairly  comfortable  with  the
more radical implications  of Griggs for lower level jobs because
these jobs did  not seem  particularly  important.  On  the upper
level,  however,  where  courts  feel  that  the  quality  of  perfor-
mance  really  matters,  they may  be reluctant to  interfere  with
traditional selection  methods.
32
A  major  thesis  of this  Article  is  that  the  Griggs doctrine
has not proven  inconsistent  with  meritocratic  principles.  The
mass  of  employment  discrimination  litigation  over  the  past
fifteen  years  has done  more  than merely  educate us  about the
difficulties  of validation.  It  has  also  exposed  to  an  unprece-
dented  extent  the  way  in  which jobs  are  allocated  to  various
groups  in  our society.  The argument  developed  in  Section  C
of Part  I  is  that this litigation  has helped  destroy  the  notion
that  the  meritocratic  principle  is  the  norm  governing  job  al-
location.  The  systems  exposed  have  not  been  outlawed  be-
cause  employers  could  not meet an  impossibly  strict standard
of  validation;  they  have  been  outlawed  because  they  were
revealed  to  be inconsistent  with  merit selection.  Courts'  will-
ingness  to  apply  strict  standards  of  validation  grew  in  part
from  their  recognition  of how hard  it was  to justify  in  meri-
tocratic  terms the  job  allocation  systems  they observed.
The Griggs doctrine,  with  its demand  for proof of business
necessity, can  and should serve a similar function  with respect
to  upper  level  employment  systems.  A  standard  that  looks
instead  to  whether  there  are  any plausible  commonsense  jus-
tifications  for employer  practices - whether  they serve  legiti-
mate  business  purposes  - will  result  in  wholesale  immunity
from scrutiny on this level,  as it would have at the lower  level.
The fact  is that there  are  seeming  commonsense  justifications
for most of our job selection  systems.  Griggs requires  employ-
ers  to  make  a  persuasive  case  that  these  justifications  are  so
related to  merit and quality of performance  that they warrant
31 See,  e.g.,  B.  SCHLEI  & P.  GROSSMAN,  supra note  12,  at I81; Fallon,  supra note
24,  at 841,  853;  Lerner, supra note  30,  at  23,  49;  Meltzer,  supra note  24,  at 426-27;
Comment, supra note  24,  at 913.
32 Those  favoring  the  application  of  relaxed  legal  standards  to  upper  level  em-
ployment schemes  often  rely on  such rationales.  See,  e.g.,  Fallon,  supra note  24,  at
854-60;  Olmsted, Law as a Business: The Impact of Title VII  on the Legal "Industr,,"
Io  VAL.  U.L.  REV.  479, 489-90  (1976).
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a  racially  exclusionary  effect.  Griggs offers  the  only standard
that will result  in meaningful  reexamination  of traditional  se-
lection  systems.
Enforcement  of Griggs at  the  upper  level  would  generate
pressure for racially proportionate  hiring from  among the pool
of those with conceded minimum qualifications.  The argument
developed  in  Parts  IV  and  V  is  that  this  is  as  it should  be.
Validation  and  other  proof  of business  necessity  are  particu-
larly difficult on the upper level, largely because we are unsure
what we mean  by effective performance in our most important
jobs.  Our  notions  of  effective  performance  are  necessarily
value  laden,  rieflecting  what  are  often  essentially  political
choices.  These considerations  militate in favor of opening such
jobs  to  groups  traditionally  excluded  from  them.  Moreover,
the  "quota"  alternative  to  validation  allows  employers  signifi-
cant  freedom  to  choose  among  selection  systems.  As  long  as
the systems  have no adverse racial impact, there is no title VII
violation.
Other kinds  of arguments  for  racially  proportionate  hiring
rely  on  remedial  concerns  related  to  the  historic  injustice  of
slavery  and segregation.  Such  arguments  have  been  the  pri-
mary  subject  of the  continuing  debate  about  "affirmative  ac-
tion,"  which tends to ask the questions whether and how white
society should make up to blacks for what it has done to them.
Affirmative  action programs  are  generally assumed  to involve
preferential  treatment  of those  with  lesser  qualifications,  and
the question debated is whether such treatment can be justified
by  remedial  goals.  The  Griggs impact  doctrine  grew  in  part
out  of similar  concerns:  the  Supreme  Court  that struck down
tests  and high  school degree  requirements  in Griggs was  influ-
enced by the historic  injustices that had prevented blacks from
receiving the  kind of education that would have  enabled  them
to satisfy such  requirements.
The  central  rationale  of  the  Court's  decision  in  Griggs,
however,  was  something  quite  different.  It  was based  on  an
assumption  that  those  of different  races  are  inherently  equal
in ability and intelligence,  and  on a deep skepticism  about  the
utility  of devices  traditionally  used  to select  among  applicants
for employment. 33  This rationale provides an independent ba-
33
[O~n the record in the present case,  "whites register far better on the Company's
alternative requirements"  than Negroes.  . . . This  consequence  would appear
to  be  directly  traceable  to  race.  Basic  intelligence  must  have  the  means  of
articulation  to  manifest  itself  fairly  in  a  testing  process.  Because  they  are
Negroes,  petitioners have long received inferior education  in segregated schools
....  What is  required by Congress  is the  removal of artificial,  arbitrary,  and
[VOL.  95:945
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sis  for  many  of  the  programs  debated  today  in  the  name  of
affirmative  action  - a  basis  significantly  less  condescending
to the programs'  purported  beneficiaries  than notions  of "pref-
erential  treatment. '34  The  Griggs rationale  is  also  useful  in
pushing  toward  the reform  of job allocation  schemes  in ways
that have  nothing to do  with  race.
II.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  A DIFFERENTIAL  STANDARD:  FROM
JUDICIAL  SCRUTINY  TO  JUDICIAL  DEFERENCE
The goal of this Part is to show that the courts treat upper
and lower  level jobs differently  under title VII.  Why a differ-
ential standard  is  being  applied,  and  whether  it  can be justi-
fied,  are  discussed  in Part III.
Because  courts  generally  purport  to  apply  the  same  stan-
dards  to  all  employment  systems,  it  is  difficult  to  document
the existence  of a differential standard.  No claim  is made here
that  all  courts  are  applying  such  a  standard.  Indeed,  many
appear to  be trying to apply the  traditional  standards  to cases
at both  levels.  The  claim  here  is  simply that the  courts  have
generally  granted  upper  level  employers  significant  immunity
from title  VII scrutiny.
A.  Judicial Hostility to  Title VII  Challenges on the  Upper
Level
Many judicial  opinions  convey  a strong feeling that upper
level systems  should  be largely  immune  from  title VII  cover-
age.  This  attitude  is  immensely  important,  for  courts  can
implement a  differential  standard  in  myriad  ways.  A  court's
exercise  of discretion  in factfinding shapes  the legal  conclusion
that it  actually reaches;  and  in  most title  VII  cases,  facts  are
unnecessary  barriers  to  employment  when  the  barriers  operate  invidiously  to
discriminate  on the  basis  of racial  or other impermissible  classification.
Griggs, 401  U.S.  at 43o-31  (quoting opinion below,  420  F.2d 1225,  1239  n.6  (4th Cir.
1970))  (footnote omitted).
34  Professor Derrick Bell  has criticized  the classic  "affirmative action"  approach  in
the context of minority admissions  to advanced educational institutions.  Bell,  Bakke,
Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67  CALIF.  L. REv.  3
(1979).  He  notes  that the  general  solution  has  been  to use minority  racial  status as
a positive  factor in existing  admissions systems rather  than to  reformulate  admissions
standards - a solution that "has served to  validate  and reinforce  traditional policies
while  enveloping minority  applicants  in a cloud  of suspected incompetency":
Even  the  term  "affirmative  action,"  which  encompasses  minority  admissions
programs,  connotes the  undertaking of remedial activity beyond what normally
would  be required.  It sounds  in  noblesse oblige,  not legal  duty, and  suggests
the  giving of charity rather than the  granting  of relief.
Id.  at 8.
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determined  by judges  rather  than juries. 35  Of similar  impor-
tance  is  court  discretion  in  such  procedural  matters  as  class
action  certification,  preliminary  relief,  and  discovery.  Courts
hostile  to  the  merits  of  title  VII  claims  will  tend,  whether
intentionally or not, to decide key factual and procedural issues
in ways  that provide  immunity to  employers.
Judicial hostility to title VII's application on the upper level
is  apparent  in  a recent decision  holding  a law firm's  partner-
ship  selection  process  entirely  immune  from  legislative  prohi-
bitions  of  discrimination. 36  In  a  case  involving  King  and
Spalding,  an  Atlanta  law  firm  with  over  one  hundred  attor-
neys, the court found dispositive  the existing partners' interests
in privacy and freedom  of association:
In  a  very  real  sense  a  professional  partnership  is  like  a
marriage.  It  is,  in  fact,  nothing  less  than  a "business  mar-
riage" for better or worse.  Just as in marriage different brides
bring  different qualities  into  the union - some  beauty, some
money,  and  some  character  - so  also  in  professional  part-
nerships  new  mates  or partners  are  sought and  betrothed  for
different  reasons  and  to  serve  different  needs of  the partner-
ship.  . . . In both,  new mates  are  expected to bring not only
ability and  industry, but  also moral  character,  fidelity,  trust-
worthiness,  loyalty,  personality  and  love.  Unfortunately,
however,  in  partnerships,  as  in  matrimony,  these  needed,
worthy  and  desirable  qualities  are  not  necessarily  divided
evenly  among  the  applicants  according  to  race,  age,  sex  or
religion,  and in some they just are  not present at all.  To use
or apply Title VII to  coerce  a mismatched  or unwanted part-
nership too  closely  resembles a statute for the enforcement  of
shotgun  weddings.
37
A number  of courts have suggested  that title VII,  although
still applicable,  should be relaxed for upper level employers. 38
3s Title  VII has  been  interpreted  not  to  provide a  right to jury trial even  when
back  pay  claims  are  involved.  See,  e.g.,  Slack  v.  Havens,  522  F.2d  iogi  (9th  Cir.
1975);  EEOC v. Detroit Edison  Co.,  515  F.2d 301  (6th  Cir.  1975).  vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 431  U.S.  951  (1977).
36  Hishon  v. King & Spalding,  24  Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  1303  (N.D.  Ga.
ig8o).  Contra Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine  & Moore,  425 F. Supp. 123,  126 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("Congress clearly  included in  the objectives  of Title VII the elimination  of job
discrimination  in professional  fields  including law and  medicine.").
37  Hishon  v. King  & Spalding,  24  Fair Empl. Prac.  Cas.  (BNA) at 1304-o5.
38  See, e.g.,  Townsend  v.  Nassau County Medical  Center,  558  F.2d  117,  120  (2d
Cir.  5977)  (standards  for  validating  advanced  degree  requirements  for  professional
jobs should  be  relaxed),  cert.  denied, 434  U.S.  ioI5  (1978);  Vuyanich  v.  Republic
Nat'l Bank, 5o5  F. Supp.  224,  370-75  (N.D. Tex.  ig8o) (validation standards  should
be relaxed  for upper level bank jobs).
The  Townsend court relied  on  Spurlock  v.  United  Airlines,  Inc.,  475  F.2d  216,
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And some  courts  have  overtly  applied  a differential  standard.
In  cases  involving  academic  institutions,  a number  of  courts
have  adopted  a  "hands-off'  doctrine, 39  which the  Second  Cir-
cuit has  characterized  as  an  "anti-interventionist  policy  [that]
has  rendered  colleges  and  universities  virtually  immune  to
charges  of  employment  bias,  at  least  when  the  bias  is  not
expressed  overtly."' 40  The  hands-off  doctrine  has  been  criti-
cized  as  a  form  of judicial  abdication,  inconsistent  with  the
1972  amendments  to  title  VII  that  specifically  removed  the
exemption  for  academic  institutions. 41  But the  doctrine  per-
sists.
4 2  Courts  often  seem  outraged  at being  forced  to  apply
title  VII  to  academic  cases;  they  argue  implicitly  or explicitly
for  a more relaxed standard.  For example,  the Second  Circuit
recently  complained  bitterly  about  the  length  of  tenure  case
trials:  "We  do  not understand  how either the  federal  courts or
the  universities  can  operate  if  [adverse  tenure  decisions]  are
regularly taken to court and entail  burdens  such  as  those here
incurred."' 43  In  another  academic  case,  a  district  court  con-
cluded  that applying traditional  title VII  standards  would  be
practically  equivalent  to  taking  over  promotion  and  tenure
decisions.
44
219  (ioth  Cir.  1972),  an  oft-cited case  involving  airline  pilot selection,  in  which  the
ioth  Circuit proposed  a  sliding-scale  standard  under which  validation  requirements
would be  relaxed in relation  to the importance  of the job.
39 In  Faro v. New York Univ.,  502 F.2d  1229  (2d Cir.  1974), a sex discrimination
case,  the  court  stated:  "Of all the fields,  which  the  federal courts  should  hesitate  to
invade and  take over,  education  and  faculty  appointments  at a University  level  are
probably the least  suited for federal court  supervision."  Id.  at 1231-32.  The  opinion
scorned the plaintiffs claim: "Dr. Faro, in effect,  envisions herself as a modern Jeanne
d'Arc  fighting  for  the  rights  of embattled  womanhood  on  an  academic  battlefield,
facing a solid  phalanx of  men  and  male faculty  prejudice."  Id.  at  1231.  In  EEOC
v. Tufts Inst.  of Learning,  421  F.  Supp.  152  (D.  Mass.  1975),  the  court laid  out a
standard  completely  at  odds  with  lower  level  cases:  it  stated  that  plaintiffs  could
prevail  only  if they  showed  intentional  bias  or  "no  rational  basis"  for  a  selection
policy.  Id.  at I58.  Comparable deference  was afforded  academic employers in Peters
v. Middlebury  College,  409  F.  Supp.  857  (D.  Vt.  1976);  Labat  v.  Board of Higher
Educ.,  401  F.  Supp.  753  (S.D.N.Y.  1975);  Pace  College v.  Commission  on  Human
Rights, 38 N.Y.2d  28,  339  N.E.2d 880,  377  N.Y.S.2d  471  (975).
40  Powell  v. Syracuse  Univ.,  58o F.2d 1150,  1153 (2d  Cir.),  cert. denied, 439 U.S.
984  (978).
41  See,  e.g.,  Davis v.  Weidner,  596  F.2d  726,  731-32  (7th  Cir.  1979);  Powell  v.
Syracuse  Univ.,  58o  F.2d  1150,  1153  (2d  Cir.),  cert. denied, 439  U.S.  984  (978);
Sweeney v.  Board of Trustees,  569  F.2d  169,  176 (ist Cir.)  (noting "misgivings  over
one theme recurrent  in  these opinions:  the  notion  that courts should  keep  'hands off'
the salary,  promotion,  and hiring decisions of colleges  and universities"),  vacated and
remanded per curiam, 439  U.S.  24  (1978).
42  See generally Yurko, supra  note  6,  at 474,  482-83,  490-91,  495-99 (courts apply
far more deferential  standard to academic  institutions than the  law warrants).
43  Lieberman  v.  Gant,  63o F.2d 6o,  62  n.i  (2d  Cir.  i98o).
44 Johnson v.  University of Pittsburgh,  435  F. Supp.  1328,  1371  (W.D.  Pa. 1977).
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In  most  upper  level  cases,  traditional  title  VII  standards
are  purportedly  applied,  but  liability  is  generally  denied.  A
review  of large numbers  of these cases leaves  a strong impres-
sion that courts  simply look  at upper level cases with different
eyes.
Courts  in  lower  level cases  have  traditionally  been  willing
to assess  candidates'  qualifications  in order  to resolve  discrim-
ination  claims,  even  when  these  assessments  seemed  difficult.
In Grant v.  Bethlehem Steel Corp.,45 the  Second  Circuit ana-
lyzed  the  qualifications  of blacks  and  Puerto  Ricans  seeking
jobs  as  foremen  supervising  steel  construction  workers.  The
court decided  that the  minority  candidates were  qualified,  de-
spite the  employer's  claim  that its subjective  evaluations  were
essential  to  select  those capable  of adequate performance.
In upper  level  cases,  by contrast,  the  courts  often  profess
their  lack of expertise  and  refuse  to  assess  candidates'  quali-
fications. 46  The  courts  also  deny  litigants  the  discovery  that
would  make  such  assessments  possible.47  As  a  result,  it  is
virtually impossible to win  any discrimination  case brought on
an  individual basis,  because  proof in such cases  has tradition-
ally involved a showing that the  employer  has subjected  com-
parably  qualified  individuals  of  different  races  to  disparate
treatment.
Judicial  reluctance  to intervene  in upper level employment
decisionmaking  is  also  apparent  in  the  way  courts  deal  with
a  variety  of  key  procedural  issues.  In  considering  plaintiffs'
rights  to  relief,  courts  often  seem  to  weigh  the  equities  quite
differently  on  the  upper  than  on  the  lower level. 48  In  lower
45  635  F.2d  1007  (2d  Cir.  I98O),  cert. denied, ioi  S.  Ct.  3083  (1981).
46 See,  e.g., Johnson  v.  University  of Pittsburgh,  435  F. Supp.  1328,  I371  (W.D.
Pa.  1977);  Cussler  v.  University  of Md.,  43o  F.  Supp.  602,  605-o6  (D.  Md.  I977).
47 In academic  cases,  courts have refused  to  allow plaintiffs  access to  information
regarding  the  qualifications  of  other  candidates  that  might  be  essential  to  proving
liability.  See,  e.g.,  Lieberman  v.  Gant,  63o  F.2d 60  (2d  Cir.  198o);  Keyes  v. Lenoir
Rhyne  College,  552  F.2d  579,  58I  (4th  Cir.),  cert.  denied, 434  U.S.  904  (1977);
McKillop  v. Regents  of the  Univ.  of Cal.,  386  F.  Supp.  1270,  1278 n.13  (N.D. Cal.
1975).
In  a recent  case  concerning a failure  to  grant academic  reappointment,  the court
held that plaintiff had  no right  to discover  the votes  of two  of the named  defendants
on  the  reappointment  issue.  Gray  v.  Board  of  Higher  Educ.,  No.  79  Civ.  oo62
(S.D.N.Y.  Nov.  9,  I98i) (denying motion  under  FED.  R. CIV.  P.  37).  Contra In  re
Dinnan (Blaubergs v. Regents of Univ.  Sys.), 66i  F.2d 426  (5th Cir.  1981).  Discovery
of how negative  employment decisions are made is a normal  prerequisite to challenging
such  decisions.
48  See Note,  Employment Discrimination  Suits by  Professionals: Should the Re-
instatement Remedy Be Granted?, 39  U.  PiTT. L. REv.  103  (I977)  (comparing  court
reluctance  to  order reinstatement in professional  cases to court provision for  reinstate-
ment  as matter of course  in  lower level  cases).
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level  cases,  once liability is determined,  the victims  of discrim-
ination  have  had  a right  to  "make-whole  relief'  that has  in-
cluded  placement  in  the  job  positions  they  would  have  had
but  for  discrimination. 49  Nonetheless,  in  a  case  involving  a
discriminatory  discharge  of a senior advertising  executive,  the
district  court  found  liability  but  denied  reinstatement.  The
court  relied  on  arguments  that the  job at  issue  involved  per-
sonal  contact  with  clients  and  close  relationships  with  top
executives.
5 0
Further,  courts  have  been  restrictive  in  class  certification
decisions  on  the  upper  level,51 in sharp  contrast to the  liberal
approach  to  class  certification  in  lower  level  cases.  There
courts  have  recognized  that  class  treatment  is  often  essential
to the  vindication of substantive rights.52  As set forth in detail
in  Section  A  of Part IV,  class  action  treatment  is  even  more
important in  dealing with upper  level job discrimination.
Courts  occasionally  deny  class  action  treatment  in  upper
level cases on the ground that the proposed  class is too small.53
But the central  question posed  by the  numerosity  requirement
of the  federal  class  action  rule  is  the practicability of joinder
as  an  alternative  to class treatment.54  In  lower level  employ-
ment cases,  courts have recognized that joinder of even a small
number  of plaintiffs  may  be  impracticable  when  members  of
the class  might have reason  to fear coming forward to join an
49 The  principle  of make-whole  relief  was  affirmed  in  Albemarle  Paper  Co.  v.
Moody,  422  U.S.  405,  415-22  (i975).
SO  EEOC  v.  Kallir,  Philips,  Ross,  Inc.,  42o  F.  Supp.  919,  923-24,  926-27
(S.D.N.Y.  1976),  affd mem.,  559  F.2d  1203  (2d  Cir.),  cert. denied,  434  U.S.  920
('977).
51  See,  e.g., Scott v. University of Del.,  6oi  F.2d 76,  85-89  (3d Cir.),  cert. denied,
444  U.S.  931  (I979);  Tuft  v.  McDonnell  Douglas  Corp.,  581  F.2d  1304  (8th  Cir.
1978);  Peterson v.  Albert M.  Bender Co.,  75  F.R.D.  661 (N.D.  Cal.  1977);  Kinsey  v.
Legg, Mason  &  Co.,  6o F.R.D.  91  (D.D.C.  1973)  (denying class action  certification),
rev'd on other grounds sub.  nom.  Kinsey  v.  First Regional  Sec.  Co.,  557  F.2d 830,
839  (D.C. Cir.  1977).
52  See,  e.g.,  Bridgesmith,  Representing the Title VII  Class Action: A  Question of
Degree,  26  IWAYNE  L.  REV.  1413  (198o);  Rutherglen,  Title VII  Class Actions, 47  U.
CHi.  L.  REV.  688,  7o6-I3  (1980).
The Supreme  Court's  decision in  East Tex.  Motor  Freight Sys.  v.  Rodriguez,  431
U.S.  395  (1977),  has  caused some courts  to moderate  their  willingness to grant liberal
class action treatment.  But Rodriguez' significance  is unclear, and it seems to represent
at  most  a  rejection  of  an  extreme  presumption  in  favor  of  class  certification.  See
Bridgesmith,  supra, at 1431-32;  Rutherglen,  supra, at  723.
S3  See,  e.g.,  Tuft  v.  McDonnell  Douglas  Corp.,  58I  F.2d  1304,  1308  (8th  Cir.
1978);  Scott  v.  University  of  Del.,  6O  F.2d  76,  88-89  (3d Cir.),  cert.  denied, 444
U.S.  931  (I979);  Peterson  v.  Albert M.  Bender  Co.,  75  F.R.D.  661,  667  (N.D.  Cal.
1977);  Kinsey v.  Legg,  Mason  &  Co.,  6o  F.R.D.  91,  1oo (D.D.C.  1973),  reversed on
other grounds sub nom.  Kinsey  v.  First  Regional  Sec.  Co.,  557  F.2d 830  (D.C.  Cir.
1977).
54 See  FED.  R.  CIV.  P.  23(a)(I).
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action.55  A comparable standard would justify class treatment
in many  upper  level  cases.  Job  candidates  at  the managerial
and professional level are under strong pressures to avoid being
labeled  troublemakers.  An  individual  decision  to  engage  ac-
tively in  litigation  will  usually  be  highly risky,  given the  low
probability of prevailing  and  the  danger  of alienating  present
and potential future  employers.  Joinder cannot,  therefore,  be
assumed  "practicable"  solely  because  the  number  of potential
class  members  is small.
Courts  denying  class  certification  have  also  relied  on  the
subjective  nature of challenged  upper level  employment prac-
tices.  They  have  accepted  the  arguments  of defendants  that,
because  each  employment  decision  is made  on  the basis  of an
individual  assessment,  each  decision  is  different  and  class
treatment  is  therefore  inappropriate.5 6  Such  decisions  are  in-
consistent  with judical treatment  of class  action  challenges  to
lower  level  subjective  systems.  The  courts  have  as  a matter
of course  analyzed the legality of such systems  as systems  and
have granted class action certification  as a means to that end.57
B. Judicial  Distortion of Key Title VII  Doctrines in Upper
Level Cases
Courts in upper level cases have systematically  distorted  or
failed  to  apply  two  doctrines  that  have  been  central  in  title
VII  enforcement.  The  "disparate  treatment"  doctrine  holds
that differential  treatment  of comparably  qualified  persons  of
different  races justifies  an  inference  of intentional  discrimina-
tion,  unless  the  employer  produces  an  acceptable  explanation.
If  the  employer  produces  such  an  explanation,  plaintiffs  can
prevail  only if they  demonstrate  that  the  employer's  explana-
tion  is a pretext  shielding a discriminatory  motive.  The "dis-
parate impact" doctrine avoids issues of discriminatory  motive;
it holds  that  the  use  of employment  tests  and  other  selection
devices that have an adverse racial impact constitutes  unlawful
discrimination,  regardless  of the  employer's  good faith,  unless
the employer can demonstrate  the job-relatedness  and business
necessity  of such devices.
55  See,  e.g.,  Brown  v. ARA  Servs.,  i3  Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  1721,  1726
(D.  Md.  1974).
56  See,  e.g.,  O'Connell  v.  Teachers  College,  63  F.R.D.  638  (S.D.N.Y.  1974).
Contra Presseisen  v.  Swarthmore  College,  71  F.R.D.  34,  44  n.ni  (E.D.  Pa.  1976)
(O'Connell "analysis  improperly  focuses  on  the  defendant's  defense  rather  than class
claims"  (emphasis  in original)),  aff'd men.,  582  F.2d  1275  (3d Cir.  1978).
57  See,  e.g., Johnson  v. Georgia  Highway Express,  Inc.,  417  F.2d 1122,  1124  (5th
Cir.  1969);  Bowe v.  Colgate-Palmolive Co.,  416  F.2d 7i1,  719-21  (7th Cir.  1969).
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The  two  doctrines  are  closely  related.  When  an  employ-
ment  system  is  challenged,  each  doctrine  ordinarily  involves
an  initial showing by plaintiffs that the system has an adverse
racial  effect.  And  the  same  showing  of  adverse  effect  that
constitutes  a  prima  facie  disparate  treatment  case  may  also
trigger  the  Griggs disparate  impact test.58
i.  Experience  and Educational Qualifications. - How
courts  view  the  use  of  experience  and  educational  qualifica-
tions  is  critical  to  the  significance  of  title  VII  at  the  upper
level.  As noted  above,  such  qualifications  play a large  role  in
upper level  employment  selection  both  as  minimum  eligibility
requirements  and  as  factors  considered  in  overall  subjective
assessments.
(a) Limited Burden Imposed on Employers to Show  Valid-
ity of Qualifications.  - Lower  level employers  are  subject to
a heavy  burden  of justification  for  all  objective  criteria  that
have  a disparate impact,  including educational  and experience
qualifications.  Courts  require  direct  evidence  of job-related-
ness and reject  defenses  based  on  prevailing industry  practice
and uncritical  commonsense.  Thus,  lower  courts have  struck
down minimum height and weight requirements for police and
fire officers,5 9 a rule requiring the  discharge  of employees sub-
58  International  Bhd.  of  Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431  U.S.  324,  335  n.15,
339-40  (i977).  The  plaintiff's  evidence  in  a disparate  treatment  case  will  ordinarily
include  more  than  the  "effect"  evidence  indicated  in  the  text.  In  order  to  prove
discriminatory  intent on  a systemwide  basis,  plaintiffs  will  include,  where  possible,
evidence  of individual  instances  of discriminatory  conduct.  Moreover,  to justify  an
inference of discriminatory motive, courts may require  evidence of more extreme racial
impact  in  a disparate  treatment  case  than  would  be  required  to  trigger  the  Griggs
burden of justification.
Courts and litigators have often failed to understand the close  relationship between
these  two doctrines.  For a  fuller discussion  of this  problem,  see  infra pp.  oo4-06.
This confusion  may stem  from  the fact that the two  doctrines  developed  separately,
although  simultaneously,  to  deal  with  different  kinds  of  problems.  The  disparate
treatment  doctrine  has  generally  been  used  in  cases  of  discrimination  against  an
individual  rather  than  a  class.  The  Griggs doctrine,  by  contrast,  has  been  used
primarily  in class  action  challenges  to  employment  policies.  The  evidence  used  to
make out a prima facie  case in  an individual action  brought on  a disparate  treatment
theory would  usually not be  sufficient  to make  out a prima facie  Griggs impact  case.
Refusal  to  analyze  a  case  in  terms  of  disparate  impact  theory  can,  of  course,
operate  as a  means  of dismissing  claims  if  a court  does  not want  to  face  up  to  the
question  whether  the  employment  practices  at  issue  can  be  justified  as job-related.
In Scott  v.  University  of Del.,  6oi  F.2d  76  (3d  Cir.),  cert.  denied, 444  U.S.  931
(i979),  the Third Circuit analyzed the  plaintiffs'  claim that the  university's promotion
system discriminated  against blacks solely in terms of disparate treatment  theory  and
dismissed the suit, id. at 79,  even though  the district court decision  had discussed  the
plaintiffs'  disparate  impact claims  as well.  455  F.  Supp.  1102,  1105  (D. Del.  1978).
59 Davis v.  County of Los Angeles,  566  F.2d  1334,  1342  (9th Cir.  1977),  vacated
as moot, 440  U.S.  625  (I979);  League of United Latin  Am.  Citizens v.  City  of Santa
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ject to repeated wage garnishments, 60  a requirement  of related
work  experience, 61  and  high  school  diploma  requirements.
62
Courts  have  also  demanded  a  showing  of business  necessity,
i.e.,  a  showing  that  the  criterion  at  issue  is  not  only  job-
related,  but also  essential to safety  and efficiency. 63
The  Supreme  Court  has been  equally  exacting.  In  Griggs
the  Court  struck  down  a high  school  degree  requirement.  In
Dothard v.  Rawlinson,64  the  Court  struck  down  minimum
height  and  weight  requirements  for  prison  guards,  noting the
lack of evidence  correlating  the requirements with the physical
strength  necessary for adequate  performance.
A leading Fifth Circuit case,  Watkins v.  Scott Paper Co.,65
illustrates  how strictly the  Griggs standard has been  applied to
high  school  diploma  and  equivalency  requirements  for  lower
level jobs,  even  those involving  significant  skill  and  responsi-
bility.  The  employer's  high  school  diploma  requirement  ap-
plied  to  jobs  in  two  categories.  The  first  were  "Chemical
Recovery" jobs monitoring complex control mechanisms  to pre-
vent "explosive  situations" from developing in the boilers.  The
court  found  that  "[fjailure  of  the  workers  to  do  their  job
properly  would  put all  of the  employees  in the entire  plant in
extreme  danger." 66  The second were "Technical  Control" jobs
preparing chemicals  for the entire laboratory's  operations.  The
lower  court  found  the  high  school  diploma requirement  justi-
Ana,  41o F.  Supp.  873,  896  (C.D.  Cal.  i976);  Officers  for  Justice  v.  Civil  Serv.
Comm'n,  395 F. Supp.  378,  38o-8i  (N.D. Cal.  1975). Such criteria have been struck
down  because  of their disparate  impact on  women,  Latinos,  and  Asians.
60  Johnson  v.  Pike Corp.  of Am.,  332  F. Supp.  490  (C.D.  Cal.  197I).
61 See infra p.  967.
62  See,  e.g.,  James  v.  Stockham  Valves  &  Fittings  Co.,  559 F.2d  310,  355  (5th
Cir.  1977),  rev'g  394 F.  Supp.  434 (N.D.  Ala.  1975), cert. denied, 434  U.S.  1034
(1978);  Dozier  v.  Chupka,  395 F.  Supp.  836,  85o (S.D.  Ohio  1975).  See generally
Hunt  & Pazuniak,  supra note  6,  at  '34-35  (discussing courts'  tendency  to  invalidate
the  high  school diploma requirement).
The only kind of cases  in which high school  degree  requirements tend  to be upheld
are those  involving police department selection  criteria.  See, e.g.,  Castro v. Beecher,
459  F.2d  725,  735  (Ist  Cir.  1972);  League  of  United Latin  Am.  Citizens  v.  City  of
Santa  Ana,  40o F.  Supp.  873,  901-02  (C.D.  Cal.  0976)  (upheld  for  police,  struck
down  for  fire  department);  Arnold  v.  Ballard,  39o F.  Supp.  723,  728  (N.D.  Ohio
,975).
63 See,  e.g.,  James  v.  Stockham  Valves  & Fittings  Co.,  559  F.2d 310,  344,  355
(sth  Cir.  1977),  cert.  denied,  434  U.S.  1034  (1978);  League  of United  Latin  Am.
Citizens  v.  City of Santa Ana,  41o F.  Supp.  873,  898  (C.D.  Cal.  1976);  Comment,
supra note  24,  at 918-20  (strict business  necessity test generally  applied  to  nonscored
objective criteria).
64 433  U.S.  321  (1977).
65  53o F.2d  II59, 1079  (5th Cir.),  cert. denied, 429  U.S. 861  (0976).
66 Id.  at  0179  (quoting opinion  below,  6  Fair  Empl.  Prac.  Cas. (BNA)  511,  523
(S.D. Ala.  1973)).
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fled by business necessity for jobs in both categories.  It noted
that  many  of  the  jobs  were  extremely  dangerous,  that  poor
performance  could cause  great economic loss,  and that studies
by  a  special  industry  task  force  had  recommended  a  high
school  diploma  requirement. 67  The  Fifth  Circuit,  however,
held  the  requirement  not justified by  business  necessity.  The
court reasoned that the employer  could instead provide on-the-
job training  and  use  tests  designed  specifically  to  aid  in  pro-
motion  decisions.
68
Courts have  been similarly  strict in analyzing  requirements
of relevant experience.  In Crockett v.  Green,69 the court struck
down  a requirement  of related job  experience  for skilled  craft
workers.  Even  assuming the  validity  of the  requirement,  the
court  held, it could not be justified  as a business  necessity,  for
the  employer  could  always  provide  workers  with  on-the-job
training. 70
In upper  level job cases  involving educational  and experi-
ence  qualifications  with  a disparate impact,  courts have taken
a  very  different  approach. 71  Such  qualifications  have  been
generally  upheld  on the  basis of defenses  rejected  out of hand
in lower level cases.  Courts have been  persuaded by evidence
of apparent  rationality  and  good  faith,  such  as  evidence  that
a challenged  credential  is  commonly  used  by comparable  em-
67  6 Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas. (BNA) at 523.
6s  530  F.2d  at 1179-82.
69  388 F.  Supp.  912  (E.D.  Wis.  1975),  affd, 534  F.2d  715  (7th  Cir.  1976).
70 Id. at 919-21;  see also United States v.  San Diego  County,  21  Fair Empl.  Prac.
Cas.  (BNA) 402  (S.D.  Cal.  1979)  (enjoining  application  to  women  candidates  of  a
four-year in-service experience  prerequisite for promotion  to police sergeant,  on ground
that defendants  had not demonstrated the  requirement's job-relatedness).
Until  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  International  Bhd.  of Teamsters  v. United
States,  431  U.S.  324  (1977),  the  federal  courts  had  generally  struck  down  use  of
seniority systems  on Griggs-type grounds,  ruling that such systems had  an unjustified
impact  on  blacks,  who  tended to  be  at the  bottom  of seniority ladders  by virtue  of
previous  discrimination.  See id. at 378-79  & nn.2-3 (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting).  The
courts refused  to find such systems justified by business necessity even when employers
claimed  that an  orderly  progression  up  the  seniority  ladder  was essential  to  gain  the
experience  necessary for effective  performance.  Instead,  employers were  allowed only
the limited  opportunity  to prove that experience of a particular kind was essential for
particular  jobs.  While  in  Teamsters the  Court  immunized  seniority  systems  from
wholesale attack,  it did so  solely on the  basis  of the  language  and legislative  history
of  § 7o3(h)  of title  VII,  42  U.S.C.  § 2oooe-2(h)  (1976),  which  specifically  refers  to
seniority systems.  431  U.S. at 348 & n.30,  349-50,  352-54.  The Court did not argue
that seniority systems  could  be justified  on  the  basis of  business  necessity,  nor  did  it
otherwise  undermine  the cases  holding  that  the  use of  experience  as  a qualification
- other  than as  part of a seniority  system - was subject to the  Griggs doctrine.
71 See generally B.  SCHLEI  & P.  GROSSMAN,  supra note  12,  at 40-41 (Supp.  1979)
(objective  nonscored  criteria  tend  to  be  struck  down  in  lower  level  and  upheld  in
upper level job  cases).
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ployers. 72  Courts  seem  to  be  applying  a "legitimate  business
purposes"  test  - the  test  rejected  in  Griggs in  favor  of the
business  necessity test.
A Second  Circuit  case,  Townsend v.  Nassau County Med-
ical Center, illustrates the extent to which courts have reversed
the Griggs presumption. 73  The plaintiff,  a black technician  in
a blood bank, had been  fired after many years'  service because
she  had failed  a newly  imposed  exam  requirement  and lacked
the  bachelor  of science  degree  required  to  take it  again.  She
had  then  been  rehired  to  perform  exactly  the  same  job  in  a
lower  civil  service  classification  at  less  pay.  District  Judge
Weinstein  had ruled  that the  degree requirement  violated title
VII because it had a disparate impact on blacks,  the defendant
had  not established  that it  was  job related,  and  the  plaintiff
had  demonstrated  her  actual  qualification  through  on-the-job
performance. 74  On  appeal  the  Second  Circuit  rejected  plain-
tiffs disparate impact claim, arguing that Judge Weinstein had
erred  in  relying  on  general  population  statistics  to  assess  the
impact  of a degree requirement on  blacks. 7  The  Second Cir-
72 Several  cases  demonstrate  the  courts'  application  of  this  significantly  softer
standard  to upper  level  educational  prerequisites.  In  Campbell  v.  Ramsay,  484  F.
Supp.  i9o  (E.D.  Ark.),  affd per curian, 631  F.2d  597  (8th  Cir.  ig8o),  the  court
upheld a university's  failure  to  renew  a female  plaintiff's  teaching  appointment in  a
mathematics  department;  the university  had  based its decision  on the  plaintiff's  lack
of a Ph.D.  The  court conceded that the plaintiff "was an excellent  teacher" and that
"a Ph.D.  could  not  have  taught  her  courses  any  better  than  she  did."  Id.  at  '95.
But  the  court  was  persuaded  by  arguments  that  the  Ph.D  requirement  served  the
university's goal  of  increasing  its  prestige  and  its  drawing power.  In  Scott  v.  Uni-
versity of Del.,  455  F. Supp.  1102  (D. Del.  1978),  aff  d in relevant part, 6oi  F.2d 76
(3d Cir.),  cert. denied, 444 U.S.  931  (x979),  the court upheld a Ph.D. requirement for
promotion  in a sociology department  despite  "surprisingly  sparse"  evidence  of justi-
fication.  Id.  at  1124.  In  Keyes v.  Lenoir Rhyne College,  i5  Fair Empl. Prac.  Cas.
(BNA) 914  (W.D.N.C.  1976),  affd, 552  F.2d  579  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.
904  (i977),  the  court  upheld  a  doctorate  requirement  on  the  ground  that a  Ph.D.
degree "presumably is evidence of certain skills and knowledge from which  one might
predict job  performance  and  is an  educational  credential  which is  almost  universally
required for higher ranks in most colleges."  Id.  at 923.  In Wade v. Mississippi Coop.
Extension  Serv.,  372  F. Supp.  T26 (N.D. Miss.  I974),  affd in relevant part, 528  F.2d
508  (Sth  Cir.  1976),  the  court  upheld  the  use  of  master's  and  doctor's  degrees  as
factors  in  filling  various  professional  positions  in  the  state's  educational  extension
services  agency  for agriculture  and  home  economics;  the  court  relied  in  part  on the
national  trend to demand advanced  degrees  for extension programs.  Id.  at 134.
For an  upper level case upholding  experience  on the  ground that it was "useful,"
see EEOC v. New  York Broadcasting  Serv.,  542  F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976)  (employer's
use of experience  as  a basis for pay  differentials upheld despite  evidence  that women
had been  deprived of such experience  by  discrimination).
73 Townsend  v.  Nassau County Medical  Center, 558 F.2d  117,  120 (2d Cir.  1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S.  roI5  (1978).
74 See  id. at  rig (citing unpublished  district court opinion).
75  Id.  at 120.
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cuit's  view  is  at odds  with  traditional  title  VII  impact  analy-
sis. 76  The  court's apparent  concern  was  with the  radical con-
sequences of forcing employers to defend advanced educational
degree requirements:
If we were  to hold  that a bare census  statistic concerning
the  number  of  blacks  in  the  general population who  have
college  degrees  could  establish  a prima facie case of  discrim-
ination,  every  employer  with  a  college  degree  requirement
would  have  the  burden  of justifying  the  degree  requirement
as  job-related  . . . The  requirement  of  a  college  degree,
particularly in the sciences,  seems to be in the modern day of
advanced  scientific  method,  a  neutral  requirement  for  the
protection of the public ....  There will be  time, if a showing
of  racial  impact  is  made,  for the  comparison  of the  require-
ment  of  a  degree  in  medicine,  law,  engineering  or  other
professions  with  such  a  requirement  for  a  laboratory  tech-
nologist . . .77
The  contrast  to  Griggs and  its  progeny  could  hardly  be
more  stark.  There  the courts  found  newly  imposed  qualifica-
tions  suspect;  they  accepted  as  evidence  that  such  qualifica-
tions  were  not  essential  the  fact that  employees  hired  earlier
did  not  possess  them  and  yet  managed  nonetheless  to  do  a
satisfactory  job. 78  But in  Townsend  the  court  upheld  an  ed-
ucational  qualification  as  applied  to  an  individual  the  court
conceded  to  be  qualified.  In  Griggs the  Supreme  Court  had
condemned  the diploma  requirement in  language  suggesting  a
general  skepticism  about the  need  for traditional  educational
credentials:  "History is filled with examples  of men and women
who  rendered  highly  effective  performance  without  the  con-
ventional  badges  of  accomplishment  in  terms  of certificates,
diplomas,  or degrees."'7 9  In Townsend the  Second  Circuit dis-
torted  impact analysis,  expressing  a deep  concern that the use
76  When an employer sets an absolute prerequisite  to employment, such as a degree
requirement, general  population statistics indicating  the relative number of blacks and
whites  with  such  degrees  are  ordinarily  the  appropriate  statistics  for  assessing  the
discriminatory  impact  of the employer's  policy.  Statistics  relating only  to applicants
for  the  employment at issue - which the Second Circuit in Townsend implied would
have  been  more appropriate  - are  likely to  be  irrelevant,  for a person  who  does  not
possess a degree that is a prerequisite to employment is not likely to apply.  In Griggs,
401  U.S.  at 43o n.6,  and Dothard, 433  U.S.  at 329-31,  the  Supreme  Court relied  on
general  population  statistics in dealing  with  absolute prerequisites  to  employment;  in
Dothard the Court discussed the reason why  such statistics were appropriate  in these
kinds  of cases.  Id.  at 330.
77  Townsend, 558 F.2d at  120  (citations omitted) (emphasis  in original).
78  Griggs, 401  U.S.  at 430  n.6.
79  Id. at 433.
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of educational  degrees  as  prerequisites  to  various  professional
endeavors  be  protected from  legal scrutiny.
(b)  Qualifications Assumed  Valid in  Analyzing Racial Im-
pact. - Identification  of the  appropriate  candidate  pool  and
its racial makeup  is usually  the starting point for  impact anal-
ysis.  The  Griggs test  is  triggered  when  a  selection  device
selects  minorities  in a proportion smaller  than that in the pool
of qualified  candidates.
In  lower  level  cases,  courts  have  accepted  rough  approxi-
mations  of the  qualified  pool.  In the  case of entry level jobs,
for  example,  courts often  look to the racial  composition  of the
general  population  in order  to assess  the racial  impact of em-
ployers'  selection  procedures.  Courts  have  assumed  that per-
sons  in  the  general  population  are  qualified  or  could  easily
become  qualified.  Similarly,  courts  have  used  the  general
work  force  as  an  appropriate  pool  in  order  to  determine  the
racial  impact  of procedures  for  selecting  supervisors.  When
employers  have  argued that special  qualifications  are  required
for a particular job and that the appropriate  pool was therefore
smaller  and  contained  a  significantly  higher  proportion  of
whites,  courts  have  required  employers  to  demonstrate  the
business  necessity  of  such  qualifications.  These  courts  were
presented  with  no  evidence  that  all  persons  in  a given  pool
were  qualified  for the  skilled  and  responsible  jobs such  cases
often  involved.  Rather,  in  order  to  analyze  the  racial  impact
of the employer's  policies,  pools were identified  on the basis  of
generous  assumptions  about the  number  of people  with  con-
ceded  minimal  qualifications  for  the  job.  For  example,  in
Grant v.  Bethlehem Steel  Corp.,80  the  employer  argued  that
plaintiffs  could  not establish  disparate  impact on  the  basis  of
general  work  force  statistics,  because  experience  as  an  iron-
worker or as a foreman  was clearly a relevant qualification  for
work  as  a foreman  responsible  for  the  lives  of high-construc-
tion steelworkers.  The  Second Circuit held that the defendant
had  to  demonstrate  the  business  necessity  of such  qualifica-
tions; a  Griggs challenge  could not be thwarted by limiting the
qualified  pool  based  on  casual  assumptions  that  particular
qualifications held disproportionately  by whites  were necessary
for adequate job performance. 8 '
80  635  F.2d  1007  (2d  Cir.  I98O),  cert. denied, ro  S.  Ct. 3083  (i98i),  discussed at
Supra pp.  953-54.
81  Id.  at  ioI9.  Similarly  in  Swint  v.  Pullman-Standard,  539  F.2d  77  (5th  Cir.
1976),  cert. granted, 451  U.S.  906  (i98i)  (No.  8o-ix9o),  the  court  stuck  down  a
promotional system for jobs involving the supervision of welding and steel construction
work.  The  court  below  had found  general work  force  statistics of limited  relevance,
because  more  blacks  than  whites  were functionally  illiterate and  because  black  em-
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By  contrast,  in upper  level  cases  courts  often  simply take
for  granted  the  business  necessity  of  education  or  experience
requirements  that shrink  and  "whiten"  the  pool.8 2  By  doing
so,  courts  deny  plaintiffs  the  chance  to  challenge  those  quali-
fications,  and  free  employers  of  the  burden  of  defending
them.
8 3
ployees  had  fewer  relevant  skills  and  less  experience  than  whites.  See  id.  at  IO4.
Rejecting  this  analysis,  the  Fifth Circuit  held  that both  educational  and  experience
qualifications  would  have  to  be  justified  by  the  employer  on  business  necessity
grounds.  Id.  For similar  treatment of these issues,  see,  e.g.,  Watkins v.  Scott Paper
Co.,  53o  F.2d  i159,  1192-94  (5th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 429  U.S.  861  (1976);  Rowe  v.
General Motors  Corp.,  457  F.2d 348,  358  (5th Cir.  1972).
82  In  EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,  445  F.  Supp.  223 (D.  Del.  1978),
the  court  found  no  disparate  impact  in  analyzing  defendants'  "above  career  level"
promotional  pattern.  The  court  assumed  the  relevance  of years  of  experience  as  a
qualification.  In  Agarwal  v.  Arthur  G.  McKee  & Co.,  i6  Empl.  Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)
, 83oi  (N.D.  Cal.  1977),  aff'd,  644  F.2d  803  (9th  Cir.  198I),  the  court  rejected  a
racial  challenge  to the  selection and  promotion  system  on the  ground that no impact
was  shown.  It  implicitly  rejected  use  of  the  general  employer  work  force  as  the
relevant  pool,  although  the  employer had no  minimum educational  prerequisites  and
had  a  policy  of filling  higher  level  positions  from  within  by  promotion  or  transfer.
Id. at 5578-79; see also Wheeler v. Armco  Steel Corp.,  471 F.  Supp.  1050  (S.D. Tex.
1979)  (accepting,  without  discussion,  women's  lack  of  relevant  prior  experience  in
previously  male-dominated  world  of oil-drilling  equipment  distribution  as  adequate
explanation  for lack of women  in top  management).
For  an  upper level job  case  taking  a different  approach,  see  Greenspan  v.  Auto-
mobile  Club,  22  Empl. Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)  30,812  (E.D. Mich.  198o),  a sex discrim-
ination  case  involving professional,  technical,  and  sales positions.  For  discussions  of
these  general  issues,  see  Copus,  The  Numbers Game Is The Only Game In Town,  20
How.  L.J.  374,  382-90  (I977);  Shoben,  Probing the Discriminatory Effects  of Em-
ployee Selection Procedures  with Disparate  Impact Analysis Under Title VII,  56 TEX.
L.  REV.  i,  13-19  (i977).
83  See generally Copus,  supra note  82,  at 390-92  (a prima  facie  showing  of dis-
crimination  is made when a substantial disparity exists between the racial  composition
of the employer's  work  force  and that of the  general population);  Shoben,  supra note
82,  at x5-16 (courts should resolve  doubts in favor of a general  population comparison
rather  than  a  relevant  labor  market approach,  lest the  relevant labor  market  be too
narrowly  defined).
An analogous  problem arises  when courts dismiss  disparate treatment cases  on the
ground  that plaintiffs have  failed  to  acccount  for  every possible  factor,  subjective  or
objective,  that  might conceivably  explain  the  differential  treatment.  In  Agarwal, 16
Empl. Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)  8301  (N.D. Cal.  1977),  aff'd, 644 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1981),
minority  plaintiffs  challenged  employer  practices  preventing  them  from reaching  top
salary  levels,  and  introduced  a  multiple  regression  study  controlling  for  numerous
factors  including  years  of  education,  years  since  receipt  of  highest  degree,  age  of
employee,  type  of professional  registration  held by employee,  and years  of experience.
The court found plaintiffs'  regression  study inadequate because:  (x) the study excluded
information  that "could  have  had  some bearing  upon  salary";  (2) the  study  did not
control  for type  or quality of prior  experience and education;  and (3) "plaintiff  did not
attempt  to  determine  whether  particular  individuals  had  special  abilities  or charac-
teristics which might  have had a bearing  upon salary level."  Id. at 5574.  A  similar
case  is  Presseisen  v.  Swarthmore  College,  442  F.  Supp.  593,  66 (E.D.  Pa.  1977),
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A similar  problem  arises  when  the  courts  define  the  qual-
ified  pool by looking to  the current work force in the  relevant
industry or to other figures that may simply reflect the kind  of
discrimination  being  challenged.  For  example,  to  determine
whether  the  racial  composition  of a  particular  bank's  work
force  indicates  that the  bank's  selection  practices  have  a  dis-
parate  impact,  a court might  take the  relevant pool  to  be the
work force in the banking industry as a whole.84  The problem
is  that,  if  plaintiffs  are  challenging  selection  procedures  that
affd mem.,  582  F.2d  1275  (3d Cir.  1978).  Agarwal and Presseisen  are  discussed and
criticized  in  Finkelstein,  The  Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in
Race and Sex  Discrimination  Cases, 80  CoLUm.  L.  REV.  737,  741-45  (198o).
Requiring  plaintiffs  in  disparate  treatment  cases  to  account  for  every factor  that
might explain  differential  racial  treatment  places  an impossible  burden  on plaintiffs,
who are much  worse equipped than employers to know  how qualifications are actually
assessed.  The requirement is also inconsistent  with the logic of the disparate treatment
doctrine.  At the  initial stage of disparate treatment cases,  plaintiffs have traditionally
not  been required  to prove  that qualifications  are in fact comparable,  but simply that
they appear sufficiently comparable  to  warrant an  explanation  from the  employer for
the  disparate  treatment.  The  purpose  of  the  doctrine  is  to  force  the  employer,  and
not the  plaintiff, to produce  that explanation.  For example,  in James  v.  Stockham
Valves  &  Fittings  Co.,  559  F.2d 310  (5th  Cir.  1977),  rev'g 394  F.  Supp.  434  (N.D.
Ala.  1975),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.  1034  (1978),  a simple  showing  that  blacks  were
assigned  to  the  worst  jobs,  that  they  received  less  pay  even  after  accounting  for
seniority,  and that there were  virtually no objective  standards at work  was sufficient
to make  out a  prima facie  case.  Id.  at 328-31;  see Davis v.  Califano,  613 F.2d 957,
964  (D.C. Cir.  1979)  (adopting similar analysis  in an  upper level  case).  See generally
D.  BALDUS  &  J.  COLE,  STATISTICAL  PROOF  OF  DISCRIMINATION  § 6.222[13],  at
191-94  (ig8o)  (if  relevance  of a  qualification  in  defendant's  selection  process  cannot
be  decided  on  threshold  inquiry, plaintiff should not  be  required to  account for it  in
her  prima facie  case).
84  In  Presseisen  v.  Swarthmore  College,  442  F.  Supp.  593  (E.D. Pa.  1977),  aff'd
mem.,  582  F.2d  1275  (3d Cir.  1978),  a sex  discrimination  case,  the  court  determined
the  relevant  labor  pool,  in  part,  by  looking  to  the  faculties  of  other  educational
institutions  in  the United  States.  Id.  at 621;  see also Agarwal  v.  Arthur  G.  McKee
&  Co.,  i6  Empl. Prac.  Dec. (CCH)  8301,  at 5576-77 (N.D. Cal.  1977) (using general
national  and industrial labor market figures for  positions comparable  to those at issue
in the case),  aff'd, 644  F.2d 803 (9th  Cir.  ig8I); Croker  v.  Boeing Co.,  437  F.  Supp.
1138,  1184 (E.D. Pa.  1977) (in assessing  selection  procedures  for managerial employ-
ees,  court looked  to  census  figures  showing  the  percentage  of  blacks  employed  in
related  occupational categories).
In  Vuyanich  v.  Republic  Nat'l  Bank,  5o5  F.  Supp.  224  (N.D.  Tex.  I98O),  the
court  accepted  the  defendant's  argument  that,  because  the  bank's  upper  level  em-
ployees  tended to  have certain  degrees,  the  court should  look  to relevant  work  force
statistics  indicating the ethnic makeup  of the group  possessing  such  degrees  in  order
to  assess  the  legality of the  bank's selection  procedures.  Because  plaintiffs'  challenge
was directed in part to the legality of the criteria used by the bank in making selection
decisions,  including bank reliance on just such degrees,  the court's approach effectively
denied  plaintiffs' right to present their discrimination  claim.
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are  common  in  an  industry,  it makes  no  sense  to take  as  the
candidate pool a group that has already been screened by such
procedures.
Appropriate  pools  for  impact  analysis  will  often  be  more
limited for upper level jobs, for there will often be little dispute
that the jobs at issue require some educational  and other qual-
ifications  beyond  those  possessed  by  the  general  population.
There are  conceded  minimum qualifications  for  many of these
jobs,  and these qualifications  must be used to define  the qual-
ified pool.  But the  courts' approach  in many upper level  cases
is  so  strict that it prevents the  possibility of challenge  to pol-
icies going  beyond  conceded  minimum  qualifications.85
2. Subjective Selection Systems. - The significance of title
VII  on  the  upper  level  depends  largely  on  how carefully  the
courts  scrutinize  subjective evaluation  processes.8 6  Subjective
assessments  play  a role  in most upper level employment  deci-
sions regarding  hiring,  promotion,  job  placement,  and  salary.
Tests and  objective  criteria  such  as  education and  experience
requirements  are  ordinarily used  on  the  upper level  primarily
as  minimum  qualifications  for  certain  positions.  Once  mini-
mum  qualifications  are  met,  they  and other  objective  criteria
are  usually  considered  only  as  part  of  an  overall  subjective
assessment,  which  is typically based on  a variety of subjective
procedures:  an  interview,  an  evaluation  of biographical  infor-
mation,  an  evaluation  of performance  in previous  educational
or work  settings.
8 7
At  the  lower  level,  subjective  processes  that  have  an  ad-
85 Some  confusion  may  result from  a misreading  of the  Supreme  Court's decision
in  Hazelwood  School  Dist.  v.  United States,  433  U.S.  299  ('977).  There the  Court
distinguished  between  cases  in  which  general  population  statistics  would be relevant
because the  skill was one that many  "possess or  can fairly readily acquire"  and those
in  which  "special  qualifications  are  required";  in  the latter,  general  population com-
parisons "may"  have little  probative value.  Id.  at 308  n.13.  However,  there was no
dispute in Hazelwood about whether teachers constituted the relevant pool.  Moreover,
the Hazelwood Court reaffirmed  the principle  that the qualified pool should be  defined
to include  those  capable  of becoming  qualified  with relative  ease.  Id.
86 Authorities  dealing  with  the  use of subjective  processes  in upper  level  employ-
ment include Hunt  & Pazuniak,  supra note 6; Newman,  Remedies for Discrimination
in Supervisorial  and Managerial  Jobs, 13 HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L.  REV.  633 (1978);  Stacy,
Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title  VII,  io  GA.  L.  REv.  737
(1976);  Comment, supra note 6.
s7  The assessment center techniques that have become  increasingly popular devices
for selecting  managerial  level employees  are  essentially sophisticated  subjective  selec-
tion  processes.  Assessment  centers  attempt  to  measure  an  individual's  managerial
ability  through  the use of such  devices as business games,  group discussion  problems,
in-basket  tests,  motivational  and  personality  tests, and  interviews.  See D.  BRAY,  R.
CAMPBELL  & D.  GRANT,  FORMATIVE  YEARS  IN  BUSINESS:  A  LONG-TERM  AT&T
STUDY  OF  MANAGERIAL  LIVES  (1974).
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verse  racial  impact have  almost  uniformly  been  condemned.
The  courts have  generally  relied at least in part on  the theory
that subjective  processes  lend themselves  to the  expression  of
conscious  or unconscious  bias.  The  oft-cited  Fifth  Circuit de-
cision  in Rowe  v.  General Motors Corp. 88  states:
[P]rocedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective
evaluation  and  favorable  recommendation  of  the  immediate
foreman  are  a  ready  mechanism  for  discrimination  against
Blacks....  We and  others have expressed a skepticism  that
Black  persons  dependent  directly  on  decisive  recommenda-
tions from Whites  can  expect nondiscriminatory  action. 89
Following Rowe's lead,  courts  have  often found  suspect such
features  as the absence  or ineffectiveness  of guidelines  limiting
discretion;  the  predominance  of whites  in  the  group  charged
with exercising discretion;  and the  absence of procedures,  such
as  open job posting  and built-in  review  of decisions,  designed
to  guard against bias. 90  Additionally,  courts have often  relied
on  Griggs and  found that the  subjective  systems  at issue were
not justified  as job-related.91
The  Supreme  Court indicated  similiar suspicion about  sub-
jective  processes  in  Albemarle  Paper Co.  v.  Moody.92  The
Court  criticized  a performance  rating system  for its failure  to
provide  adequate  guidance  to  those  evaluating  performance.
Condemning the criterion  of success used - "who  is doing the
better job" - as  "extremely  vague  and fatally  open  to  diver-
gent  interpretations, '93  the  Court  complained  that  there  was
88  457 F.2d 348  (5th Cir.  1972).
89  Id. at 359  (citations omitted).
90  Id. at 358-59.
91 For cases condemning subjective  systems at the lower level  on some combination
of these  theories,  see Crawford  v. Western  Elec.  Co.,  614  F.2d 1300,  1315-17  & nn.
29-30  (5th Cir.  I98O); James  v.  Stockham  Valves  & Fittings  Co.,  559  F.2d 30,  328
(5th Cir. I977),  cert. denied, 434 U.S.  1034  (1978);  United States v. Hazelwood  School
Dist.,  534  F.2d  805,  812-13  (8th  Cir.  I976),  rev'd on other grounds,  433  U.S.  299
(1977);  Senter v.  General Motors Corp.,  532  F.2d 51,  528-30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429  U.S.  870  (1976);  Brown  v.  Gaston  County Dyeing  Mach.  Co.,  457  F.2d  1377,
1382  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 409  U.S.  982  (0972);  Hester  v.  Southern  Ry.,  349  F.
Supp.  812,  817  (N.D. Ga.  1972),  rev'd on other grounds, 497  F.2d  1374,  1380  (5th
Cir.  0974).  For  a  discussion  of  the  courts'  general  presumption  against  subjective
employment  practices  for  jobs  ranging  up  to  low  level  supervisory  positions,  see
Newman,  supra note  86.
92  422  U.S.  405  (1975).  Subjective  supervisory  ratings  were at issue  because  the
employer's  validity  study  relied  on  such  ratings  in  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  the
validity  of  the  selection  tests  challenged  by  plaintiffs.  The  Court's  criticism  of the
subjective  rating system  in this  context,  however,  seems equally  applicable  when  the
subjective  process  is itself the subject  of the  initial  challenge.
93  Id. at 433.
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"no way of knowing precisely what criteria of job performance
the  supervisors  were  considering,  whether  each  of the  super-
visors  was  considering  the  same  criteria  or  whether,  indeed,
any  of the  supervisors  actually  applied  a focused  and  stable
body  of  criteria  of  any  kind."'94  The  Court  concluded  that
there  was  "simply  no  way  to  determine  whether  the  criteria
actually considered  were  sufficiently  related  to  the Company's
legitimate  interest  in  job-specific  ability  to  justify  a  testing
system  with a racially  discriminatory  impact." 95
Few  lower  level  job  cases  have  considered  exactly  what
would be  required  to justify  a subjective  system;  the  systems
tend  simply  to  be  struck  down  outright.  Some  courts  have
implied  that  subjective  systems  might  be  saved  by extensive
procedural  reform  - development  of  detailed  guidelines,  re-
view  procedures,  and  the  like. 96  Others  have  ordered  such
reforms. 97  Still others have insisted on a demonstration of job-
relatedness  and  business  necessity. 9 8  And  some  courts  have
required  a demonstration  of validity.99
What  is  clear  is  that  subjective  systems  are  judged  by  a
strict  standard.  In Rowe  and  other  blue  collar  cases,  super-
visors  selected  employees  for  promotion  to  foreman  on  the
basis of such  apparently reasonable  criteria as leadership  abil-
ity,  quality  of  performance  on  the  job,  and  ability  to  take
orders. 1 00  Yet  the  courts  condemned  the  vagueness  of,  for
example,  the  quality-of-performance  criterion,  even  though
quality  of performance  in  a  closely  related  job  is  one  of the
best  means  of  predicting  future  performance' 0 1  and  even
though  supervisors  are  obviously  in  a good  position  to  assess
94  Id.  (footnote omitted).
95  Id.  (emphasis  in original).
96  See, e.g.,  Hester v.  Southern  Ry.,  349  F.  Supp.  812,  817 (N.D. Ga.  1972),  rev'd
on other grounds, 497  F.2d  1374  (5th Cir.  1974).
97  See,  e.g.,  Miller  v.  Continental  Can  Co.,  13  Fair  Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)
1585,  I602-03  (S.D.  Ga.  1976)  (defendant  ordered  to  develop  written  standards  es-
tablishing  reasonably  objective  criteria and to  post vacancies).
98  See, e.g.,  Rogers  v.  International Paper Co.,  5  o F.2d 1340,  1350-51  (8th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 423  U.S.  809  (1975).
99 See,  e.g.,  Brito v. Zia Co.,  5 Fair Empl.  Prac. Cas. (BNA)  1203,  1205 (D.N.M.
1972),  affd, 478  F.2d  1200  (ioth Cir.  1973).
100 See,  e.g.,  Parson v.  Kaiser  Aluminum  & Chem.  Corp.,  575  F.2d  1374,  5383
& nn.21-22,  1386 nn.25-26 (5th Cir.  1978),  cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (5979);  Watkins
v. Scott Paper  Co.,  530 F.2d  5559  (5th Cir.),  cert. denied, 429 U.S.  861  (1976);  Rowe
v.  General Motors  Corp.,  457  F.2d 348,  353  (5th Cir.  1972).
101  See,  e.g.,  R.  GUION,  supra note  27,  at 380;  Owens,  Background Data, in
HANDBOOK  OF  INDUSTRIAL  AND  ORGANIZATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY  609,  625  (M.  Dun-
nette  ed.  1976)  ("One  of  our  most  basic  measurement  axioms  holds  that  the  best
predictor  of  what  a  man  will do  in  the  future  is  what  he  has done  in  the  past.")
[hereinafter  cited as  HANDBOOK].
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quality of performance.  Moreover,  basing promotions  on prior
performance  gives  employees  an  incentive  to  perform  well.
Finally,  this  kind  of system  is  simple  and  inexpensive  to ad-
minister.  The  pervasive  use  of  such  schemes  in  industrial
workplaces  suggests  that employers  thought  they served  their
business  purposes.  ' 02
On  the upper level,  courts  have applied  a far more  lenient
standard.  Often  they  simply  assert  that  subjective  decision-
making  is  appropriate,  and  that is  the  end  of  the  matter:  an
employer  has  no  burden  to  demonstrate  the  job-relatedness,
validity,  or business  necessity of any particular subjective  sys-
tem. 103  In  one  academic  promotion  case,  the  court examined
a  university's  procedures  and  pronounced  them  satisfactory
according to  the  following  standard:  "If  the  criteria  used  and
the  procedures followed were reasonable  and rationally  related
to  the  decision  reached  this  is  about  as  far  as  the  court  can
go."' 1 04  This  standard  is,  of course,  totally  at odds  with  the
Rowe  line of cases.  In another academic  case,  the  Third Cir-
cuit  upheld  a  system  that  represents  an  extreme  example  of
the  uncontrolled  and  unreviewable  discretion  condemned  on
the  lower  level.  Tenure  decisions  were  made  on  the  basis
of. "i)  teaching  effort  and  effectiveness,  2)  scholarly  activity,
and  3)  service  to  the  department,  the  University,  the
community."' 05  Each member of the department  was allowed
to use  his  personal  view  of each  factor's  importance.' 0 6  In  a
102  Similarly,  courts  have  condemned  the  use  of  performance  evaluations  as  a
means  of  making  employment  decisions  regarding  salary,  promotion,  and  layoffs,
despite  the  fact that performance  evaluations  seem  a sensible approach  to such  deci-
sionmaking.  See James  v. Stockham  Valves  & Fittings Co.,  559  F.2d 310  (5th  Cir.
1977)  (salaries and  promotions),  cert. denied, 434 U.S.  1034  (r978);  Brito v. Zia Co.,
478 F.2d  1200,  12o6  (ioth  Cir.  1973) (layoffs).
103  See,  e.g.,  Tuft v.  McDonnell  Douglas Corp.,  58I  F.2d  1304 (8th  Cir.  1978);
Frausto v. Legal  Aid  Soc'y,  563  F.2d  1324  (9th Cir.  i977);  EEOC v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours  & Co.,  445  F.  Supp.  223,  254-55  (D.  Del.  1978);  Agarwal  v. Arthur  G.
McKee & Co.,  i6 Empl.  Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)  8301 (N.D.  Cal.  I977),  affd, 644  F.2d
803  (9th  Cir.  I98i); Frink  v. United  States Navy,  16  Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)
67,  69-70  (E.D. Pa.  1977),  affid mem.,  6o9  F.zd 5o  (3d Cir.  1979),  cert. denied, 445
U.S.  930 (i98o);  Keely v. Westinghouse  Elec.  Corp.,  404  F. Supp.  573,  579-8o (E.D.
Mo.  i975);  Levens v.  GSA,  391  F.  Supp.  35  (W.D.  Mo.  1975), aff d mem.,  538  F.2d
332  (8th Cir.  1976).
Articles  noting that  a more  lenient  standard  appears  to  be  applied at  the  upper
level include:  Wagner, Tenure and Promotion in Higher  Education in Light of Wash-
ington v.  Davis, 24  WAYNE  L.  REv.  95,  II9-2I  (I977);  Waintroob,  supra note 6,  at
48-62;  Comment, supra note  6; see also Devine,  supra note  6,  at 429-35  (criticizing
use of lenient standard in university hiring  and promotion  cases).
104 Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435  F. Supp.  1328,  1357  (W.D.  Pa. 1977).
105  Scott v.  University  of Del.,  6oi  F.2d  76,  79  (3d Cir.  1979),  affg  in part and
vacating in part on other grounds 455  F. Supp.  1102  (D. Del.  1978),  cert. denied, 444
U.S.  931  (i979).
106  Scott v.  University of Del.,  455  F.  Supp.  at 1107-08.
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sex  discrimination  case  involving selection  of an  archivist,  the
court  upheld  a  subjective  selection  system,  arguing  that  the
factors  used were  "sufficiently  capable  of objective  evaluation
as  to be  unlikely pretexts  for  discrimination.' 0 7  Without the
benefit  of  guidelines,  a male  supervisor  assessed  candidates'
"personality,"  "habits,"  and  ability  to  plan  and  implement  a
project in the absence  of detailed  supervision. 108
Courts  in upper level  cases  have recognized  the concern  at
the heart  of the  Rowe  doctrine  - the  tendency  of insiders  to
keep out those who are different.  Nonetheless,  they have been
reluctant to take action  against subjective  systems that permit
self-perpetuation.  In Fogg v.  New England Telephone & Tel-
egraph Co., 109 the court found that the company had advanced
a "male-oriented  promotional  policy"'11 0  by creating  two  sex-
segregated  management  level job  categories.  The court none-
theless  denied  relief,  noting plaintiff's  "aggressive,  ambitious"
character:
While these  traits  are  supposedly  ones  that make  for  success
in  business,  they  also  run  counter  to  the  tendency  of  any
bureaucratic  hierarchy  to  perpetuate  itself  and  protect  its
members  against any  sudden  change  or disruption  of  the  es-
tablished routine  ....  [Wlhat the Company required  at this
management  level was primarily conformity and  the ability to
get along with other  personnel."'
The contrast in judicial  attitudes toward subjective systems
on  the  two  levels  is  striking.  The  discrepancy  cannot  be  ex-
plained  by differences  in  the subjective  systems  at issue.  Up-
per level systems  typically  involve  white  decisionmakers  pass-
ing  judgment  on  black  candidates.  These  decisionmakers
typically  use  criteria  so  vague  that  they  allow  the  expression
of conscious  and  unconscious  bias - the  kind of criteria  con-
demned  by the Albemarle Court  as  "fatally  open  to divergent
interpretations.""12  Upper  level  systems  typically  grant deci-
sionmakers  significant  discretion  in  determining  which  candi-
107  Adams  v.  Reed,  567  F.2d  1283,  1286  (5th Cir.  1978) (footnote  omitted).
108  Id.  at  1286  &  n.8.  Indeed,  the  courts  regularly  find systems  unobjectionable
that rely  on  the  kind  of vague  and  general  criteria condemned  on  the  lower  level.
E.g.,  EEOC  v. E.I. duPont de  Nemours & Co.,  445 F.  Supp.  223,  253-54  (D.  Del.
1978) (criteria included "initiative,"  "originality,"  and "desire  to be  a supervisor");  see
Thompson  v.  McDonnell  Douglas  Corp.,  416  F.  Supp.  972,  977,  982  (E.D.  Mo.
1976),  affd, 552  F.2d  220  (8th Cir.  1977).
109  346  F.  Supp.  645  (D.N.H.  1972).
110 Id. at 651.
"I  Id.  at 649.
112  Albemarle  Paper  Co.  v. Moody,  422  U.S.  405,  433  (1975),  discussed at supra
PP-  974-75; see,  e.g.,  Yurko, supra note  6,  at 476-78  (criteria typically  considered  in
academic  decisionmaking).
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dates  should  even  be  considered  for  selection.  But  although
these  features are sufficiently suspect on the lower  level  to call
for  condemnation  of the  subjective  process,  they  are  viewed
with  benign  approval on the  upper  level.
3.  Tests.  - At  the  lower  level,  courts  have  imposed  a
heavy burden  of justification  on  employers  who  use standard-
ized  tests  to  screen  employees.  Courts  have  demanded  that
employers  produce  evidence  of validation,  as  well  as proof  of
business  necessity.113  By contrast,  in  some  of the  few  upper
level cases  involving  tests designed  specifically  to measure job
qualifications,  courts  have  required  very  little  in  the  way  of
employer justification.  In  a  case  challenging  a  state  bar  ex-
amination,  the  court  granted  defendant's motion  for summary
judgment,  stating  baldly:  "[T]he  principles  of  test validation
developed  under  Title VII  do  not  apply to  professional  licen-
sing  examinations.""14  In  a  case  summarily  affirmed  by -the
Supreme  Court,  another  district court  upheld  use  of the  Na-
tional Teacher  Examinations  (NTE) for hiring and setting sal-
aries." 5  As Justices  White  and Brennan  noted in dissent,  the
"validation study" deemed sufficient by the district court failed
to  show  job-relatedness  in  traditional  terms." 6  The  district
court had conceded  the  absence  of evidence  showing a correl-
ation  between  NTE scores  and  teacher  effectiveness,  but had
excused  the  deficiency  on  the ground  that "there  is,  as yet,  no
satisfactory  measure  of teaching effectiveness."11 7
III.  THE  CASE  FOR  A  SINGLE  STANDARD
A.  Elitist Nature of the Current Differential Standard
The current differential  standard is elitist.  The courts dis-
tinguish  between  selection  systems  primarily  on  the  basis  of
113  While  the  Supreme  Court arguably indicated  doubt about some of these prin-
ciples  in  Washington  v. Davis,  426  U.S.  229  (1976),  courts  have  not generally  read
that  case  to  significantly  reduce  the  burden  of justification  imposed  on  lower  level
employers  in  title  VII  cases.  See,  e.g.,  Guardians  Ass'n  of N.Y.  City Police  Dep't,
Inc.  v.  Civil Serv.  Comm'n,  633  F.2d  232,  245-47  (2d  Cir.  I98O),  cert. granted, 5o
U.S.L.W.  3527  (U.S. Jan.  12,  1982)  (No.  81-431);  Davis  v.  County of Los Angeles,
566  F.2d  1334,  1338-40  (9th Cir.  1977),  vacated as moot, 440  U.S. 625  (I079);  United
States v.  City of Chicago,  549  F.2d 415,  431-32  (7th Cir.),  cert. denied, 434 U.S.  875
(1977).
114  Woodard v. Virginia Bd.  of Bar Examiners,  420 F. Supp.  211,  214 (E.D. Va.
1976),  affld per curiam, 598  F.2d  1345  (4th  Cir.  1979).
11s  United States v.  South Carolina,  445  F. Supp.  1094 (D.S.C.  1977),  aff  d mem.
sub nom.  National Educ.  Ass'n v.  South  Carolina,  434 U.S.  1026  (1978).
116 See  National Educ.  Ass'n v.  South  Carolina,  434  U.S.  at 1027-28  (White, J.,
dissenting).
117  United  States  v. South  Carolina,  445 F.  Supp. at iio8  n.13.
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the  social  and  economic  status  of  the  jobs  involved.  They
have  intervened  freely  in  low-status  jobs,  even  when  poor
performance  in  these  jobs  might  have  threatened  significant
economic  and safety interests.118  But with high-status  jobs,  a
hands-off  attitude  has prevailed.
Judges  defer  to  the  employers  with  whom  they  identify,
and  they  uphold  the  kinds  of  selection  systems  from  which
they  have  benefited.  When  they  deal  with  prestigious  jobs,
the courts  show  an  appreciation  of the  apparent rationality  of
the  employment  procedures  at  issue  and  a  respect  for  the
decisionmakers  involved that can only be explained by the fact
that  these  cases  confront  the  courts  with  their  own  world.
Judges have a personal investment  in traditional  selection pro-
cedures  on  the  upper  level.  By  contrast,  courts  can  readily
strike down a civil service test or a Rowe-like subjective system
because,  not knowing  or  caring  much  about  how  blue  collar
workers  are  chosen  or  promoted,  judges  find  it easy  to focus
on  the  social harm of racial exclusion.
In deferring  to  upper level  employers,  courts often  profess
their lack  of expertise.  Only  the  universities,  the  courts  say,
are  competent  to  assess  teacher  qualifications  and  to  design
appropriate  selection  and  promotion  systems.  But courts  are
surely more  qualified  to intervene  in academic  decisions,  with
which they have  some familiarity,  than to decide  who is qual-
ified  to  serve  in  highly  skilled  blue  collar  jobs  or  how  they
should  be  chosen.  It is  the  courts'  expertise,  rather  than  the
11  Illustrative  cases  are  discussed  in  Parts I  and  II.  Ordinarily  the lives  at  risk
have been  those  of workers involved  in  the  lawsuits  and their  coworkers  or subordi-
nates,  as in  cases involving work  with potentially explosive equipment  or under other
dangerous  conditions.  See,  e.g.,  Griggs  v.  Duke  Power  Co.,  401  U.S.  424  (1971),
discussed at supra pp.  951-53;  Grant v.  Bethlehem  Steel  Corp.,  635  F.zd  1007  (2d
Cir.  I98O),  cert.  denied,  1o  S.  Ct.  3083  (i98i),  discussed at  supra pp.  953-54;
Watkins v. Scott Paper  Co.,  530  F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.  1976),  rev'g in part 6  Fair Empl.
Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  5N,  515  (S.D.  Ala.  1973),  cert.  denied, 429  U.S.  861  (0976),
discussed at supra pp.  966-67.
In  other cases  the  lives  at  risk have  been  those  of the  public  beyond  the  work
force.  See,  e.g.,  United States v. Chesapeake  & 0.  Ry.,  471  F.2d 582,  588  (4th Cir.
1972)  (rejecting business  necessity  defense  based on  safety  in  case  involving railway
brakeman),  cert. denied, 411  U.S.  939 (1973);  United States v. St. Louis-San  Francisco
Ry.,  464  F.2d 301,  308  (8th Cir.  1972)  (en banc) (same),  cert. denied, 409  U.S.  1107
(1973).
A  number  of  courts,  however,  have  applied  a  relaxed  title  VII  standard  to  jobs
apparently  involving extreme  safety  risks to  the  general public.  See,  e.g.,  Harriss v.
Pan  Am.  World  Airways,  Inc.,  649  F.2d  670,  675-77  (9th  Cir.  i98o) (sex  discrimi-
nation  case  upholding  mandatory  pregnancy  leave  for  flight  attendants);  Boyd  v.
Ozark  Air  Lines,  Inc.,  568  F.2d  50,  54  (8th  Cir.  1977)  (sex  discrimination  case
upholding height qualifications  for pilots);  Spurlock  v. United  Airlines,  Inc.,  475 F.2d
216  (ioth Cir.  1972)  (upholding system for  selection  of airline  pilots).
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lack of it, that makes  them  reluctant  to interfere at the  upper
level.  They know  these  decisionmakers;  they  sympathize  and
identify with  their concerns  and  their  use  of traditional  selec-
tion  methods.  Indeed,  courts  have  occasionally  noted  that
upper  level cases  strike  close to  home.  In  an  academic  case,
one  court  sympathized  with  the  difficulties  of upper level  se-
lection  as follows:
Of a hypothetical twenty  equally brilliant law school grad-
uates  in  a  law  office,  one  is  selected  to  become  a  partner.
Extensive discovery  would reveal that the other nineteen were
almost  equally  well  qualified.  Fifty junior  bank  officers  all
aspire to become  a vice-president - one is selected.  And,  of
course,  even judges  are plagued by  the  difficulty of decision
in selecting law  clerks  out  of the  many  equally  well  quali-
fied."l9
Courts'  identification  with  upper  level  employers  also
makes  them  less  capable  of  imagining  alternatives  to  tradi-
tional  selection  systems.  In dealing with lower level  jobs, the
courts  have  had  enough  distance  to  weigh  the  social  cost  of
racial  exclusion  against  the  need  for  traditional  systems.
Judges  have  been  able  to  reject  with  relative  ease  employer
arguments  that things must be  as  they have always  been.  If,
for  example,  a police  or fire  department  selection  scheme  sys-
tematically  excludes blacks,  judges  have recognized  that there
must be alternative schemes that would serve  the community's
interest  in  police and  fire  protection  as  well or  better.
Judges must develop  this same  analytic distance  in looking
at upper  level  selection  systems.  The  Griggs doctrine  encour-
ages  such detachment.  By rejecting apparent commonsense  as
a  sufficient  defense,  it  forces  courts  to  analyze  their  own  as-
sumptions.  By  insisting  that  employers  produce  evidentiary
justifications  for  their  systems,  the  doctrine  educates  courts
about  the  actual  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  these  justifica-
tions.
B.  The  1972 Amendments  to Title  VII  and Their Legislative
History
Not  only  does  the  language  of  title  VII  fail  to  draw  a
distinction  based  on  level  of employment,  but the  legislative
history  of the  1972  amendments  also indicates that no  distinc-
tion was intended.  The history reveals both congressional  con-
cern  with  upper  level  discrimination  and  a congressional  un-
derstanding  that title VII would remedy that discrimination.
119 Faro v.  New York Univ.,  502  F.2d 1229,  I232  (2d Cir, 1974) (emphasis added).
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One of the  1972  amendments  to title VII extended  its cov-
erage to academic  institutions. 12 0  With that amendment,  Con-
gress  in effect decided that professorships,  for example,  should
not  be  treated  differently  from  other  jobs.  A  Senate  Report
stated:
[I]n  the  higher-paying  and  more  prestigious  positions  in  the
institutions  of  higher  learning,  blacks  constituted  only  2.2%
of  all  positions,  most  of  these  being  found  in  all-black  or
predominantly black institutions ....  The committee  believes
that  it  is  essential  that  these  employees  be  given  the  same
opportunity to  redress  their  grievances  as  are  available  to
other  employees  in the  other sectors  of business. 121
The same issue arose when Congress  specifically considered
and  rejected  a proposal  to  exempt  other  upper  level  occupa-
tions, namely physicians and surgeons.  Speaking  in opposition
to the  proposed  exemption,  Senator Javits  said:
One  of the  things  that  those  discriminated  against  have
resented  the most is  that they  are  relegated  to the position  of
the  sawers  of  wood  and the drawers  of water;  that  only  the
blue  collar jobs  and  ditchdigging jobs are  reserved  for them;
and  that  though  they  built  America,  and  certainly  helped
build it enormously  in the days  of its basic construction,  they
cannot ascend the higher  rungs in  professional  and other  life.
Yet,  this  amendment  would  go  back  beyond  decades  of
struggle  and  of injustice,  and  reinstate  the possibility  of  dis-
crimination  on  grounds  of  ethnic  origin,  color,  sex,  reli-
gion  - just  confined  to  physicians  or  surgeons,  one  of the
highest  rungs  of  the  ladder  that  any  member  of  a  minority
could  attain - and thus lock in and fortify the idea that being
a  doctor  or  a  surgeon  is  just  too  good  for  members  of  a
minority,  and  that they  have to  be  subject to  discrimination
in respect  of it,  and the Federal  law will not protect them. 122
Congress  in  1972  also  expanded  title  VII  to  cover  public
employment.  The legislative  history of that amendment  dem-
120 The Equal  Employment  Opportunity Act of  1972,  Pub.  L. No.  92-261,  § 3,  86
Stat.  103,  103-04  (1972)  (codified  at  42  U.S.C.  § 2oooe-i  (1976)),  abolished  the  ex-
emption  for the  employment  of individuals engaged  in  educational  activities at non-
religious  educational institutions.
121  S.  REP.  No.  415,  92d Cong.,  1st Sess.  12  (1971)  (emphasis  added) [hereinafter
cited as  SENATE  REPORT].
122  118  CONG.  Rc.  3802  (1972)  (statement of Sen.  Javits).
An  amendment proposed  in  1972  to exclude public  and  private hospitals  and their
professional  staffs  from  title  VII  coverage  was  defeated.  See  iIS  CONG.  REC.
3799-802  (1972),  reprinted in  STAFF  OF  SUBCOMM.  ON  LABOR,  SENATE  COI1M.  ON
LABOR  AND  PUBLIC  WELFARE,  92D  CONG.,  2D  SESS.,  LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY  OF THE
EQUAL  EmPLOYMENT  OPPORTUNITY ACT  OF  1972,  at 1455-65  (Comm.  Print  1972).
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onstrates  Congress'  concern  about  the  absence  of  minorities
from high positions in the federal bureaucracy;  moreover,  Con-
gress  knew that  most white  collar  federal jobs  were filled  on
the  basis of civil service  tests of a type traditionally  subject to
strict  Griggs analysis. 123  Finally,  Congress  explicitly  recog-
nized  the importance  of increasing  minority representation  in
important  state  governmental  jobs.  The  House  Committee
Report  took  note  of the  fact  that  blacks  were  excluded  from
many  white  collar  governmental  jobs,  from  city  managerial
positions,  from  law  enforcement  agencies,  including  prosecu-
tors'  offices,  and from education.  The report  concluded  that:
The problem  of employment  discrimination  is particularly
acute and has the  most deleterious  effect in these governmen-
tal activities  which  are  most visible  to  the minority  commu-
nities  (notably education,  law  enforcement,  and the  adminis-
tration  of justice)  with  the  result that  the  credibility  of the
government's  claim  to  represent  all the  people  equally  is  ne-
gated. 1 24
When  Congress  decided  in  1972  to  cover  upper  level jobs
without in any way distinguishing them from lower  level jobs,
there  was  extensive  congressional  discussion  of the  fact  that
the central problem of employment discrimination was one  not
of overt discrimination,  but  of  covert  bias  and  of  systematic
exclusion  of blacks  from certain jobs  by facially  neutral  crite-
ria.125  The  discussion  generally  endorsed  the  then-recent
Griggs decision  and  the  pre-Griggs case  law  establishing  the
disparate  treatment  and disparate  impact doctrines.126
One  cannot  assume,  however,  that Congress  endorsed  the
most radical  implications  of the  Griggs impact  doctrine.  The
hard question  is what burden should be  placed  on upper level
employers  to  justify  selection  systems  that  have  a racial  im-
pact.  Neither  the  language  nor  the  legislative  history  of the
123  See  H.  REP.  No.  238,  92d  Cong.,  Tst  Sess.  23-24  (1971),  reprinted in  1972
U.S. CODE  CONG.  & AD.  NEWS  2137,  2158-59  [hereinafter  cited as  HOUSE  REPORT].
124  Id.  at  17,  reprinted in  r972  U.S.  CODE  CONG.  &  AD.  NEWS  at 2153;  see  also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 12x,  at  io  (expressing concern with exclusion of minorities
from important governmental  agencies).
125  See International  Bhd.  of Teamsters  v.  United States,  431  U.S.  324,  391-93
& n.2,  (I977)  (Marshall, J.,  concurring in  part and  dissenting in  part).  See generally
SENATE  REPORT,  supra note  121  (covert  discrimination  is  crucial  problem);  HOUSE
REPORT,  supra note  123  (same).
126 See Meltzer,  supra note  24,  at 429  n.3I,  437  &  n.69;  Rutherglen,  supra note
52,  at 719  &  nn.186-87.
Meltzer notes Congress'  concern that title VII not be used to impose hiring quotas.
He  argues that  the  legislative  history provides  no  resolution of any  conflict  between
this concern  and Congress'  endorsement of Griggs.  Meltzer, supra note 24,  at 436-37.
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1972  amendments  can  alone  answer  that  question. 127  How-
ever,  title  VII  does  establish  a  presumption  that upper  level
selection  systems  should  be treated  no  differently  from  lower
level  systems.  The issue addressed  in the following  Section  is
whether  there  is  something  about  upper  level  job  selection
systems  that  demands  different  legal  treatment,  despite  title
VI's apparent  single standard.
C.  Applicability of Traditional  Title  VII Standards to  Upper
Level Selection Systems.
i.  Privacy and Associational Interests. - One justification
offered  for  a differential  standard  is  that privacy  and  associ-
ational rights  on the  upper level are  entitled  to special  protec-
tion.  Courts  have  expressed  concern  about  interfering  with
the  right  of law  partners  and  advertising  executives  to  work
with whom  they please.  Personal relationships  are  said  to be
vital  to performance  on this level. 128
This argument is no more powerful  at the  upper level  than
at the  lower.  Personal relationships  are likely  to be extremely
important  to  performance  on  the  lower  level  in  many  small
enterprises.  Personal relationships between blue collar workers
dependent  on each other for their safety are also  important,  at
least to those workers.  Moreover,  Congress'  decision to extend
title  VII's  coverage  to  all  employers  with fifteen  or more  em-
127  Nor are the interpretive guidelines  promulgated  by the relevant enforcing agen-
cies  particularly  helpful  in  determining  the  burden  employers  should  properly  bear.
The  Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  make  no  distinctions  on  the  basis  of  an
employee's  job.  Moreover,  the  history  of the  Guidelines  indicates  that various  em-
ployer groups, including academic  institutions, attempted to obtain significant  exemp-
tion from  coverage.  43  Fed.  Reg.  38,290,  38,294 (1978).
The Uniform  Guidelines do contain language indicating  that in some circumstances
employers  may  have  a  reduced  burden  to  demonstrate  job-relatedness.  Uniform
Guidelines,  supra note  13,  § 16o7.6(B).  When  an  informal  or  unscored  procedure
produces  an adverse  impact,  the  employer "should  eliminate  the  adverse  impact,  or
modify  the  procedure  to  one  which  is  a  formal,  scored  [measure]  . . . and  then
validate  . . . . or  otherwise  justify  continued  use  of the  procedure  in  accord  with
Federal law."  Id. § I6o7 .6(B)(1).  When formal, scored procedures produce  an adverse
impact,  the  Guidelines  indicate  that  the  employer  should  validate  if. (I)  there  is  a
large  enough  sample  of persons to  achieve a statistically  significant study;  (2) there  is
a  sufficient  range  of  selection  procedure  and  job  performance  scores  to  produce
representative  results; and  (3) adequate  measures  of job performance  can  be  devised.
Id. 88  i607.6(B) to .I6(U).  If validation is not feasible, "the user should either modify
the  procedure  to eliminate  adverse  impact  or  otherwise justify  continued  use  of the
procedure  in  accord with  Federal  law."  Id. § I60 7.6(B)(2).
128  See  Hishon  v.  King  & Spaulding,  24  Fair  Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  1303  (D.
Ga.  198o),  discussed at supra p.  960;  EEOC  v.  Kallir,  Philips,  Ross,  Inc.,  42o  F.
Supp.  919,  926-27  (S.D.N.Y. 1976),  aff'd mern.,  559 F.2d I2o3  (2dCir.), cert. denied,
434  U.S.  920  (1977),  discussed at supra p.  963.
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ployees 129  was  a decision  to  interfere  radically  with  rights  of
privacy and association in the workplace.  The courts' decision
in  title  VII  cases  to  provide  reinstatement  and  promotion  as
a matter of right 130  was a decision  to interfere  with traditional
rights of freedom from unwanted  employment  relationships.
Courts have also indicated that the lifelong nature of tenure
warrants according it special immunity. 131  However,  the great
bulk  of the  lower  level jobs  that have  been  the  focus  of title
VII enforcement  have involved  something  akin  to  life  tenure.
They  have  generally  been  covered  by  civil  service  laws  or
collective bargaining  agreements,  both of which provide  effec-
tive guarantees  against discharge  for anything other than egre-
gious misconduct.  Against this background  Congress  amended
title VII to cover  academic  institutions.  It  knew  full well that
tenure  decisions  were  at  issue,  and  yet  provided  no  special
immunity  for them.
2. Difficulties of Demonstrating  Job-Relatedness and Busi-
ness Necessity.  - More  significant  are  the  arguments  that
traditional  title VII  standards  are  inappropriate  on  the  upper
level because  of special  difficulties  in  demonstrating job-relat-
edness and business  necessity.
(a) Nature of the Jobs. - It  is  often  argued  that  upper
level employers  should be  free  from  any real  burden  of dem-
onstrating job-relatedness  because  defining  and  measuring  ef-
fective  job  performance  is  simply  too  difficult. 132  It  is  often
129 Equal  Employment Opportunity  Act  of  1972,  Pub.  L.  No.  92-261,  §  2(4),  86
Stat.  103,  103  (codified at 42  U.S.C.  § 2oooe(b)  (1976)).  The  Act originally  covered
all employers  with 25  or more employees.  Civil Rights Act of 1964,  Pub.  L.  No.  88-
352,  §  70T(b),  78  Stat. 241,  253.
130 See supra pp.  962-63.
131  See Labat v. Board of Higher Educ.,  401  F.  Supp.  753,  756  (S.D.N.Y.  1975).
It  is  also  said that academic  freedom  would be  jeopardized  by strict  enforcement
of  title  VII  standards.  In  Gray  v.  Board  of  Higher  Educ.,  5o  U.S.L.W.  2307
(S.D.N.Y. Nov.  9,  1981),  the  court relied  on  considerations  of academic  freedom  in
denying plaintiff discovery of how  particular defendants  voted  on the  reappointment
and tenure decision  at issue.  The  Fifth Circuit  rejected  a comparable  claim  in In re
Dinnan (Blaubergs  v.  Regents  of Univ. Sys.),  66i  F.2d 426  (5th Cir.  i98i); the court
found no threat  to  academic  freedom  in  permitting access  to  information vital  to the
proof of discrimination  claims.  Indeed,  the  court found that to  deny such access and
thereby  to  provide  academic  institutions  with  effective  immunity  from  such  claims
would threaten  "the very core  of values  that [academic  freedom]  now protects."  Id.
at 430.  It  noted that  "ideas  may be suppressed just as effectively  by  denying tenure
as by prohibiting the teaching of certain courses."  Id.  (emphasis in  original).
132  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  South  Carolina,  445  F.  Supp.  1094,  i1o8  n.i 3
(D.S.C.  1977)  (court excused  absence  of evidence  that success  on  National  Teacher
Examinations  correlated  with  success  on  job,  on  ground  that  "there  is,  as  yet,  no
satisfactory  measure of teaching  effectiveness"),  afj'd mem.  sub nom.  National  Educ.
Ass'n  v.  South  Carolina,  434 U.S.  1026  (1978);  Ash  &  Kroeker,  Personnel  Selection,
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difficult to  define jobs on  the upper level.  There  is no consen-
sus on  what the  ideal lawyer  or school principal  or bank  vice-
president should be doing.  Often there is no single ideal; many
different  behaviors  can  be  successful.  It  is  also  difficult  to
develop  selection  devices  that  predict  the  complex  behavior
these jobs require. It would be still more  difficult to prove that
the  devices  were  selecting those  capable  of the  most  effective
performance,  precisely  because  we  are  uncertain  about  what
effective performance  is.
Yet these  facts  cut  the  other  way.  Our  uncertainty  about
how certain jobs should be performed and about the usefulness
of existing  systems  for  predicting  performance  makes  it hard
to justify the  continued use of selection  devices that effectively
exclude  blacks.  Moreover,  we  are  not  certain  what  ideal job
performance  means,  in  part,  because  definitions  of  the  ideal
performance  of  lawyers  or  doctors  or  teachers  reflect  value-
laden  choices.  These choices  are largely political:  they involve
decisions,  for  example,  about how  scarce  resources  should  be
allocated  and what services should  be provided to what social
groups.  This  too  argues  for  including  rather  than  excluding
major racial  groups  in such "political"  positions. 133
(b)  Nature of the Selection Systems.  - Attempts  to justify
a differential  standard  often  rely on the  difficulties  of validat-
ing the education and experience  requirements  and the subjec-
tive procedures generally used on the upper level.  When look-
ing at comparable  selection  devices  on  the lower  level,  courts
have  generally  found  it  unnecessary  to  decide  whether  vali-
dation  was  required.  Such  devices  tended  to be struck  down
outright, on  the  ground that they  were obviously  not justified
by business  necessity.  On the upper level,  courts are reluctant
to  decide  that  objective  qualifications  are  simply unnecessary
or  that  subjective  systems  should  be  outlawed  as  inherently
Classification,  and Placement, 26 ANN.  REV.  PSYCHOLOGY  481,  493 (I975)  (the defense
typically raised  in  cases involving  certification  examinations  is that criteria of success
defy  measurement);  Hunt  & Pazuniak,  supra note  6,  at  128 ("[It will  frequently  be
impossible  to  devise  reliable  measures  of job  performance  or of employee  adequacy"
for upper level jobs.).
133  Some aspects of upper level jobs may warrant the development  of new methods
by which employers  may  satisfy their burden  of justification.  Such jobs  are likely  to
change  over time,  thus  rendering  validation more  difficult.  And  the  relatively small
number  of incumbents  and candidates  with  respect to particular  positions  may make
it impossible  to obtain  statistically significant  results in  validation studies  under tra-
ditional methods  of analysis.  See R.  GUION,  supra note  27,  at 457-76  (discussion  of
personnel  selection  at upper  levels);  see also Trattner  &  O'Leary,  Sample Sizes for
Specified Statistical Power in Testing for Differential Validity,  65 J.  APPLIED  PSY-
CHOLOGY  127  (i980)  (small sample  sizes  make validation  difficult).  These  difficulties
simply call for the  development  of new validation techniques.  See infra note  174.
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suspect.  But  the  obvious  alternative  is  for  the  courts  to  de-
mand  validation.
Courts often  argue  that the principles  of validation  simply
do  not  apply  to  nonscored  objective  criteria  or  that it  is  in-
herently  impossible  to  validate  these  criteria.  Hence,  the  ar-
gument  goes,  commonsense  arguments  for  their  use  must  be
accepted.  However,  the  testing  experts  would  counsel  that,
when  such  criteria  are  used  as  prerequisites  to  employment,
one  can  systematically  examine  the  connection  between  the
criteria and  the  abilities  essential  to  adequate  performance.134
And  when  such  criteria are  used  as  factors  in  a discretionary
process  - with  extra  credit  given  to  those  with  additional
education  and  experience,  for  example  - validity  studies  can
measure  the correlation  between additional years of experience
and job performance,  just as  they can  measure the  correlation
between  scores  on  written  employment  tests  and job  perfor-
mance. 13 5  Testing experts have in fact made efforts to validate
such  objective  criteria.  Although  they  have  produced  little
evidence  demonstrating  the  validity  of  employment  systems
relying  on objective  criteria,  the same  was true  of scored  tests
when Griggs was decided,  and was indeed part of the rationale
for  the  Griggs result.  It is  in part  because  there is  reason  to
question  the  validity  of  current  systems  relying  on  objective
criteria that a strong burden of justification should be  imposed
on  the  employer  when  such  criteria  have  an  adverse  racial
impact. 136
134  See  infra p.  I7.
135  The  Uniform  Guidelines  make no  distinction between  nonscored  objective cri-
teria and  scored  tests.  Both  are  included  in  the  definition  of "selection  procedures,"
and  both  must be validated  if  their  use  has  an adverse  racial  impact.  See Uniform
Guidelines,  supra note  13,  §§  1607.5,  .16(Q).  See generally E.  McCoRaICK  &  D.
ILGEN,  INDUSTRIAL  PSYCHOLOGY  181-209  (7th  ed.  i98O)  (discussing the  use  of bio-
graphical  data  and  interviews  in  personnel  selection);  Guion,  Recruiting, Selection,
and Job Placement, in  HANDBOOK,  supra note  ioi,  at  777,  799-802  (discussing  the
need for  proof  of validity for  predictors  other  than  tests,  such  as biographical  data
and interviews).
Upper  level job cases  requiring validation  of nonscored  objective criteria include:
Greenspan  v. Automobile  Club,  495  F.  Supp.  IO2i  (E.D. Mich.  i98o)  (prior related.
experience  requirements  for  professional,  technical,  and  sales  positions);  Leisner  v.
New  York Tel.  Co.,  358  F. Supp.  359,  368-69  (S.D.N.Y. 1973)  (requirements  such
as prior supervisory experience  and  technical  degrees  for management level jobs).  In
Townsend  v. Nassau  County Medical  Center,  ii  Empl.  Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)  IO,852
(E.D.N.Y.  1975),  rev'd, 558  F.2d  117  (2d  Cir.  1977),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.  1015
(1978),  Judge Weinstein  discussed the applicability of validation  techniques to a college
degree  requirement for a  blood  bank technician's job.  Id.  at 7567-69.
136 See Francis, Diplomas, Degrees, and Discrimination,  26 HASTINGS  L.J.  1377,
1381  n.23,  1389  n.6o  (1975)  (arguing  that  use  of  credentials  by  employers  typically
cannot be justified  under Griggs analysis  and noting  evidence that credentials  may be
inversely  related  to  performance  for many jobs);  Tenopyr,  The  Realities of Employ-
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Some  have  argued  that  educational  degree  requirements
are  inherently  less  suspect  than  the  written  tests  commonly
held  to  require  validation,  because  degrees  are  conferred  on
the basis  of tests  designed  not by or  for  the  employer  but  by
independent  institutions. 137  But the  chances  that  a test  will
prove  valid are  enhanced when it is tailored  to predict perfor-
mance  in  a particular job.  The  fact that degrees  are  granted
on  the basis  of testing processes  designed to serve  quite differ-
ent purposes makes their validity as employment criteria more,
rather  than  less,  suspect.138
Similarly,  courts in  upper level  cases often seem  to assume
that  subjective  systems  are  inherently incapable  of being  val-
idated. 139  This  assumption  is  implicit  in  many  of  the  cases
upholding  such systems  on the  ground that some  kind of sub-
jective  system  clearly  seems  appropriate,  without  further  in-
quiry  into  whether  the  system  at issue  is  valid.  Again,  there
seems  to  be  little  basis  for  the  assumption.  The major  vali-
dation  methods,  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Part IV,  are  ap-
plicable  to all selection devices.  The validity of a written  test
is  traditionally  established  by correlating  the  scores  of  candi-
dates  who  passed  the  test  and  are  on  the  job with  indicia  of
their job  performance.  A  subjective  assessment  process,  like
a written  test,  can  be  scored  even  if  only  for  the  purpose  of
conducting  a  validity  study.  Alternatively,  an  employer  can
establish  the  validity  of subjective  processes  by  proving  that
the  behavior  assessed  by  the  process  represents  a fair  sample
of the  behavior  required  in the  job  at issue,  or that the  sub-
ment  Testing,  36  Am.  PSYCHOLOGY  1120,  1123  (1981)  (compared  to  scored  tests,
educational  requirements  have low validity coefficients);  White  & Francis,  supra note
3o,  at  1231-32  (educational  degree  requirements  generally  lack  job-relatedness  and
should  be subject  to Griggs standard).  Contra Lerner, supra note 30,  at 23-24.
137 See  Vuyanich  v.  Republic  Nat'l  Bank,  5o5  F.  Supp.  224,  372-73  & n.195
(N.D. Tex.  I980).
133 See generally Francis, supra note  136,  at 1389-92  (better alternative predictors
are usually  available); White  & Francis, supra note 30,  at  1243 (characterizing  degrees
as "cheap  approximations  of more  precise  screening  devices").
139 See,  e.g.,  Vuyanich v.  Republic Nat'l Bank, 505  F. Supp.  224,  371 (N.D. Tex.
198o);  see  also Hunt  &  Pazuniak,  supra note  6,  at  128  (validation  for  upper  level
subjective  evaluation  "may not  as a practical matter  be 'technically  feasible"');  Note,
Self Defense for Women Lawyers: Enforcement of Employment Rights,  4  U.  MICH.
J.L. REF.  5,7,  528-29  (971)  (personal interview incapable  of validation).
A  very  few  decisions  involving  upper  level  jobs  have  held  that  employers  must
validate  subjective  selection  processes.  See  Wade  v.  Mississippi  Coop.  Extension
Serv.,  372  F.  Supp.  126,  142  (N.D. Miss.  1974),  aff'd in part, rev'd in part on  other
grounds, vacated in part on  other grounds, and remanded, 528  F.2d  508,  518  (5th
Cir.  1976);  Leisner  v.  New  York  Tel.  Co.,  358  F.  Supp.  359,  368-69  (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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jective  process measures  the knowledge,  skills,  or abilities that
are the necessary  prerequisites  to the job.140
The  industrial  psychology'literature  does  not  support  the
notion  that  subjective  systems  should  be  immune  from  vali-
dation  principles.  The profession  has taken the stand  that all
selection  systems,  including  subjective  ones,  can  and  indeed
should  be  validated. 141  The  literature  contains  numerous  de-
scriptions  of validity  studies  of the  most commonly used  sub-
jective  processes,  such  as interviews, 142 the  evaluation  of bio-
graphical  data, 143  and  assessment  center  techniques. 144  The
literature  does note that the subjective devices most commonly
used  in  upper  level  employment  have  rarely  been  validated,
but  this  observation  is  thought  to  argue  for  the  need  to  do
more  validation.145  The  literature  also  reveals  little  evidence
that  the  subjective  processes  common  to  the  upper  level  are
valid. 1 46  Again,  exactly the same situation existed with respect
140 See supra pp.  1oI6-17.
141  "When  any selection  procedure  is used,  the  essential  principle is  that evidence
be accumulated  to show  a relationship  between  decisions based on  assessments  made
by that procedure  and criteria  such as job  performance.  ... DIVISION  14  PRINCI-
PLES,  supra note  12,  at i.  The  Uniform  Guidelines  are more ambiguous  on the  issue
of the employer's obligation  to validate subjective processes.  While they provide  that,
in  general,  the duty to demonstrate job-relatedness  applies to  all selection procedures,
including subjective ones, they also state that, when "informal  or unscored procedures"
are  used,  the  employer  must  either  (I)  modify the  procedure  to  a  formal,  scored  or
quantified  one  and  then validate  it,  or  (2)  "otherwise  justify [its]  continued  use  . . .
in accord with  Federal  law."  Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  § 16O7.6(B).
142 See,  e.g.,  N.  MAIER,  PSYCHOLOGY  IN  INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATIONS  226-27
(4 th ed.  1973);  M.  MINER  &  J.  MINER,  EMPLOYEE  SELECTION  WITHIN  THE  LAW
145-65  (1979);  Heneman,  Schwab,  Huett & Ford, Interviewer Validity as a Function
of Interview Structure, Biographical Data, and Interview  Order, 6o  J.  APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY  748  (1975);  Landy,  The  Validity  of the  Interview  in  Police  Officer
Selection, 61  J. APPLIED  PSYCHOLOGY  193  (1976).
143  See,  e.g.,  M.  MINER  &  J.  MINER,  supra note  142,  at  183-201;  Dunnette  &
Borman, Personnel  Selection and Classification  Systems, 30  ANN.  REV.  PSYCHOLOGY
477,  510  (1979)-
144  See,  e.g.,  Hinrichs,  An  Eight-Year Follow-Up of a  Management Assessment
Center, 63  J.  APPLIED  PSYCHOLOGY  596  (1978);  Klimoski  &  Strickland,  Assessment
Centers - Valid or Merely Prescient, 30  PERSONNEL  PSYCHOLOGY  353  (1977).
145  See,  e.g.,  M. MINER & J.  MINER,  supra note 142,  at 338; Dunnette,  Personnel
Management, 13  ANN.  REV.  PSYCHOLOGY  285,  291-92  (1962);  Hinrichs,  supra note
144,  at 596.
146 See  generally M.  MINER  &  J.  MINER,  supra note  142  (discussing  variety  of
selection devices  commonly used for upper level jobs and summarizing related validity
studies);  sources  cited  supra notes  132-45  (same).
While claims have  been made  for the  validity of assessment  centers,  many writers
have  questioned  the  significance  of  the  validity  studies  on  which  these  claims  are
based.  See  infra pp.  ioi6-i8; see also Hinrichs,  supra note  144,  at 600  (assessment
center  validity  studies  "rarely  if  at  all"  address  the  key  issue  whether  the  centers
succeed  in predicting  job performance).
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to written tests at the  time of Griggs, and that was thought to
provide  a  reason  for  developing  the  Griggs  requirement  of
proof of job-relatedness.
The point is not that the validation techniques  appropriate
on  the  upper  level  will  be  identical  to  those  developed  for
lower  level  selection  devices.  There  may  well  be  differences
in  selection  methods  that  call  for  development  of  new  tech-
niques.  Techniques  developed  in  the  context  of written  tests
given  in identical form  to hundreds  of applicants may well  be
of limited assistance.  The point is rather that the fundamental
principles  of validation  apply  to  all  selection  devices;  accept-
ance  of this  concept  would  lead  to  the  development  of  tech-
niques  appropriate  to  upper level  devices.
3.  Quality of Performance. - It  seems  likely  that fear  of
lowering  the  quality  of performance  in  jobs  that are  thought
to  really  matter 147  is  a major  factor  underlying  development
of  a  differential  standard.  On  the  lower  level,  courts  strike
down subjective  criteria  not because  exclusively  objective  cri-
teria  would  be  preferable,  but  because  at that  level  the  pos-
sibility that a subjective system  might produce better qualified
candidates  is not thought to be worth the  cost of racial  exclu-
sion.  By contrast, on  the upper level courts uphold subjective
systems  because  selection  of  the  best candidates  seems  essen-
tial.  Moreover,  courts  may  be reluctant  to  demand  proof of
job-relatedness  and  business  necessity  on  the  upper  level  be-
cause  such  proof  will  be  difficult  and  expensive  to  produce.
Courts  may  fear that requiring  this proof would  seriously  im-
pair the quality of performance  in two ways.  First, the quality
of important  social  institutions  might  be  adversely  affected  if
employers  expended  resources  on  validation  or  related  litiga-
tion,  or  if they  altered  employment  devices  to  suit the  views
of judges and testing experts.  Second,  employers  may opt for
a  quota system  to  avoid the  costs  of litigation  and  validation;
if we assume that existing employment  schemes select the most
qualified  candidates,  we  can impose  quota systems  only at the
risk of reducing  quality of performance.
A  major  argument,  then,  for  a  relaxed  standard  on  the
upper  level  ultimately  rests  on  a rejection  of the  meritocratic
rationale  that has been  used  to justify  the  Griggs impact  doc-
trine.148  But if  quality of performance  is  more  important  on
147 This concern  was  expressed  by the  dissenting judge  in  Davis v.  Califano,  613
F.2d  957  (D.C. Cir.  1979):  "To my mind this  case  presents  an  issue that is  of great
national  concern  - is the cry of discrimination  going  to be used as  a means  for the
promotion  of  underqualified  employees  to  positions  requiring  great  ability?"  Id.  at
972  (MacKinnon, J.,  dissenting).
148  See supra pp.  957-59.
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the  upper  level,  so  also,  arguably,  is  the  cost  of racial  exclu-
sion.  Black participation  in policymaking jobs at major social
institutions  is  important  for  a  number  of reasons,  including
the  potential  for  affecting  the  way  race-related  issues  are  re-
solved.  Moreover,  even  if  the  only  concern  were  quality
of  performance  - if  the  cost  of  racial  exclusion  were  ig-
nored  - there  are  strong  arguments  supporting  Griggs'
meritocratic  rationale.  It  is the  constant refrain  of civil  rights
litigants  that  they  are  seeking  not  to  destroy  but  to  further
merit-based  employment.  A  review  of  the  litigation  in  this
area reveals  that there  is  a good  deal to  this  claim.
In the first place,  contrary to  the common  assumption,  the
standard  imposed  in lower level cases  has not been  impossibly
strict.  Courts have not blindly rejected  all systems not meeting
the highest standards  of the  industrial  psychologists.  Indeed,
in recent years  many courts have approved,  as adequately job-
related,  systems  based  on  validity  studies  falling far  short  of
professional  standards. 149
What  courts have done  is to impose  a standard that forced
employers  to  come  up  with  evidence,  rather  than  simply  ar-
guments  based  on  commonsense  and  common  practice.  Fur-
ther,  the standard  was  strict enough  to  force  courts  to scruti-
nize  closely  both  the  systems  at  issue  and  the  employers'
justifications  for  those  systems.  In  applying  this  standard,
courts  were  educated  by the  testing  experts.  Courts  learned,
for  example,  that  certain  selection  devices  that  seemed  ob-
viously job-related were  not.  Thus,  one study of a high school
diploma  requirement  showed  that  those  with  a  diploma  had
a higher  turnover  rate  than  those  without;  high  school  grad-
uates were  more likely to get bored  with routine jobs. 150  The
courts  also learned  some  fundamental  questions  to  ask in an-
alyzing  the  job-relatedness  of employment  systems.  Had  the
employer  made  any  effort  to  determine  what kind  of perfor-
mance  was  called  for  in  the  job  at  issue?  Did  the  employer
have  any  way  of  deciding  which  job  incumbents  were  per-
forming most effectively,  and therefore any way of discovering
whether  its  selection  devices  successfully  predicted  good  per-
formance?
Critics  have  focused  on  the  technicalities  of  validation  in
149 See,  e.g.,  Guardians  Ass'n  of  N.Y.  City  Police  Dep't,  Inc.  v.  Civil  Serv.
Comm'n,  63o  F.2d  79,  89-9o  (2d  Cir.  ig8o)  (courts  have  not  interpreted  testing
theories so strictly as to strike down  all tests with disparate impact),  cert. denied, ioi
S.  Ct. 3083  (198).
150  R.  GUION,  supra note  27,  at 49i;  see also U.S.  DEP'T  OF  HEALTH,  EDUC.,
AND  WELFARE,  WORK  IN  AMERICA  135-36  (1973)  (education  and  job  performance
inversely  related  in many jobs).
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claiming that the Griggs burden is impossible to meet.  But the
fact  is  that  employers  in  the  lower  level  cases  lost,  for  the
most  part,  because  they  were  unable  to  provide  answers  to
such  fundamental  questions.  They  lost  because  they  could
produce  so  little  to  demonstrate  that  their  existing  selection
systems  were  in fact merit-based.
Litigation has also exposed the extent of the antimerit char-
acteristics  of  traditional  employment  systems.  The  systems
often seem designed  not only to screen  out minorities, but also
to  select,  reward,  and  advance  candidates  on  the  basis  of
factors  that  have  little  to  do  with  promoting  high  quality
performance.  Employment  schemes  typically  produced  by
civil service systems and collective bargaining  agreements often
place  a premium  on,  for  example,  employee  security  and  the
protection  of employees  against  individual  favoritism  or  bias.
The concept of reward and advancement  on the  basis of merit
is  to a great degree  sacrificed  in favor  of such interests.
When  courts  have  investigated  systems  traditionally  used
to  select  sanitation  workers,  police  officers,  firefighters,  and
school  principals,  they  have  found  written  examinations  that
were  absurd  on their face.  Exam questions  demanded  knowl-
edge  that a promising  candidate  had  no  reason  to  possess. 151
151  For  example,  the  1961  examination  for  New  York  City  elementary  school
principals  contained the  question:
Of the  following  characters  in the  nursery  rhyme,  THE  BURIAL OF  POOR





A question on  the  1965  exam  for junior high  school  assistant principals  in  New York
City went as  follows:





Another  multiple  choice  question  on  this  examination  asked:  "Which  one  of  the
following  violin  makers  is  NOT  of  the  great  triumvirate  of Cremona?"  Chance  v.
-Board  of  Examiners,  330 F.  Supp.  203,  220  n.23  (S.D.N.Y.  1971),  affd,  458  F.2d
1167  (2d  Cir.  1972).  The  district  court  noted:  "[Mlany  of [these]  questions  strike us
as having little  relevance  to the qualities expected of a school  supervisor."  Id. at 220.
The authors served as plaintiffs'  counsel  in the Chance case and in several  other cases
cited  in this  Article.
New  York  City  firefighters  were  tested  on  their  knowledge  of  such  words  as
"attest,"  "luminous,"  "deficit,"  and "irate."  Vulcan  Soc'y of the  N.Y.  City Fire Dep't
v. Civil  Serv.  Comm'n,  490  F.2d 387,  397  n.12  (2d  Cir.  1973).  The  court observed:
"It is hard to understand  how the ability to  find the  closest analogue to most of these
words  is a good  test of the  ability  to fight  fires  . . . ."  Id.; see also Boston  Chapter,
NAACP,  Inc.  v.  Beecher,  504  F.2d  1017,  1022  (ist Cir.  1974)  (Boston  firefighters
were  tested  on  the  spelling  of such  words  as  "pressurized"  and  "buoyancy"),  cert.
denied, 421  U.S.  910  (1975).
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To  succeed  on  such  examinations,  candidates  took  cram
courses designed to teach mnemonics.  Candidates for the New
York City  school principal  examinations  were  advised  to pre-
pare for essay questions on such topics as "Developing a Learn-
ing  Experience"  by  memorizing  "RICE"  ("Readiness;  Instruc-
tional  materials  provided;  Carrying  out  the  experience;
Evaluating the  experience").  They were  taught to  discuss the
topic of "Improving School  Discipline"  by memorizing  "PERT
CAGES" ("Planning of standards and rules;  Environment,  im-
provement  of,"  and  so  on). 152
The  courts found that such examinations  were used as  the
almost  exclusive selection  device;  no  consideration  was  given,
for  example,  to  personal  qualities  that might  make  police  of-
ficers likely to function well under stress,  to abide  by rules,  or
to relate well  to the community.  In  case after case,  the courts
struck  down  these  systems,  not  merely  because  defendants
failed to  prove that their exams  were job  related,  but because
the  evidence  as  a  whole  demonstrated  that  the  systems  were
irrational.  In Chance v.  Board of Examiners, the Second Cir-
cuit  struck  down  the  use  of the  school  principal  examination
described  above. 153  For  decades  educators  had  argued  that
the  rigidities  of the  selection  system  and  the  arbitrariness  of
the  examinations  discouraged  many  of the  most qualified  can-
didates  from  applying.  Critics  claimed  that  the  scheme  per-
petuated  the  mediocre  calibre  and  bureaucratic  mentality  of
the supervisory  staff.  When  suit was brought,  the superinten-
dent  of  the  city  school  system  refused  to  defend;  he  agreed
that  the  system  was  an  obstacle  to  improving  the  quality  of
supervisory  personnel.  The  district  court  found  the  written
examination  system to be  an  absurd and irrational method  for
selecting school supervisors;  the  Second  Circuit suggested that
it was no  better  than drawing  names  out of  a hat.154
152  Chance  v.  Board  of  Examiners,  330  F.  Supp.  203,  222  &  n.24  (S.D.N.Y.
1971),  affld, 458  F.2d  1167  (2d  Cir.  1972).
153  Chance v.  Board of Examiners,  458 F.2d  at  1175.
154 Id.  In  Association  Against  Discrimination  in  Employment  v.  City,  25  Fair
Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  1013  (2d Cir.  r98i),  the  court  reviewed  the  evidence  re-
garding the  challenged  firefighters'  examination  as follows:
[T]he exam had no rational  relationship  to the skills needed in firefighting.  ...
[T]he  Bridgeport  Fire  Chief had  testified  at the  remedy  hearing  "that  there
might  be  an inverse  correlation between  those  who passed the  exam  and those
who  are  most qualified  to  be  firefighters."  For  example,  while the  Fire  Chief
stated that superior physical  ability and intelligence  are the two most important
attributes,  the  1975  hiring process  used  simply a pass-fail physical  agility test,
and the  1975  written  exam  weighed negatively  any high  scores on  comprehen-
sion questions  ....  Ironically, the court noted that the  1975  exam "represented
a decided  improvement  over some  of the  earlier civil  service  exams employed
by Bridgeport."
Id.  at  1017  (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Civil service  schemes  for  choosing whom  to  promote often
seem  similarly at  odds  with merit.  In many  cases, little  or no
credit is given for  the quality  of prior performance.  Thus, the
most promising  predictor  of future  performance  is ignored.155
Nor is there much incentive to perform well in entry level jobs,
because  the quickest route  to promotion  is  not to focus on the
immediate job but to study for a written examination by taking
cram  courses.  These  examinations,  like  entry  level  examina-
tions,  have  often  been  condemned  by  the  courts  as
irrational.  '
5 6
Litigation  has  also  revealed  the  institutional  bias that  use
of these examinations  represents.  It  was known  for years that
black  candidates  as  a group  scored  much  lower  than  whites.
As  a  result,  disproportionately  few  blacks  made  the  cutoff
score  required  for  eligibility.  Moreover,  many  civil  service
systems  ranked  candidates  according  to  their  test  scores;  au-
thorities  were  generally  required  to  hire  from  the  top  of the
ranked  list.  Since  blacks  who  managed  to  make  the  cutoff
score  were  usually  ranked  low  on  the  list,  they were  the  last
to  be  hired.  Indeed,  if not  hired  before  a  new  examination
was  given,  they  might  never  be  hired,  for  the  old  eligibility
list was usually  eliminated.
The  examinations  placed  a  premium  on  mastery  of  the
English  language  and  on  traditional  test-taking  capacities  -
abilities  often  irrelevant  to the  jobs being  allocated.  Empha-
sizing these  abilities  did,  however,  put  blacks  and  Hispanics
at  a  significant  disadvantage.  As  a  result,  minorities  were
excluded  from  many  jobs  for  reasons  that had  little  bearing
on  their  likely  ability  to  perform.  A  vivid  illustration  was
New  York  City's  reliance  on  a  traditional  civil  service  exam-
ination  to  select sanitation  workers.  The pool  of those  likely
to be interested in these low-skilled jobs was significantly black
and  Hispanic,  and  many  in  the  Hispanic  group  had  limited
155  See sources  cited supra note  ioi.
156  See,  e.g.,  Firefighters Inst. for  Racial  Equality  v.  City of St.  Louis,  549  F.2d
5o6,  51,  (8th Cir.)  (written test  for  promotion  to  fire captain  "failed to  test the  one
major  job attribute  that separates  a firefighter from  a fire captain,  that of supervisory
ability" (emphasis  in  original)),  cert. denied, 434 U.S.  819  (1977);  Kirkland  v.  New
York  State  Dep't of  Correctional  Servs.,  374  F.  Supp.  1361,  1378 (S.D.N.Y.  1974)
(examination for promotion to correction  sergeant failed to test essential qualifications:
leadership,  understanding  of inmate resocialization,  ability  to empathize  with persons
from  different  backgrounds,  and  ability  to  cope  with  crises),  affld  in relevant part,
520 F.2d  420 (2d Cir.  1975),  cert. denied, 429  U.S.  823  (1976);  see also Officers  for
Justice  v.  Civil Serv.  Comm'n,  371  F.  Supp.  1328,  1338  (N.D.  Cal.  1973)  ("[Tlhe
construction  of the  examination  does  not reveal  the  careful attention  to  the  selection
of questions  necessary  to  insure  that  the  examination  accurately  tested  candidates'
knowledge,  skills,  or attitudes.").
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English  literacy.  For New  York to  rely  on such  an examina-
tion  to  fill  sanitation  department  jobs  - jobs  that  required
minimal  written  or  oral  communicative  abilities  - seemed  a
fairly blatant form  of institutional  racism.15 7
Litigation  has  also  revealed  the  extent  to  which  seniority
systems  have  sacrificed  merit  selection  and  high  quality  per-
formance  in  the  name  of  other  interests.  Seniority  systems
generally  prevent  the  rapid  promotion  of  the  best  qualified
workers  and  thereby limit incentives  for  good performance  on
lower  levels.  They  also  inject  into  job  placement  decisions
factors  that  are  completely  at  odds  with  business  safety  and
efficiency.  Seniority systems  normally  reward  those  with  the
greatest  seniority  by  giving  them  the  most  desirable  jobs,
which  are  often the more  difficult,  responsible  jobs.  Seniority
promotion  runs  contrary  to  merit  if  the  more  senior  are  no
longer as capable  as younger  workers.  On the other hand, the
most  desirable  jobs  sometimes  involve  easier  work  and  less
responsibility;  a merit system might place the least experienced
workers  in these  jobs.'5 8
Seniority systems also serve to protect the jobs of employees
whom  employers  might  consider  high  risk,  even  when  those
jobs entail  significant responsibilities.  In a case  involving the
New  York  City Transit Authority,  an  employment  policy  ex-
cluding  former  drug addicts,  even  those long engaged  in treat-
ment  and  rehabilitation  programs,  was  defended  on  grounds
of  business  necessity.  The  Transit  Authority  argued  that  all
its jobs  were  safety-sensitive  and  that exclusion  of those with
drug histories  was necessary  because  of their questionable  re-
liability.  Discovery revealed that a variety of potentially high-
risk  groups,  such  as  alcoholics  and  heart  disease  victims,  re-
ceived  significant  protection  as  a result  of seniority and  other
protective  provisions  under  the  collective  bargaining  agree-
157  This system was challenged  in  Lugo v. Bronstein,  No.  73 Civ. 4886  (S.D.N.Y.
filed Nov.  14,  1973).  The case  was resolved  by a settlement accepting  a substantially
revised examination  system  requiring only  minimal  English  language  and  arithmetic
skills,  and  the  ability  to  read  street  signs.  Lugo  v.  Bronstein,  No.  73  Civ.  4886
(S.D.N.Y.  order  accepting settlement and  dismissing case  June  26,  1974).
1SS  In  Hodgson  v.  Greyhound  Lines,  Inc.,  499  F.2d  859  (7th  Cir.  1974),  cert.
denied,  419  U.S.  1122  (i975),  the  employer  successfully  defended  on  grounds  of
business safety  and necessity  against  an  age  discrimination  claim  brought  under  the
Age  Discrimination  in  Employment  Act,  29  U.S.C.  §§  621-634  (1976  & Supp.  III
1979).  Litigation  revealed  a  seniority  system  that  seemed  inconsistent  with  safety
goals.  The system  meant that new and  inexperienced  drivers  were  placed  in "extra-
board" jobs, in which driver accidents  were most likely  because  of the long hours and
arduous  work.  At the  same time, older workers,  who the  company asserted might  be
incapable  of  performing  extra-board  work  safely,  were  allowed  by  virtue  of  their
seniority  to  choose such  work  if they wanted  the extra  money it provided.
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ment.  Alcoholics  who  had  worked  long  enough  to  gain  sig-
nificant  seniority  would  not  be  fired  even  if  caught  drinking
on  a concededly  safety-sensitive  job,  such  as  motorman.  Al-
coholics  could  join  a  Transit-Authority-sponsored  alcoholic
treatment program  while  continuing  to  perform  in  safety-sen-
sitive positions. 1 5 9
Antimeritocratic  influences  have  also  been  exposed  in  the
subjective  systems  often  used  at  the  lower level.  Court scru-
tiny  here  has revealed  the  degree  to  which job  allocation  de-
pends  on  friendship  and  nepotism 160  and  on  factors  directly
linked  to social status  and  race. 161
The  point is  not that traditional  employment  schemes  are
inevitably  inconsistent  with  business  safety  and  efficiency. 162
The point is  simply  that  litigation  has helped  reveal  that the
schemes have  not always been  designed primarily with  a view
to merit selection.  Rather,  they appear to have  been designed
to serve  a wide variety of interests - many of them in conflict
with merit selection.  Challenges  to such employment  schemes
as  racially  exclusionary  cannot,  therefore,  simply  be  charac-
terized  as  demands  that  merit  principles  be  compromised.
They  can  be  seen  to  further  those  principles  by exposing  the
real  workings  of job  allocation  schemes  and making  it  clear
which  aspects  of the  systems  serve  valid  interests  and  which
do  not.
The judicial record  with respect to upper level employment
systems  is  sparse  because  so  few  have  been  subject  to  tradi-
tional title VII scrutiny.  But there is no reason  to assume that
159  Beazer v. New York  City Transit Auth.,  399  F. Supp.  1032  (S.D.N.Y.  x975),
affld in part and rev'd in part,  558  F.2d 97  (2d Cir.  1977),  rev'd, 440 U.S.  568 (1979).
160  See,  e.g.,  Grant v. Bethlehem  Steel Corp.,  635  F.2d  1007  (2d Cir.  i98o),  cert.
denied,  xI  S.  Ct. 303 (i98).  The defendant  argued that the  dangerous  nature  of
steel  construction  work  justified  its  subjective  system  for  selecting  foremen.  Id.  at
1012,  io6.  The court discovered  that jobs  as foremen  were handed out by the  white
supervisors  to their white  friends  and relatives,  often without  regard to  safety consid-
erations;  supervisors had hired persons with drinking problems and persons responsible
for prior accidents.  Id. at  iox8-i9.
161  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  City  of  Chicago,  549  F.2d  415,  432  (7th  Cir.)
(striking  down  background  investigation  procedure  involving  inquiries  into  social
status and arrest records of a candidate's  family members),  cert. denied, 434 U.S.  875
(1977).
162  Cf. Feller,  A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining  Agreement, 61  CALIF.
L.  REv. 663,  768-69 (x973)  (collective bargaining agreements further  a sense of fairness
that is  important  to  the  employees'  effectiveness  and  that may,  in  terms of  overall
economic  efficiency,  justify  the  antimerit  aspects of  the  promotion  and  lay-off deci-
sionmaking such agreements  entail);  Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism,
PUB.  INTEREST,  Fall  1979,  at 69  (discussing conflicting  views on  whether  unionism
fosters  or  negates  economic  efficiency,  and  arguing that  in  many  settings  unionism
has more  positive than  negative  effects).
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upper  level  employment  systems  are  any  more  pure  in  their
merit orientation than lower level systems.  Wealth,  social sta-
tus, and personal relationships,  to take a few examples,  are of
immense  importance  in determining  who  gets selected  for the
most  prestigious  positions.  Many  employers  favor  graduates
of institutions from which their own  top level employees grad-
uated.  Upper  level  subjective  systems  typically  invest  deci-
sionmakers  with  broad  discretion,  allowing  the  expression  of
personal bias and inviting selection of candidates  who resemble
those  doing  the  selecting.  A  major  New  York  law  firm  de-
scribed  and defended  its  procedure  for selecting  associates  as
follows:
The record  of the applicant is,  of course,  a starting point,
but  in  every  case  the  final  decision  is  also  predicated  upon
subjective  factors  such  as  sincerity,  appearance,  poise,  and
the  ability  to  understand  and  articulate  conceptual
matters....  Only  during  the  interview  at  the  Firm  is  an
evaluation  of the  intangible  factors discussed  above  possible.
Thus,  the  initial  impression  of the  applicant  is  of necessity  a
lasting  one.  Much  depends  upon  the  "chemistry"  which  oc-
curs between  the applicant and  the interviewers.  It is impos-
sible to  exaggerate  the importance  of this  aspect of the inter-
view,  for a person  with  excellent grades  may well simply fail
to  impress  that  small  number  of persons  who  have  the ulti-
mate selection  responsibility. 163
The assessment center techniques  that are increasingly  used to
select  managerial  employees  represent  some  of  the  most  so-
phisticated  subjective  evaluation  systems  available.  Yet  they
too  rely  on  evaluation  of factors  that  lend  themselves  to  the
expression  of bias  and  the  perpetuation  of the  status  quo  -
factors  such as leadership,  ability to get along with others,  and
identification  with organizational  goals. 164
To  the  very  limited  extent  that  courts  have  scrutinized
upper  level  systems,  they  have  found  the  same  kind  of irra-
tionality  and  bias  that  were  revealed  in  many  lower  level
employment  systems.  One  example  is  Chance  v.  Board  of
Examiners,  165  one of the first cases in which  a court subjected
163  G.  COOPER,  H. RABB  &  H.  RUBIN,  FAIR  EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION  192  (1975)
(quoting  defendant's  brief  in  Kohn  v.  Royall,  Koegel  &  Wells,  59  F.R.D.  515
(S.D.N.Y.  1973) (No.  72  CiV.  2705),  appeal dismissed, 496  F.2d 1094  (2d  Cir.  1974)).
164  Yurko,  supra note  6,  describes  the use  of similarly vague  criteria by academic
institutions,  id. at  476-78,  as  well  as  of  such  status-quo-oriented  criteria  as  "the
consistency of the faculty member's educational  philosophy with that of the department
and  the  institution,  and  the  compatibility  of  his  personality  and  work  habits  with
those  of other members  of the  department."  Id.  at 477  (footnotes omitted).
165  458  F.2d 1167  (2d  Cir.  5972).
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an upper level employment  system to traditional  title VII  stan-
dards.  Another  is  a sex  discrimination  case challenging  New
York  Telephone's  system  for  selecting  managerial  candidates.
The  defendant's  subjective  process  was  supposed  to  assess
candidates'  capacities  for supervision  and  leadership.  The de-
fendant gave  significant credit for military experience,  because
"'[t~he  military  ...tend[s]  to  give  their officers  rather  imme-
diate  roles  of responsibility."'' 166  Teaching,  by contrast,  was
not  considered  a  significant  supervisory  experience.  When
asked  how  he  knew  that  experience  as  a military  officer  was
more  valuable  than  experience  as  a teacher,  the  employee  in
charge  replied,  "'I  guess  I'm  paid  to  make  this type  of judg-
ment."1
67
One  of the  few  other  cases  striking  down  an  upper  level
subjective  system  involved  a  performance  evaluation  system
for  professional  level  employees  in  a  Mississippi  agency. 168
The  agency  had only  recently been  transformed  from  a dual,
segregated  system  into  an  integrated  one.  The  court  noted
that a substantial  part of the  evaluation  guide for supervisors,
who were  to assess  the job performance  of their subordinates,
related  to  characteristics  that  plainly  lent  themselves  to
bias - characteristics  such  as  public  acceptance,  appearance
and  grooming,  personal  conduct,  outlook  on  life,  and  ethical
habits. 169  In  another  case,  in which  the  Reader's Digest was
charged  with sex discrimination,  discovery of personnel records
revealed  that  male  employees  were  sometimes  given  raises
when  their  families  expanded,  the  rationale  being  need.  The
records  revealed  no  evidence  that  female  employees  received
favorable  consideration  for  raises when  they had children. 170
Only if courts  apply the  demanding  business  necessity  test
will upper level systems  be exposed  to critical  inspection.  The
kinds  of  questions  that  courts  learned  to  ask  in  lower  level
cases  can be put usefully to upper level employers.  Have they
decided  what they think  the job  entails  and  what constitutes
effective  performance?  What  basis do  they have  for  conclud-
ing that their systems  are  selecting the  best employees?  Have
166  Leisner v. New York Tel.  Co.,  358  F. Supp. 359,  365 (S.D.N.Y.  1973)  (quoting
testimony of defendant's  personnel  supervisor).
167  Id. at 369  (quoting testimony).
168  Wade  v.  Mississippi  Coop.  Extension  Serv.,  372  F.  Supp.  126  (N.D.  Miss.
1974),  aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 528  F.2d 508  (5th
Cir.  1976).
169  Id.  at  142.
170 Interview with George  Cooper in New York  City (Sept. 13, i98o).  Mr. Cooper
was counsel to plaintiffs in  Smith v. Readers Digest Ass'n,  15 Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas.
(BNA) 16o6 (S.D.N.Y.  1974).
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they considered  alternative selection systems that would be less
discriminatory  in  effect?  If  so,  do  they  have  any  basis  for
concluding that such  systems  would work  less well?
When  such  questions  are  asked  and  employers  have  pro-
vided whatever justifications they can,  courts will at least have
a better understanding  of the  systems  in question.  They  may
conclude  in  some  cases  that  the  justifications  are  strong  and
that the  systems  should  be  upheld.  In  other  cases  they may
conclude  that  the  systems  cannot  be  defended  as  true  merit
systems.  But  courts  will  at  least  have  information  enabling
them  to  decide  whether  the  racially  exclusionary  impact  of
upper level systems  is justified.
When  systems  are  struck  down,  employers  will  be  free  to
devise  new  systems that can be justified  as job-related  or that
will at least have  no  racially  exclusionary  impact.  This effort
may  mean  expenditures  for  validation,  but  testing  experts
counsel  that  more  resources  should  be  devoted  to  developing
valid  selection systems  for the  most important  jobs. 171  Alter-
natively,  striking  down  the  system  may  create  pressure  for
quotas  or racially proportionate  hiring.  But this pressure  will
be  directly  related  to  the  weakness  of  the  justifications  for
existing systems.  Courts are inherently conservative  creatures.
They  are  not  likely  to  strike  down  upper  level  employment
systems  unless,  upon  scrutiny,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  case
for a system  that excludes blacks  has  simply not  been made.
IV.  PRACTICAL  IMPLICATIONS  OF  A  SINGLE  STANDARD:
MAJOR  ISSUES  IN  APPLYING  TRADITIONAL  TITLE  VII
STANDARDS  TO  UPPER  LEVEL  EMPLOYMENT
Differences  between  upper  and  lower  level  jobs  and  job
systems  will  require  some  creativity  if  traditional  title  VII
standards  are  to  be  adapted  and  applied  on  the  upper  level.
One  important  difference  is  numerical:  in  the  entire  nation,
there  are  relatively  few  bank  managers  or  astronomy  profes-
sors,  and few persons seeking such jobs at any given time.  By
contrast,  a single  city may  employ many  thousands  of sanita-
tion  workers  and  may  hire  hundreds  each  year.  The  small
number  of jobs  and  applicants  on  the  upper  level  makes  it
harder  to  analyze  the  racial  impact  of  the  selection  systems
used 172  and harder to  prove  validity  by methods  that rely  on
171 See,  e.g.,  M.  DUNNETTE,  PERSONNEL  SELECTION  AND  PLACEMENT  8  (1966).
172  These  problems  have  been  exacerbated  by  recent  Supreme  Court  decisions
requiring  greater precision  in  analyzing  adverse  racial  impact than  some  courts  had
been  demanding.  See,  e.g.,  Hazelwood  School Dist.  v.  United  States, 433  U.S.  299,
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statistical  comparisons  of  test  performance  with  job  perfor-
mance. 173  Selection  systems  on the  upper level are  also likely
to  be multifactored  and discretionary,  and therefore  more  dif-
ficult to analyze,  while lower level  systems often  rely on a few
absolute,  objective requirements - attaining a score above the
cutoff  on  a  civil  service test,  passing  a  physical  examination,
or possessing  a high  school  diploma.
Given these differences,  the courts must develop new meth-
ods  for  assessing  both  the  job-relatedness 74  and  the  racial
impact  of upper  level  selection  systems.  They  must,  for  ex-
ample,  be  willing  to look  at the  collective  impact  of selection
systems  for  all  of an  employer's  management  positions  when
those systems share significant common elements.  Courts must
also be willing to consider challenges  to industrywide  practices
for  which  meaningful  statistics  are available.  Otherwise,  jobs
held  by  very  few  employees  under  any  particular  employer
will be immune from scrutiny.  '7 5  When upper level employers
use  education  or  experience  as  important  factors  in  hiring,
courts  must focus  on  the  impact that  use of such factors  will
necessarily  have on blacks  as  a group,  if the number  of actual
applicants  involved  is too  small for specific  impact  analysis.
Likewise,  courts  should  take  advantage  of computer  tech-
nology  and  statistical  methods  to  analyze  complex  subjective
systems  in  order  to  determine  what  factors  are  important  in
decisionmaking.  Thus,  even  if the employer  has no  clear pol-
icies  setting  the  weight  for  various  objective  and  subjective
factors,  analysis of company personnel records can give a fairly
clear  picture  of what role  each  factor  has played. 176
The  following  Sections  discuss  some  of  the  major  issues
309-1o (1977);  International Bhd. of Teamsters  v. United States,  431  U.S. 324, 348-55
(1977).
173  See supra note  133.
174  Synthetic  validity,  for  example,  enables  employers  to  validate  tests  for jobs
with few incumbents  by combining the  results of validity studies for a number of job
titles.  This technique  is based on the assumption that all jobs are merely the collection
of identifiable job components.  Tests for each of the job components  can be validated
by  developing  criteria  measures  for  the  job  component  and  performing  a  validity
study using all employees in jobs that contain  the same job  component as the sample.
E.  MCCOUMICK  & D.  ILGEN,  supra note  135,  at 125-28.
175 Courts  must also  explore  the  usefulness  of the  Uniform  Guidelines'  provision
that statistical significance  may  not  be demanded  under  certain  circumstances.  The
Guidelines'  four-fifths  rule  provides that  federal  agencies  will  regard  as  evidence  of
adverse  impact  the  fact that a  passing  rate on  a  selection  procedure  for a  minority
group  is less  than  four-fifths  the  passing rate  of the  highest group.  Uniform  Guide-
lines,  supra note  13,  §  16o7. 4(D).  Absence  of  statistical  significance  when  small
numbers  are involved is relevant but not necessarily determinative  of whether adverse
impact  will  be found.
176 The opinion  in  Vuyanich  v.  Republic  Nat'l  Bank,  5o5  F.  Supp.  224  (N.D.
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courts would face in applying traditional  title VII standards  to
upper level  employment.
A.  Importance of Class Action Treatment
In lower level  cases,  courts  have granted  class certification
quite  liberally177  because  of the  group-oriented  nature  of  the
alleged  wrong  and  of  any  relief  that  might  be  appropriate.
Moreover,  courts have  recognized that class treatment may be
essential  if substantive  rights  are to  be vindicated;  most cases
would not be brought on  an individual  basis,  given such prob-
lems  as  the  costs  of litigation  and  legitimate  fears  of retalia-
tion. 17 8  These  traditional justifications  for  class  action  treat-
ment  are  equally  apposite  in  upper  level  job  cases.  Indeed,
such treatment may be even more  important to the vindication
of substantive  rights  on  the  upper level.
Given  the  many  antidiscrimination  laws  and  regulations
that exist today,  overt and blatant forms of discrimination will
be  rare,  especially  on  higher  levels  where  the  decisionmakers
are  likely to  be  more  sophisticated  and  legally  astute.  Hence
the  socially  significant  questions  are  whether  upper  level  em-
ployment systems permit the  expression  of conscious or uncon-
scious bias,  and whether systems that result in racial  exclusion
can be justified  as job-related.
Cases  tried on  an  individual basis  will  rarely resolve  these
questions.  Analysis  of the  overall operation of an employment
system requires broad proof about how the system has affected
groups  of  candidates  and  employees.  Such  evidence  might
Tex.  198o),  demonstrates  how  multiple regression  and  other forms  of statistical  anal-
ysis  can  be used  to create  a detailed  description  of a complex  employment  scheme.
For discussion of the use of these techniques in  employment litigation, see D.  BALDUS
& J.  COLE,  supra note 83;  Finkelstein,  supra note  83;  Fisher,  Multiple Regression in
Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM.  L.  REv.  702  (i98o);  Greenfield,  From  Equal to Equiv-
alent Pay: Salary Discrimination  in Academia, 6  J.L. & EDUC.  41  (i977); Gwartney,
Asher,  Haworth  & Haworth,  supra note  3o; Note,  Beyond the Prima Facie Case in
Employment Discrimination  Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89  HARV.  L.  REv.
387  (1975).
177  See supra pp.  963-64.
178 See,  e.g.,  7  C.  WRIGHT  &  A.  MILLER,  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  AND  PROCEDURE
§  1762,  at  602  (1972).
Rutherglen,  supra note  52,  argues  that the  general judicial  presumption in  favor
of class  action  certification  should  not extend  to all  title  VII  cases.  This  argument,
however,  is  based  on  the  theory that the  propriety  of class  action  treatment should
turn on the merits of the substantive  claim.  Id. at 724-30.  Rutherglen considers  class
action  treatment  appropriate  for  disparate impact  claims:  "Griggs thus  established a
theory of liability designed  for class  wide application."  Id.  at  713.  The  importance
of applying the disparate impact doctrine  to upper level  cases  is discussed at infra pp.
xoo4-o6.
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theoretically  be  available  to  an  individual  plaintiff  who
charged  that  an  individual  employment  decision  was  the  un-
lawful  product  of  a  discriminatory  system.  As  a  practical
matter,  however,  evidence  in  an  individual  case  will  be  far
more limited.  When the issue is one individual's job treatment
rather  than  the  treatment  of a  larger  class,  courts  will  ordi-
narily  not permit the  extensive  discovery and  proof needed to
understand  a system's operations.
Moreover,  cases  brought on  an individual basis will, under
current  legal  doctrine,  almost  inevitably  be  lost  even  if  the
courts permit  proof about the  operation  of the overall  system.
And if the individual case is lost, the court will have no reason
to assess  the legality  of the  employment system  as  a whole.
A look at what typically happens  in upper level cases  tried
on  an  individual  basis  reveals  why  this  is  so.  Most  of  these
cases  have  been  based  on  a  disparate  treatment  theory  de-
signed  to  prove  covert  intentional  discrimination.  Ordinarily
the  plaintiff  in  such  a  case  must  demonstrate  that  he  was
passed  over  for  a  white  applicant  of  comparable  or  lesser
qualifications;  from this an  inference  of discriminatory  motive
can  be  drawn.  The  employer  can  rebut  this  inference  by
offering  a nondiscriminatory  reason  for  the  employment  deci-
sion;  the  plaintiff  can  then  prevail  only  by  proving  that  the
reason  is  a  mere  "pretext,"  a  cover  for  intentional  discrimi-
nation.  The entire  case  depends  on  there  being a systematic,
predictable  method  of  employment  decisionmaking,  so  that  a
discriminatory  decision  will  stand  out as  aberrational.  These
requirements  might  be  satisfied  in  a lower  level  case:  an  ap-
plicant for a job  as a truck driver might  well be able to show
that an employer hires all candidates satisfying certain  minimal
requirements;  the  employer's  defense  that  the  applicant  was
rejected  because  of  inadequate  performance  with  a previous
employer might easily be rejected  as  a pretext  if the  employer
did  not  ordinarily  check  applicants'  references.  By contrast,
a lawyer  who  applied  for  work  with  a law  firm  or a teacher
who  applied for  an  assistant professorship  would find  it hard
to  prove  that  an  employment  rejection  was  aberrational  and
hence  presumptively  discriminatory.  The court could not take
a  candidate's  possession  of  certain  qualifications  as  evidence
that the candidate  would ordinarily  be hired, and the law firm
and the  university  would  argue  that  their  decisions  reflected
overall subjective  assessments  of many factors - assessments
that a court  could  not easily unpack  or challenge.
On the other hand,  plaintiffs may be  able to prove that the
overall operation  of  a  particular  system  reflects  intentional
bias.  Thus,  when  a  bank's  black  and  white  employees  are
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HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev.  1001 1981-1982HARVARD  LAW  REVIEW
looked at as groups and when productivity-related  factors such
as age,  experience,  and education  are  controlled for,  differen-
tial  treatment  of  blacks  and  whites  may  indicate  that  the
bank's  subjective  evaluation  process  is  operating  in an  inten-
tionally  discriminatory  way.  However,  even  if  this  kind  of
evidence  is  accepted  in  an  individual  case,  it  will  be hard  to
prove  bias  against  particular  individuals  unless  the  bias  is
blatant:  courts  are  reluctant  to  stand  in  the  place  of the  em-
ployer  and  to  try to  make  the  difficult  determination  of how
the overall subjective assessment process  would have come  out
had there  been  no  improper motive. 179
Even if cases brought on an individual basis could be won,
they would rarely  be worth the  expense.  A  glance at the  170-
page  opinion  in  Vuyanich  v.  Republic  National Bank,i80  a
challenge  to a bank's employment  system,  and at the evidence
presented  in  the  case  by  statisticians,  econometricians,  and
industrial psychologists  gives some idea of the battle of experts
that  these  cases  have  become.  It is  little  wonder  that  some
courts have  expressed  concern  at the spectacle  of trials lasting
for weeks,  following years  of discovery,  and  involving a mul-
titude  of statistical  and  other  experts  and  seemingly  endless
testimony about the credentials  of a single candidate. 18'  These
cases are just not worth it, from the point of view of litigants,
courts,  or society  generally,  unless  broad  issues  related  to  the
legality of entire job systems are to  be considered.  Class action
treatment is  designed  to deal  with such  issues.
Moreover,  class  action  treatment  enables  courts  to  avoid
the particularized  intervention  in employer  decisionmaking  re-
quired in individual cases.  When  courts have determined that
selection  systems  have  an  unjustified  disparate  impact,  they
have  generally  ordered  reform  without  deciding  how  the  re-
formed  system should look.  They have  rarely done more  than
outline  broad  goals  - for instance,  that  the  system  have  no
disparate impact  or that it be  validated;  typically,  they  have
179  While  most  upper  level  cases  brought  as  individual  actions  have  relied  on
disparate treatment doctrine,  similar  problems would be encountered  in  an individual
case  relying  on  a  disparate  impact  doctrine.  Even  if the  plaintiff  were  allowed  to
prove that the  employer's  system had  an  unjustified  impact, the  plaintiff would  have
to  show  that  he or  she was  qualified  for  the  job in  order to  prevail.  Courts  would
probably  be  reluctant  to  dispute  the  employer's  assertion  that the  plaintiff  was  not
adequately qualified.
180 505  F.  Supp.  224  (N.D. Tex.  i98o).
181  See,  e.g.,  Lieberman  v.  Gant,  474  F.  Supp.  848  (D.  Conn.  1979),  affd,  630
F.2d 6o (2d Cir. i98o); Johnson  v.  University of Pittsburgh, 435  F.  Supp.  1328 (W.D.
Pa.  1977).
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outlined  principles  for  how  the  class  as  a  whole  should  be
treated,  but have  been  able  to  avoid  adjudicating  particular
candidates'  qualifications.  The details of individual relief have
to a great extent been left to negotiations  between  the parties.
In  addition,  liberal  class  action  treatment  is  required  be-
cause of the small numbers  of candidates  for many upper level
jobs.  Proof  of racial  impact may  be found  inadequate  unless
the numbers  are large enough to  permit statistically  significant
conclusions.  Class action  challenges  to  a broad range  of  em-
ployer practices  must be allowed so  that the numbers  are large
enough  to expose  existing  patterns.
An example  illustrates  the importance  of class action treat-
ment  in  solving  the  small-numbers  problem.  A  bank  might
have  twenty  job  titles  on  the  managerial  level,  with  five
hundred employees.  In a given job  title, such  as that of credit
analyst,  there  might  be  two  dozen  employees.  (In analyzing
the  impact  of  this  selection  process,  a  court  must  focus  on
selections  after  1965,  because  it  was  only  then that  discrimi-
nation  became  unlawful  under  title  VII.)  If the  turnover  of
credit  analysts  is  low,  the  numbers  of  employees  hired  or
rejected  will  be  too  small  to  reveal  any  disparate  impact,
except  in  extreme  cases.  However,  if the bank uses  a similar
system  to make hiring,  promotion,  and  salary  decisions for  its
entire  managerial  staff  and  if  a  challenge  to  the  entire  em-
ployment  scheme  is  allowed,  disparate  impact  - if  any  -
will  be  revealed  far  more  easily.  For  example,  a  salary
analysis,  controlled  for  years  of  education  and  relevant expe-
rience,  could  be done of all managerial  employees.  This  anal-
ysis  might  reveal  that blacks  receive  lower salaries  than com-
parably  qualified  whites,  a  phenomenon  that  would  be
invisible in  examining  any single job title.
As  a  practical  matter,  the  class  action  decision  will  often
determine  whether  the  court  sees  the  larger  picture.  If  the
court  denies  class treatment  altogether,  an  individual  seeking
a job  as  a  credit  analyst  will  likely  be  permitted  to  present
evidence  only  about  how  credit  analysts  are  selected.  If  the
court grants  class action treatment but limits the class to those
seeking  credit  analyst  positions,  proof  will  probably  be  simi-
larly limited.  Only if the  court grants broad class  action treat-
ment, allowing a challenge to the bank's entire system of hiring
and  promoting  managers,  is  the  larger  picture  likely  to  be
considered  legally  relevant. 8 2
1,2  The Supreme  Court has  granted  certiorari on the  related issue of the  propriety
of permitting  an employee charging  promotion discrimination  to represent the class of
persons  allegedly  discriminated  against  in  hiring.  General  Tel.  Co.  v.  Falcon,  59
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B.  Importance of Disparate  Impact Analysis as Compared
with Disparate Treatment Analysis
It is striking how many upper level job discrimination cases
are analyzed  as  disparate  treatment cases  and dismissed  with-
out  discussion  of  whether  a  disparate  impact  case  has  been
made  out.  Title  VII's significance  depends  on  an understand-
ing of the relationship  between  the two doctrines  and on  court
willingness  to  apply disparate  impact  analysis.
Analytically,  plaintiff's  prima facie  case  under  a disparate
treatment  theory  looks  much  the  same  as  under  a  disparate
impact theory, at least when the challenge  is to an employment
system  rather than  an individual  decision.  In both,  the plain-
tiff must show that the  employment system  treats  blacks  dif-
ferently  from  comparably  qualified  whites. 183  But the  weight
of the burden the employer must bear once the plaintiff makes
out a prima  facie  case  depends  on  which  doctrine  is  applied.
Under  the  disparate  treatment  doctrine,  the  employer  need
only explain the differential  treatment,  and unless the plaintiff
can show that this explanation  is a pretext masking intentional
discrimination,  the  plaintiff loses.184  Under  the  disparate im-
pact  theory,  by  contrast,  the  employer  must  prove  the  job-
relatedness  and business  necessity of his  selection  devices.
The difference  between these  burdens on the employer  will
often  be the  difference  between winning  and losing.  Rational
explanations  abound for why blacks  are assigned  to  less desir-
able jobs or receive  lower salaries.  Proof that business  neces-
sity demands  that they be treated  this way is  a different mat-
ter.  The  workings  of  a typical  upper  level  employment  case
illustrate  the  relationship  between  the  two  doctrines  and  the
central  significance  of impact  analysis.  Ordinarily  it  will  be
easy for plaintiffs  to show that blacks  do less well than whites
in  terms  of hiring,  job  placement,  and  salary.  To  make  out
a traditional disparate treatment case,  however,  plaintiffs must
also demonstrate that blacks are treated differently from whites
with  comparable qualifications.  This  might  be  done  through
use of objective,  quantifiable  data concerning  years  of educa-
U.S.L.W.  3385  (U.S.  petition  for certiorari  filed  Sept. 21,  1981)  (describing questions
presented),  cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.  3465  (U.S.  Dec.  7,  i98I) (No.  81-574).
183  See supra pp.  964-65.
184 See supra pp.  964-65  & note 58.  Under disparate treatment  analysis,  once the
plaintiff has  produced  evidence  implying discriminatory  motive,  the  employer's  only
obligation  is  to  "articulate"  a  nondiscriminatory  explanation.  See  Texas  Dep't  of
Community  Affairs  v. Burdine,  450 U.S.  248  (I98i);  Board of Trustees  v.  Sweeney,
439  U.S.  24,  vacating and remanding per curiam  569  F.2d  x69  (ist Cir.  1978).
Burdine makes  clear that the employer's  explanation must take the form of admissible
evidence,  450 U.S.  at 255,  and  must be clear and reasonably  specific.  Id. at  258.
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tion,  years  of related  experience,  and  the  like.  Plaintiffs  can
then  show  that,  even  when  such  factors  are  controlled  for,
blacks  are  treated  less well  than whites.
This showing should be sufficient under traditional  dispar-
ate  treatment  analysis  to  place  the  burden  of  explanation  on
the defendant.  The defendant  may then theorize  that discrep-
ancies  between  the  treatment  of  blacks  and  whites  are  ex-
plained  by  the  fact  that  whites  are  more  likely  to  possess
advanced  degrees  in business-related  fields.  Or the  defendant
might  theorize  that  differences  in  quality  of  performance  ac-
count  for  the  differential  treatment.  The  defendant  would
attempt to show that,  if these  additional  factors are  controlled
for,  the  treatment  of blacks  and whites  is equivalent.
The  crucial  issue  is  what should  happen  at  this  stage  of
the litigation.  Plaintiffs can go on to the next stage of disparate
treatment  analysis  and  try  to  demonstrate  that  defendant's
explanation  is  a mere  pretext concealing  intentional  discrimi-
nation.  Such  a demonstration  is  not  easy to  make,  however.
If the  explanation  is  not  shown  to  be  a pretext,  the  question
is  whether  the  case  should  be  dismissed.  It  should  not,  if
courts  mean  to  apply  the  Griggs doctrine  to  upper level  em-
ployment systems.  Defendants' rebuttal  to the disparate treat-
ment case has simply fleshed out a previously obscure employ-
ment  scheme,  indicating  more  specifically  which  policies  are
responsible for blacks'  doing less well.  Under Griggs, any such
policies  are  suspect:  blacks  are  presumed  capable  of doing as
well  as  whites;  therefore,  it  is  up  to  the  employer  to justify
any policies  that have  a disparate impact.  For example,  if the
defendant's  explanation  of  disparate  treatment  in  the  hypo-
thetical  above  rests  in  part  on  the  fact  that  business-related
degrees  are  used  as  employment  criteria  and  that blacks  are
less likely to have  such degrees,  the  defendant  should have  to
prove  the  job-relatedness  of  such  degrees,  Similarly,  if  the
defendant's explanation  rests  on subjective  evaluations  of em-
ployee  performance,  the  bank  should  have  to  prove  that the
evaluations  were  accurate  or  that the  evaluation  systen  was
job-related. 1 8 5
18s  See  D.  BALDUS  & J.  COLE,  supra note  83,  1.2,  at 46-47  (under traditional
legal  standards,  defendants  should  have  burden  of  justifying  factors  produced  in
explanation  of disparate  treatment).
In James v.  Stockham Valves  & Fittings Co.,  559  F.2d 310  (5th Cir.  1977),  cert.
denied, 434  U.S.  1034  (1978),  the  court  followed  the  approach outlined  in  text.  The
defendant  had  attempted  to  explain  disparate  treatment  by  a  regression  analysis
relying  on  employees'  merit  rating  and  educational  level.  Merit rating was  rejected
as  a  suspect  subjective  process.  Educational  level  was  rejected  on  the  grounds  of
disparate  impact  and  lack of  apparent  job-relatedness.  Id. at  332.  Similarly,  in  a
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Failure  to  apply impact  analysis  in  this manner  takes the
teeth  out  of title  VII  on  the  upper  level;  employers  will  ordi-
narily have apparently rational explanations for the differential
treatment  of black  employees  - explanations  resting,  for  ex-
ample,  on differences  in experience  and education.  The entire
point  of Griggs was to  demand that  employers  produce  some-
thing more than seemingly reasonable  justifications for policies
with  a negative impact  on  blacks.
Courts  may sometimes fail  to apply disparate  impact anal-
ysis  because  plaintiffs'  initial  case  rests  on  a  disparate  treat-
ment  theory.  This  initial  plaintiff  strategy  may  be  sensible
when the  employment  scheme  at issue  is  obscure  and all  that
is  clear is that it results in differential  treatment - as is often
the case  in  upper  level employment.  Plaintiffs  cannot  always
know,  when they first file suit,  how defendants  will eventually
describe  their employment policies;  it is  not possible for  plain-
tiffs  to  show  that  unknown  policies  have  a disparate  impact.
Courts  must  recognize  that  one  important  function  of a  dis-
parate  treatment  challenge  is to force  defendants  to  articulate
their policies  so  that analysis  of their legality is  possible. 186
C. Advantages of Griggs  Approach in  Assessing Legality of
Subjective Selection Systems
Courts  striking  down  lower  level  subjective  systems  have
often suggested that systems  based on purely  objective  criteria
would  be preferable.  It  is  not  clear  that this  solution  is  par-
ticularly  good  on  the  lower  level,  and  it  certainly  does  not
professional  level case involving provision of agricultural  extension services,  the court
held  that, when  the defendant's  explanation  of disparate treatment  was based in part
on  a  performance  evaluation  system,  the  system  was  subject  to  Griggs analysis.
Because  the system  had a  disparate  impact  and  had not  been  validated,  the  expla-
nation  was rejected.  Wade  v. Mississippi  Coop.  Extension  Serv.,  372  F.  Supp.  126,
142-43  (N.D. Miss.  1974),  aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, vacated in
part on other grounds, and remanded, 528  F.2d 508  (5th Cir.  1976).
It  should not  be enough  to offer,  as did one  defendant,  an unsubstantiated  theory
that women have less motivation  for advancement.  See EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co.,  22 Fair Empl. Prac.  Cas. (BNA) 1665,  1679 (N.D. Ohio  I98O) (rejecting
such  a  defense).  Instead,  the  employer  should  have  to  prove that  women  are  less
qualified for advancement.
186  Unless  the  disparate  treatment  and  disparate  impact  doctrines  work  together
in  this fashion,  it is hard to make  sense of the coexistence  of two theories  for proving
discrimination  that place such different  burdens  of justification  on the employer.  This
problem  is noted and an alternative solution  presented  in Belton, Burdens of Pleading
and Proof in Discrimination  Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural  Justice, 34 VAND.
L.  REv.  1205,  1266-73  (198).  Professor  Belton  argues that,  in disparate  treatment
cases,  the  burden  of persuasion should  shift  to  the  defendant,  once  plaintiffs  have
made  out a prima  facie  case.  However,  the  Supreme  Court  ruled to  the  contrary in
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs  v.  Burdine,  450 U.S.  248,  258  (I98i).
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make  much  sense  on  the  upper  level.  Few  would  argue,  for
example,  that business managers  should be promoted  solely on
the basis  of seniority  or that academics should  be hired on the
basis  of the  number of  hours taught or pages  published.
Another  alternative  would  be  insistence  on  procedural  re-
form  of subjective  systems.  Many  courts have  suggested  that
unlawful systems could be cured by the development of specific
guidelines to control the exercise  of discretion,  by requirements
that job  openings  be  advertised,  and  by  addition  of  new  de-
cisionmakers  and  layers of  review. 187
Procedural  reform  may  be  an  important first  step.  It  may
help  to  control  the  bias  of individual  decisionmakers  and  to
open  up  and  expose  subjective  decisionmaking  for  review  by
courts.  But this  route  has  significant limitations.  First,  pro-
cedural  controls  cannot  provide  complete  protection  against
conscious and unconscious  bias.  As long as discretionary judg-
ment remains  an essential part of the  system - as it probably
will  in  upper  level  selection  - there  will  be  room  for  the
expression  of bias.188  There  is a  danger,  therefore,  in looking
to procedural  reform  as  an adequate  substitute for validation.
Moreover,  some  procedural  reforms  might  be  thought  to
interfere  with  effective  decisionmaking.  Thus,  courts  often
refer  to  the  need  for  guidelines  specifying  the  weight  to  be
given  various  factors.  But  predictive  judgments  about  how
people  will  perform  complex  jobs  may  best  be made  by  en-
trusting  an  intelligent  decisionmaker  with  discretion  to  make
187  See,  e.g.,  Frink v.  United States  Navy,  6  Fair  Empl.  Prac.  Cas. (BNA)  67,
70-71  (E.D.  Pa.  1977),  aff  d  mere.,  6og  F.2d  501  (3d Cir.  1979),  cert.  denied, 445
U.S.  930  (x98o);  Miller  v.  Continental  Can  Co.,  13  Fair  Empl.  Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)
i585,  16o2-o3  (S.D. Ga.  1976).
185  Guidelines  specifying  the  weight  to  be  accorded  particular  factors  have been
shown  to  have limited  impact;  decisionmakers  still tend to give  an assessment  based
on  their overall judgment.  Cf. E.  MCCORMICK  & D.  ILGEN,  supra note  135,  at 77-78
(the "halo effect"  causes  evaluation of the candidate  on many  criteria to be  influenced
by  the  decisionmaker's  evaluation  of  the  candidate  on  one  criterion);  Cooper,  Ubiq-
uitous Halo, go  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULL.  218  (198I)  (discussion of the  halo  effect and
procedures  to  minimize  it).  Even  when  asked  to  evaluate  performance  on  a  very
simple  task,  decisionmakers  may  be  influenced  by  race.  In  one  laboratory  study,
black  and  white  job  applicants  were  filmed  stacking  cans  onto  shelves;  the  only
difference  in  their  performance  was  that  some  stacked  more  swiftly  than  others.
Blacks  who  performed  as  swiftly  as  whites  were  found  by  white  raters  to  be  less
qualified  than  their white  counterparts.  Hamner,  Kim,  Baird & Bigoness,  Race and
Sex as Determinants  of Ratings by Potential  Employers in a Simulated Work-Sampling
Task,  59  J.  APPLIED  PSYCHOLOGY  705  (1974).  Pooling judgments  and  adding  levels
of review  limit the  impact only  of particular  biased  individuals.  If the  alleged  bias
at  issue  is  systemic  - if  the  concern  is  that white  decisionmakers  as  a  group  will
judge blacks  differently than they would judge  whites - then adding white  decision-
makers  will  do little  good.
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an  overall  assessment.  In  fact,  employers  at  the  upper  level
have  rarely  chosen  to  use  elaborate  weighting  schemes,  pre-
sumably because no  one is  sure exactly  what factors  make for
success  and how  important each  is.
One of the great advantages of the Griggs approach is that,
by focusing on results and proof of job-relatedness,  it gives the
employer  maximum  freedom  to  design  employment  systems;
the  sole constraint  is that the systems  must not exclude  blacks
unless  there  is  a  powerful  justification  for  their  doing  so.
Thus,  the  employer  can  attempt to validate  its subjective  sys-
tem without  having  to  moderate  it in  any  way. 189  If unable
to validate  its system,  the employer  is  free to  develop  another
system  that  is  designed  to  be  job-related  or  that  does  not
exclude  blacks.
D. Assessing Proof of Job-Relatedness and Business
Necessity on the  Upper Level
x.  Limitations of the  Testing Experts. - The  testing  ex-
perts have  developed extremely  helpful  methods for  analyzing
existing  employment  systems,  but  there  are  limits  on  their
ability to resolve fundamental  questions about whether racially
exclusionary systems can be justified.  In lower level job cases,
the  role  of testing  experts  has  been  largely  to  debunk  tradi-
tional  employment  systems.  On  the  upper  level,  however,
experts  can  be  expected  to  play  a  significant  role  both  in
defending  current  employment  schemes  and  in  creating  new
ones  designed to  withstand  legal challenge.
It  is  disturbing  that  the  "new"  employment  systems  de-
signed  by  testing  experts  often  look  similar  to  the  systems
earlier struck  down by the courts  as violative  of title VII,  and
result  in  similar  black  failure  rates.  This  result  would  be
defensible  if  the  new  test  development  process  were  to  be
trusted, 190
189  The  employer  may  have  to  analyze  how  the  system  works  for  purposes  of
validation,  but  the operation  of the  system  will  not have to  be altered.
190  Courts  have  found  reason  to  be  suspicious  of  the  design  of  new  selection
procedures,  In  Guardians  Ass'n  of  N.Y.  City  Police  Dep't,  Inc.  v.  Civil  Serv.
Comm'n,  484  F. Supp.  785 (S.D.N.Y.),  aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
and remanded, 63o  F.2d  79  (2d Cir.  ig8o), cert. denied, 1o  S.  Ct.  3o8i (1981),  the
court struck  down  a  selection  test for  police  officers.  It  noted  that the  test  had  a
disparate impact  and that the  defendant's failure to  follow  appropriate  procedures for
test development  was part of a long pattern  of discriminatory  testing.  Id.  at  798.  In
United States  v.  San Diego  County,  21  Fair Empl. Prac.  Cas.  (BNA)  402 (S.D.  Cal.
1979),  the  court enjoined  the use of a new sheriff sergeant's exam  designed to replace
another  exam found  unlawful.  The  court  rejected  the new  exam,  in part  because  it
did not test for  abilities found to  be  important  in  a job  analysis.  Id.  at 414.
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However,  courts should be wary of accepting without ques-
tion  the  solutions  and  defenses  proposed  by  testing  experts.
First,  these experts are likely  as a group to see  things primarily
from  the  employer's  perspective.  The  experts  who  designed
the validity studies and  employment schemes at issue in a title
VII  lawsuit  will  ordinarily have  been  hired  by the  employer.
Plaintiffs will of course have an opportunity to present experts,
but  their  testimony  will  ordinarily  be  limited  to  criticizing
studies  and  employment  schemes  produced  by the  employer's
experts.  Moreover,  the testing experts' professional  bias makes
them  likely  to  be  employer  oriented.  It  is  the  business  of
industrial  psychologists  and  other  testing  experts  to  develop
improved  selection  systems  for  employers.  They  inevitably
tend to  be  committed  to  the  rationality  of the  testing  devices
they are  trained  to develop.
A  second  reason  that  courts  should  be  reluctant  to  defer
too  much to the testing experts  is that these  experts  are,  after
all,  simply  technicians;  their expertise  gives  them no  basis  for
making the  value  choices  that determine  the  legality  of selec-
tion  systems.  The danger  is  that courts  will  accept  the  myth
of expertise  and avoid  their own responsibilities  to enforce  the
mandate  of  title  VII.  For  it  is  the  courts  that must  decide
whether  employers,  with  the  aid  of  their  experts,  have  ade-
quately explained  why their job performance  goals have to  be
defined  and  their  selection  systems  designed  such  that  blacks
are  significantly excluded  from  participation.
2.  Problems and  Potential of  Validation on  the  Upper
Level.  - (a) Job Analysis.  - Analysis  of  what  the job  does
or should entail  is crucial to  any attempt to design job-related
selection  systems  and  to  any  demonstration  that a  particular
system  is  in  fact  job  related.  We  must  know  the  kind  of
performance we  are looking for before  we can begin  rationally
to  design  systems  that  select  people  capable  of  that  perfor-
mance. 191
191  The  testing literature  recognizes  the  importance  of job  analysis.  See,  e.g.,  L.
CRONBACH,  ESSENTIALS  OF PSYCHOLOGICAL  TESTING  407 (3d ed.  1970)  (job analysis
is the first  task in performing a criterion-related validation  study);  DIvISION  14  PRIN-
CIPLES,  supra note  12,  at 4,  7  (a  job  analysis is  essential for proving content validity
and,  in most cases,  criterion-related validity);  E.  MCCORIICK,  JOB  ANALYSIS  240-71
(1979);  see also Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  §  607.14(A),  (B)(2),  (B)(3) (validity
studies  must  be  based  on  a  review  of  information  about  the  job,  which  ordinarily
must include  a job  analysis).
The  case  law  also  indicates  that job  analysis  is  the  critical  first  step.  See,  e.g.,
United States v.  City of Chicago,  549 F.2d 415,  429 (7th Cir.),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.
875  (1977);  Vulcan  Soc'y of  the  N.Y.  City  Fire  Dep't v.  Civil  Serv.  Comm'n,  490
F.2d 387,  395  (2d  Cir.  1973).
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A meaningful job  analysis  will be difficult for  many upper
level  jobs,  because  we  are  uncertain  what  constitutes  good
performance.  But  without  an  adequate job  analysis,  valida-
tion  is  impossible.  If  we  concede,  for  example,  that we have
very  little  idea what  it  means  to  be  a good  lawyer  and  that
we  consequently  cannot  analyze  how important  to  good law-
yering  are  the  analytical  skills measured  by law school  exami-
nations,  there  can be no way of validating  a law firm's reliance
on  law  school  grades  for  selecting  lawyers.  Similarly,  if we
concede  that  we do  not know  what makes  for effective  teach-
ing,  as did a lower court in a case  upholding  South  Carolina's
use of the National Teacher  Examination  (NTE), there can be
no  way  of  measuring  the  validity  of that  examination  as  a
device  for  selecting teachers.
192
(i)  Inadequacy of Job Description Approach. - The  task
of job  analysis  should  not  be  seen  as  simply  one  of job  de-
scription.  The  purpose  of  the  job  selection  enterprise  is  to
select  those  most  qualified  to  do  the  best job,  not  simply  to
perpetuate  current levels of performance.  The purpose  of val-
idation  in  the  context  of  a  racial  discrimination  claim  is  to
assess  whether  particular  selection  systems  are  necessary  to
promote  good  performance  despite  their  negative  impact  on
blacks.  The  latter  purpose  is  not  served  if, for  purposes  of
validation,  one describes jobs simply by describing what pres-
ent job incumbents  do.  An  appropriate  analysis of the job of
police officer  in a department whose officers  engage in brutality
would  not  consist  simply  of a description  of the  way  current
officers  perform  their jobs.
The job description  approach  is  likely  to lead  to  the  crea-
tion  of "new"  selection  systems  that perpetuate  the  racial  ex-
clusion  characterizing  the  old  system.  Thus,  if almost all  the
incumbents of a job are whites with middle class backgrounds,
a job analysis that focuses solely on the way they perform their
jobs is  likely  to reflect  characteristics  common  to middle class
whites.  Selection  devices  designed  to  test for  those character-
istics  are likely to continue to select whites  at disproportionate
rates.
192  United  States v.  South  Carolina,  445  F.  Supp.  1094,  xio8  n.13 (D.S.C.  1977),
afj'd  mem.  sub nom.  National Educ.  Ass'n v.  South  Carolina,  434  U.S.  1026  (1978).
Without  a job  analysis,  there  is  no  sense  of what  combination  of skills  makes  for
effective job  performance  overall.  Even  if one assumes  that the  skills  measured  by
law school  examinations  or by  the NTE are  important  to  some part  of effective  job
performance,  one  does  not  know  how  large  that part  is,  what  other  skills  may  be
important,  or whether  ability  to perform  on  the  examinations  correlates  with ability
to perform  in  ways that the  examinations  do not purport  to  measure.
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Although  the  importance  of  not  limiting  job  analysis  to
mere  job  description  seems  obvious,  the  point  has  received
little  attention.  Indeed,  the  task  of  job  analysis  has  been
routinely  described  in  the  testing  literature  as  one  simply  in-
volving  description. 193  When defendants  have  presented  evi-
dence  of validation  efforts,  they have  usually  relied  primarily
on  a  review  of  what  current  jobholders  are  doing. 194  The
"new"  selection  systems  spawned  by this  type  of job  analysis
have  often  had the  same  kind of adverse  impact on blacks  as
the  systems  previously  struck  down. 195  And  of  course,  this
result  tends simply  to  confirm  the  views  of  many that blacks
are less  capable  of performing  well  on the  job.  But it should
be clear  that, if job  analysis  relies  on  the  activities  and views
of job  incumbents,  a  selection  system  based  on  that  analysis
may well  select  a candidate  group  similar  to the  incumbents,
with a  similar  racial composition.
This  problem surfaced  at one stage  of the  Chance case,
196
a  suit  challenging  the  criteria  for  selecting  school  principals
and  other  supervisors  in  New  York  City's  public  school  sys-
tem.  Plaintiffs  charged  that  the  selection  system  had  an  ad-
verse racial  impact and  was  not job  related;  they alleged  that
the  system  failed  to  select  the  most  qualified  candidates  be-
cause  it ignored  such  characteristics  as  a principal's  ability to
relate to the local community.  After the old system was struck
down,  defendants  hired  experts  to conduct job  analyses  in  an
attempt  to  develop  a  legally  defensible  selection  system.  The
analyses  consisted  largely  of descriptions  of  what the  incum-
bent school  supervisors - almost all whites - did on the job
and of which  tasks they considered  most important.  Plaintiffs
successfully  opposed  court  approval  of  a plan  to  develop  ex-
193  See,  e.g.,  E. MCCORMICK,  supra note  191,  at 48;  E.  McCoRMICK  & D.  ILGEN,
supra note  135,  at 37-46;  McCormick,  Job and Task Analysis, in  HANDBOOK,  supra
note  Ioi,  at 65I,  652-53.
194  The  most common  methodology  has  been to  poll  current  jobholders  and  their
supervisors about  which tasks they  feel  are the  most important.  See,  e.g.,  Guardians
Ass'n of the  N.Y.  City  Police Dep't,  Inc.  v. Civil  Serv.  Comm'n,  484  F.  Supp.  785
(S.D.N.Y.) affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 630 F.2d 79  (2d  Cir.  198o),
cert. denied,  ioI  S.  Ct.  3083  (195i);  Chance  v.  Board of  Examiners,  330  F.  Supp.
203,  216  (S.D.N.Y.  1971),  affid, 458  F.2d  1167  (2d  Cir.  1972).
19' See,  e.g.,  Firefighters Inst. for  Racial  Equality v.  City  of St.  Louis,  549  F.2d
5o6  (8th  Cir.  1977),  affg in part, rev'g in part, and remanding in part United  States
v.  City of St.  Louis, 41o  F.  Supp.  948,  953  (E.D. Mo.  1976),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.
819  (977);  Guardians  Ass'n  of  the  N.Y.  City  Police  Dep't,  Inc.  v.  Civil  Serv.
Comm'n,  484 F. Supp.  785 (S.D.N.Y.), affid in part, vacated in part, and remanded,
630  F.2d  79  (2d Cir.  i98o),  cert. denied,  1OI  S.  Ct. 3083  (i981);  Arnold  v.  Ballard,
390  F.  Supp.  723,  731-33  (N.D.  Ohio  1975).
196  Chance v.  Board of Examiners,  458  F.2d  1167  (2d  Cir.  1972).
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aminations  based  on  these  analyses; 197  they argued that a job
analysis that looked primarily to the activities  and value judg-
ments  of white  incumbents  would  be  hopelessly  flawed.
Unless  the  courts  insist otherwise,  job  analysis  may  well
continue to be seen  as mere job description,  because employers
and  their  experts  will  be naturally  biased  in favor  of keeping
the job as  it has been.  The  testing experts'  only real  claim  to
expertise in  this  area is  in techniques  of describing  what jobs
entail.  They  certainly  are  not  experts  in  deciding  what  a
school  principal  or  lawyer  or  business  manager  ought  to  be
doing.  Unless  instructed  otherwise,  the  testing  expert  would
probably leave these value  choices  to the  employer  and would
accept  the  status  quo.  And  the  employer  is  likely  to  have  a
bias  in  favor  of  the  way  it  has  been  defining  performance.
Even  an employer  attempting in good faith to test its previous
assumptions  is  likely  to  think  that a descriptive  job  analysis
makes  perfect  sense if the  "experts"  treat it as  the  norm.
Courts  are  likely  to  resist  the  notion that  they  should in-
terfere  with  the  employer's  determination  of how  job  perfor-
mance  goals should be  defined.  They are likely to protest that
they  are  not  experts  in  deciding  what the  ideal  lawyer,  man-
ager,  or academic  should  look like. 198  But it is  to  the  courts
that our legal system  has entrusted responsibility for  weighing
employers'  justifications  for  running  their  businesses  as  they
traditionally  have  against  the  values  embodied  in  title  VII's
prohibition  of  racial  discrimination.  Courts  cannot  fully  en-
force  that prohibition  if they  refuse  to  consider  whether  em-
ployers are justified in defining jobs of key importance  to both
blacks  and  whites  by  looking  only  to  white  views  of  what
197 Transcript  of hearing and  of decision  from  the  bench,  at  13,  44,  45,  56,  64,
Chance  v. Board  of Examiners,  No.  70 Civ.  414I  (S.D.N.Y. June  1,  1976).
At a later stage of the  case,  defendants  proceeded  to  develop  "new"  examinations
based on job analyses prepared by similar methods.  Their racial impact was so harsh
that the  chancellor  of the city  school  system  initially refused  to  promulgate the  lists
of successful  candidates.  Testing Principals  and Principles, N.Y.  Times,  Aug.  11,
1981,  at A16,  col.  i (editorial).  A suit is now pending challenging the new examination
system on grounds similar to those  on which the original  suit was based.  Marchiarola
v. Board of Supervisors,  No. 81  Civ. 4798  (S.D.N.Y. amended  complaint filed  Sept.
24,  1981).
198  See  Lynn v.  Regents  of Univ.  of Cal.,  zi  Empl.  Prac.  Dec.  (CCH)  30,558
(C.D.  Cal.  1979)  (court  declines  to  intervene  despite  evidence  that negative  tenure
decision  reflected  disapproval  of feminist  nature  of candidate's  work);  Scott  v.  Uni-
versity of Del.,  455  F. Supp.  1102,  1126  (D.  Del.  1978) (challenge to  doctoral require-
ment  for academic  promotion  held  inappropriate  because "the  University's  choice  of
mission  is  not  a subject  for  judicial  review"),  affd  in part and vacated in part on
other grounds, 6oi  F.2d 76  (3d Cir.),  cert. denied, 444  U.S.  931  (1979).
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those  jobs should  be.  This  does  not mean  that  courts should
step  in  to  define  job  performance  goals  in  the  first  instance.
Employers would continue  to play that role.  But it does mean
that,  in  reviewing  the  legality  of an  employment  system  that
has  a  racially  exclusionary  effect,  courts  should  consider
whether  the employer's  job  definition is  partly responsible  for
that effect and,  if so,  whether  the  definition  is defensible.
Courts  have  occasionally  reviewed  job  definitions  in  this
manner.  In  Diaz v.  Pan American World  Airways,  Inc., 199
the  employer's  defense  of its females-only  flight attendant  pol-
icy  relied  on proof that women  were  for various  psychological
reasons  better  suited than  men  to perform  a function that the
employer  argued  was central  to the  flight attendant job  - to
make  passengers feel  comfortable.  The court struck down the
defense,  finding that this function  was simply not a part of the
court's  own  concept  of  a  flight  attendant's  main  respon-
sibility  - "to  transport  passengers  safely."'200  The  fact  that
women  apparently  performed  the  flight attendant  job  as  de-
fined by the  employer better than men was  deemed irrelevant,
because the  court decided  that the  nonsafety aspects  of the job
were  "tangential  to  the essence  of the  business."'20 1  In  effect,
the court  overrode  the  employer's job  definition,  because  that
definition  excluded men  from the  job  for  reasons that did  not
seem  particularly weighty.  Obviously the court was no  expert
on the flight attendant's job,  nor would it ordinarily be appro-
priate  for  a court  to  decide  how  that job  should  be  defined.
But  it  is  the  court's  function  to  weigh  the  cost  of  excluding
protected  groups  against the  cost  of interfering  with  employer
choices;202  for that  reason,  the  court  could  properly  say that
the essence  of a flight attendant's job  was or should  be related
to passenger  safety.
(ii)  Race  as Job-Related. - Those  engaged  in  designing
job analyses  should  not  only consider  whether the job  defini-
tion  will  perpetuate  the  exclusion  of blacks;  they should  also
be  willing  to  consider  blackness  in  a  positive  sense.  They
should determine  whether the job is one in which the inclusion
of  racial  minorities  is  important  to  improving  the  quality  of
performance.  Many  have  argued,  for  example,  that  there  is
199  442  F.2d 385  (5th  Cir.), cert. denied, 404  U.S.  950 (I97).
200  Id. at 388.
201  Id.
202  Courts  have traditionally  engaged in  this kind  of balancing  in interpreting  title
VII.  The  business  necessity  test,  for  example,  requires  courts  to  decide  whether
employment  policies  represent  interests  that are  important enough  to  outweigh  their
racial  impact.  See,  e.g.,  Robinson  v. Lorillard  Corp.,  444  F.2d 791,  799  (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404  U.S.  ioo6  (i971).
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a need  for more  black lawyers  who  are  interested  in  working
with  minority  communities,  for  more  black  teachers  who  are
capable  of effectively  communicating  with  black students  and
their parents,  and for more black academics  who are interested
in focusing their teaching  and  scholarship  on  problems  partic-
ularly significant  to minority groups. 20 3
The issue whether blackness may be considered job-related
in a positive sense under certain circumstances  has rarely been
the  focus  of employment  discrimination  litigation.  Race-con-
scious  employment  plans  tend  to  be  analyzed  in  terms  of
whether they can be justified in the name of affirmative action,
as  compensation  for previous  discrimination.  Courts  need to
consider  in  addition  whether  such  plans  can  be justified  be-
cause  performance  in  certain  jobs  in  today's  society  will  be
enhanced  by increasing  the  percentage  of blacks holding those
jobs.
Court  decisions  occasionally  indicate  that  race  can  legiti-
mately be considered job-related.  In Regents of the University
of California v.  Bakke,  Justice  Powell  recognized  that  under
some  circumstances  the  government  interest  in  providing
health  care to  disadvantaged  groups  would justify  a race-con-
scious  admissions  program. 20 4  Similarly,  in  a  district  court
case  involving  a police  force,  the  court argued  as follows:
LA]ll  citizens profit when the city achieves a racially integrated
police force  of qualified  individuals who are  knowledgeable  of
the  diverse problems  of  different ethnic  groups  and who  are
not prey to  destructive  hostility from  minorities  who  feel  ex-
cluded from full participation  in city government life.  Clearly,
the  general  harmony  of the  community  is  enhanced  by  the
city's  obtaining  a  police  force  representative  of  its  popula-
tion.
205
Other  courts  have  given  similarly  explicit  recognition  to  this
concept  in  relation  to  the  hiring  of  police  and  firefighters. 20 6
203 The  concept  of race as  a  "merit-related"  qualification  is discussed  in  R.  FUL-
LINWIDER,  THE  REVERSE  DISCRIMINATION  CONTROVERSY  78-83,  86-88  (198o);  Fal-
lon,  supra note  24,  at 819,  842-43,  860-62  (i98o).
204 Regents  of the  Univ.  of Cal.  v.  Bakke,  438  U.S.  265,  310-Il  (1978)  (opinion
of Powell,  J.).
205 Officers  for Justice v.  Civil Serv.  Comm'n,  371  F.  Supp.  1328,  1330-31  (N.D.
Cal.  1973).
206 See,  e.g.,  Detroit  Police Officers'  Ass'n  v.  Young,  6o8  F.2d 671,  696  (6th Cir.
1979),  cert. denied, ioi  S.  Ct.  3079  (i98i); League  of United  Latin Am.  Citizens v.
City of  Santa Ana,  41o  F.  Supp.  873,  896-97  (C.D.  Cal.  1976);  Note,  Race as  an
Employment Qualification  to Meet Police Department Operational  Needs,  54  N.Y.U.
L.  REV.  413  (1979);  see  also Talbert  v.  City of  Richmond,  648  F.2d  925  (4th  Cir.
r981)  (relying  on  Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v.  Young  to  legitimate  goal  of racial
[Vol. 95:945 1oI4
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In  other  cases,  the  way  of  defining  the  geographic  pools
suggests  that some  notion that race  is job related  is lurking  in
the  background.  The  size  of  the  relevant  pool  is  ordinarily
calculated  in  title  VII litigation  by reference  to the  area  from
which the defendants'  employees  are recruited.  In many police
and  fire  cases,  however,  the  courts  have  held that the  appro-
priate  area is instead  the jurisdiction  served. 2 0 7  For example,
if the  population  of  a  city  is  forty  percent  black,  the  court
would  find suspect  any examination  process  that resulted  in a
police force  less than forty percent black.  This reliance on city
population  statistics  when,  as  is  usually  the  case,  officers  are
recruited  from a larger and  less black  area,  makes  no sense  if
the purpose is  to  assess the  impact of the selection  devices  on
candidates.  These  courts  seem  to be  expressing  an  unspoken
assumption  that  race  is job  related  and  that  police  and  fire-
fighters  should reflect  the racial  composition  of the  population
they serve.
In  upholding  a  prison  guard  hiring  and  promotion  plan,
the  California  Court  of Appeals  recognized  as  legitimate  the
job-relatedness  of  race.  The  plan  was  designed  to  create  a
guard force with a minority percentage  at least seventy percent
that  of the  prison population.  After  noting  evidence  showing
that  the  plan  "would  serve  inmate-related  goals  of  the  De-
partment  by  improving  relationships  with  prisoners  and  re-
ducing  severe  racial  conflict  and  violence  within  the  state
prison  system,"  the  court upheld the  plan.20 8
There  are questions,  not dealt with here,  about the legality
diversity  in police  department's  upper ranks),  cert. denied, 5o  U.S.L.W.  3547  (U.S.
Jan.  TI,  1982);  Bridgeport  Guardians,  Inc.  v.  Members  of  Bridgeport  Civil  Serv.
Comm'n,  482  F.2d  1333,  1341  (2d  Cir.  1973) ("ITIhe visibility of the Black  patrolman
in  the community  is  a  decided  advantage  for  all  segments  of the  public  at  a  time
when  racial  divisiveness  is  plaguing  law  enforcement."),  cert. denied, 421  U.S.  991
(1975).
207 See,  e.g.,  Detroit  Police  Officers'  Ass'n  v.  Young,  608  F.2d  at 688  (6th  Cir.
1975),  vacated and remanded, 431  U.S.  951  (977);  Boston Chapter,  NAACP,  Inc. v.
Beecher,  504  F.2d  1017,  102o  n.4 (ist Cir.  1974) (firefighters),  cert. denied, 421  U.S.
910  (1975);  Afro  Am.  Patrolmens  League v.  Duck,  503  F.2d 294,  299  (6th Cir.  1974)
(police);  Erie  Human  Relations  Comm'n  v.  Tullio,  493  F.2d  371,  374-75  (3d  Cir.
1974)  (police);  Vulcan  Soc'y  of the N.Y.  City Fire  Dep't v.  Civil  Serv.  Comm'n,  490
F.2d 387,  398 (2d Cir.  1973);  League of United  Latin Am.  Citizens v.  City  of Santa
Ana,  41o  F. Supp.  873,  889-9o  & n.13,  896-97 (C.D.  Cal.  1976) (police and  firefight-
ers).
208 Minnick  v.  Department  of Corrections,  95  Cal.  App.  3d  506,  157  Cal.  Rptr.
26o  (1979),  cert. dismissed,  1oi  S.  Ct.  2211  (1981);  see also Porcelli v.  Titus,  302  F.
Supp.  726,  732-33  (D.N.J.  1969)  (recognizing  need  for  black  authority figures  with
whom pupils  could identify and  upholding system using race  as a factor in  promoting
teachers  to administrative  positions),  aff'd, 431  F.2d 1254  (3d Cir.  1970),  cert. denied,
402  U.S.  944  (1971).
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under  title VII and  the  Constitution  of giving positive consid-
eration  to  blackness  in  the  definition  of certain  jobs.20 9  It  is
important, however, for courts to realize that the issues cannot
be  reduced  to  those  usually  considered  in  the  context  of "af-
firmative  action"  plans  - namely,  whether  racial preferences
can be justified  as  a means  to  make up for past injustices.  If
race  is  job  related  in  certain  instances,  this  fact  provides  a
different  kind  of justification  for  race-conscious  employment
schemes.
(b)  Validation Techniques. - Validation  of a test involves
a  demonstration  that  the  test  does  what  it  purports  to  do.
Validation  of an  employee  selection  system  will  normally con-
sist of proof that  the  system successfully  predicts  performance
on the job.  The  following discussion  examines  the  commonly
accepted methods of validation,  focusing on some of the major
issues  likely to arise in validating upper level selection systems.
(i) Content Validity. - A  test is  said  to  be content-valid
with  respect  to  a job  when  it measures  performance  of tasks
that constitute  a relatively  complete  sample of those called  for
on  the job. 210  Content  validity has generally been  considered
appropriate  for jobs  that  consist  primarily  of  a  few  simple
tasks.  The example  commonly  given is  the  typist.  If the job
consists  almost  entirely  of  typing,  a  test  that  measures  the
candidate's typing ability will ordinarily  be considered  content-
valid.
This  theory  provides  little justification  for upper  level  se-
lection  systems.  Performance  in  upper  level  jobs  ordinarily
involves  a  number  of  sophisticated  functions,  and  it  is  not
possible  to include an  adequate sample  of all of them in a test.
Indeed,  very  few  of the  selection  devices  used  on  the  upper
level  purport  to  provide  a  sample  of  the  actual  job.  Inter-
views,  assessments  of  educational  accomplishments  and  of
work  performance,  and  traditional  mental  aptitude  tests,  for
example,  are  all  devices  designed  to  predict  future  behavior,
based  on  past or  present  behavior  of a different  nature.  As-
sessment  center  techniques  often  try  to  simulate  actual  job
situations.  Candidates  may  be  given  an  in-basket  and  asked
to  make  decisions  about  what  should  be  done  with  each
209 See Knight  v.  Nassau  County Civil  Serv.  Comm'n,  25  Fair Empl.  Prac.  Cas.
(BNA)  1448,  1451  (2d  Cir.  r98i)  (violation  of  title  VII  and of  Constitution  to  use
black  employee's  race  as  a  factor  in  assigning  him  to  minority  recruitment).  A
discussion  of related issues  is contained  in Note, supra note  206.
210  See,  e.g.,  Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  i3,  §  607. 14(C)(i);  E. MCCORMICK
&  D.  ILGEN,  supra note  135,  at  iii; Guion,  Scoring of Content Domain Samples:
The Problem of Fairness, 63 J. APPLIED  PSYCHOLOGY  499,  501-02  (1978).
ioi6 [Vol.  95:945
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item  - drafting  an  answer  to a letter,  delegating  a task to  a
subordinate,  and  the  like.  Or  candidates  may  be  placed  in
discussion groups and given roles designed to demonstrate their
leadership  abilities.  The goal,  however,  will usually not be  to
reproduce  in  the  assessment  center  a representative  sample  of
the job,  but rather  to assess  a set of abilities  that seem  likely
to  be  related  to  future  ability  to  perform.  Indeed,  there  is
probably  no  way  that  the  tasks  and  real-world  pressures  in-
volved in  any complex  job could  be replicated,  short of giving
the  candidate  a  probationary  period  in the  actual job.
The  Uniform  Guidelines  provide  an  alternative  basis  for
demonstrating  content validity.  Selection  procedures that pur-
port to measure "knowledge,  skills,  or abilities" - even  if they
are not representative  samples  - may be justified by content
validity if the knowledge,  skill,  or  ability  "is  a necessary  pre-
requisite  to successful job performance."
211
Even  if one  of these  theories  of  content validity  seems ap-
plicable, numerous problems in demonstrating  validity remain.
First,  any  claim  for  content validity  depends  on  an  adequate
job analysis. 212  Second, should employers  design tests that are
content-valid  for  limited aspects  of an upper  level job - say,
for  minimum  required  knowledge  - that  alone  would  not
validate  the  overall  selection  system. 213  Third,  a test is  con-
tent-valid  only  if  performance  on  the  test  is  measured  fairly
and accurately. 214  Upper  level job  selection  devices  are likely
to  include  subjective  elements;  the  measurement  problems
likely  to  arise  are  therefore  those  typical  of all  subjective  as-
sessment  processes. 215  For  example,  after  observing  a candi-
211 Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  § 16O7.14(C)(I).  By  contrast, the  Uniform
Guidelines  find  a content validity strategy inappropriate  for  selection  procedures  that
purport to  measure  "traits  or constructs,"  such  as intelligence,  aptitude,  personality,
commonsense,  judgment,  and  leadership.  Id. The  APA  has  come  to similar conclu-
sions.  DIVISION  14  PRINCIPLES,  supra note  12,  at  13.
212  Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  §  1607.14(C(2);  DIVISION  14  PRINCIPLES,
supra note  12,  at  13.
213 See,  e.g.,  Firefighters Inst. for  Racial  Equality v.  City of St.  Louis,  549  F.2d
506,  5II-12 (8th Cir.)  (fire captain  examination  not  content-valid  when it  tested job
knowledge  but  not  supervisory  ability,  admittedly  a  key  aspect  of  the  job),  cert.
denied, 434  U.S. 819  (1977);  United States v. San Diego  County,  21  Fair Empl.  Prac.
Cas.  402 (BNA) (S.D. Cal.  1979)  (striking down  selection  test that measured only two
of four  attributes found  necessary  to job).
214 See,  e.g.,  Guion,  "Content Validity" in  Moderation, 31  PERSONNEL  PSYCHOL-
OGY  205,  208-II  (1978).  For  example,  a  typing  test  would  not  be  a  fair selection
device,  even if it represented a fair sample  of the job at issue,  if the  cutoff score were
set so high that it excluded  typists  who type  fast enough  to  satisfy job  requirements.
215  See generally Guion,  supra note  21o,  at 504-06  (serious problems  of potential
bias in  scoring  of content-structured  tests).
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date's  performance,  an  assessment  staff  makes  subjective
judgements  about  such  qualities  as  leadership  ability,  initia-
tive,  and  ability  to  get  along  with  others. 216  Even  if  the
performance  evaluated  is  comparable  to  the  performance  re-
quired  by  the job,  the  staff's  evaluation  process  is subjective
and must be  analyzed  like any other  subjective  test.  If it has
a disparate impact,  it is  suspect for  the  same  reasons  pointed
to in Rowe and related  cases. 217  The  assessment staff,  drawn
as  it  usually  is  from  the  supervisory  ranks  at or  above  the
level to which  the  candidates  aspire,  is  likely to  be dispropor-
tionately  white  compared  with  the  candidates.  Even  if  the
staff  consists  of  outside  professionals,  they  take  their  goals
from the  employer;  their criteria and  any formulae  they use to
weight  those  criteria  will  reflect  the  goals  and  values  of the
enterprise  and  its top  management. 21 8  And  beyond  consider-
ations  of conscious  or  unconscious  bias,  there  remains  a real
danger  that  this  kind  of  assessment  scheme  will  select  the
candidates  who  most  resemble  the  upper  level  employees  in
the enterprise;  in that case,  an  existing pattern  of racial  exclu-
sion  may  well  be  perpetuated,  and  the  employer  must  then
demonstrate that  the job requires this  exclusion. 219
(ii)  Empirical Validity.  - Empirical  validation  requires
an  analysis  of the  relationship  between  performance  on a test
or other  "predictor"  and performance  on  the job  being  tested
for.  Number  of  years  of experience,  medical  school  grades,
and IQ  scores  are  all  examples  of  potential  predictors.  The
goal  of the  validation  process  is  to  demonstrate  that  a  pur-
ported  predictor  actually does  predict  employee  performance.
Empirical validation requires a determination of what good
performance  is  and  how  to  measure  it.  The  testing  experts
refer to this process  as  the development  of appropriate  criteria
and  criteria  measures.  A  validity  study  then  compares  em-
ployees'  performance  on a given predictor  against their perfor-
mance on the appropriate criteria measures.  If the correlations
are  high  enough  to  be  practically  useful  - if it  seems  more
216  See,  e.g.,  Hinrichs,  supra note  144,  at 598;  Warbois,  Validation of Externally
Developed Assessment Procedures  for Identification of Supervisory Potential, 28  PER-
SONNEL  PSYCHOLOGY  77,  79-80  (i975).
217 See supra p.  974.
218  Criteria used in some assessment centers include "company orientation," defined
as  "identifying  the  organization's  goals  and  values  as  reflecting  one's  own";  and
"functional  ability," defined  as "existing successfully  in one's environment."  See,  e.g.,
Warbois,  supra note  216,  at 79-80.
219 See generally Fallon, supra note  24, at 854-56  & n.143  (discussing problems  of
using content validation  strategy when  complex jobs are  at issue).
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likely  than  not that the  predictor  is  accurately  predicting  job
performance  - the  predictor is  said to be valid.
Criterion-related  validation has been  the main  form of em-
pirical validation  to  date,  and the  main  alternative  to content
validation.  A third generally recognized technique  is construct
validation,  which focuses  on the  measurement  of certain  men-
tal  and  other  capacities  - "constructs"  - deemed  important
to future performance.  Construct validation is a relatively new
concept,  and  experts  disagree  about what it  means  or how  it
could  be  shown.  However,  there  seems  to  be  general  agree-
ment that construct  validity  requires  empirical  validation  -
that is,  demonstration  of a  relationship  between  the  construct
and job performance.
220
Developing  appropriate  criteria  measures  for  upper  level
jobs will be  difficult.  The criteria measures themselves  are yet
another kind of testing device; they must fairly and accurately
measure employee  performance if the validity study is to prove
anything.  One  alternative  would  be  to  ask employees  to take
some  sort of objective test designed  to measure how  well they
know their job.  Or  one could  use other  objective  criteria;  for
a business manager,  they might include department productiv-
ity,  employee  absenteeism,  or amount of business  attracted  to
the  company.  If  blacks  do  worse  on  such  objective  tests  or
criteria,  the  inquiry  cannot  simply  stop  there;  it  must  be  de-
termined  that  the  criteria  are  in  fact  measuring  job  perfor-
mance accurately.
Alternatively,  some  sort of subjective  evaluation  might  be
used as  a criterion  measure.  Thus,  the  employer  might try  to
assess job performance  by using performance  ratings.  Or the
employer might look to salary increases  or promotions  as mea-
220  Uniform Guidelines,  supra note  i3,  §  1607.14(D)(3)  (proof of construct validity
requires  that  the  relationship  between  construct  and  performance  be  "supported  by
empirical  evidence  from  one  or  more criterion-related  studies");  Barrett,  Is the Test
Content-Valid: Or, Does It  Really Measure a Construct?, 6 EMPLOYEE  REL.  L.J.  459,
464  (I98I)  (construct  validation  requires  "empirical  evidence  showing  the  relation
between  the  constructs  and  the  work  behavior");  see  also  E.  McCoRMICK  &  D.
ILGEN,  supra note  135,  at 124  (proof of construct validity  requires empirical  demon-
stration  that  the  test  accurately  measures  the  construct  as  well  as  a  complete job
analysis showing  the  role  of the  construct in  the job);  cf. A.  ANASTASI,  PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL  TESTING  151-61  (4th  ed.  1976)  (construct validity  is  a  broad  concept,  encom-
passing  the  notion  of  empirical  validity).  In  Douglas  v.  Hampton,  512  F.2d  976,
986-87  (D.C.  Cir.  1975),  the  court rejected  one  of the few  attempts to  justify  a test
by  means  of  construct  validity.  The  court  defined  construct  validity  narrowly  to
require  only a  showing  that  a test  accurately  measures  certain  constructs.  But the
court then said that, "in determining whether  a showing of construct validity satisfies
Griggs, the court  must also determine  whether  the  constructs  are  themselves related
to job  performance."  Id.  at 986.  The  court also  held that construct  validity  may  be
considered  only when empirical  validity is  infeasible.  Id.
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sures  of an  employee's job  performance,  when those decisions
have  been  based  on  subjective  processes.  Although  such sub-
jective  measures  may  appear  far  more  sensible  than a purely
objective  approach  for most upper  level jobs,  the  use  of sub-
jective  measures  poses  serious  problems  of fairness  and  accu-
racy.  Those  who subjectively  assess an employee's job  perfor-
mance  will  ordinarily  be  higher  level  employees  of  the  same
employer.  A  subjective  criterion  measure  for  evaluating  job
performance  may  strongly  resemble  the  selection  procedures
that kept many  minorities  from  being  hired in the  first  place.
Indeed,  courts  analyzing  the  use  of subjective  criterion  mea-
sures for purposes of empirical  validation have recognized how
suspect they  are. 221
The testing literature  reveals  professional  concern with  the
problems  criteria  measures  pose.  Experts  note that appropri-
ate criteria measures  have generally not been developed.  They
condemn the  tendency simply to  seize  on easily available  mea-
sures  such  as  promotions  and salary raises  without  regard  to
their  relationship  to  job  performance. 222  One  commentator
observed:  "If the  problem  of investigating  possible  predictor
bias  is difficult,  the  problem  of criterion  bias  is appalling. '223
221  Albemarle  Paper  Co.  v.  Moody,  422  U.S.  405  (I975). One  court condemning
validity  studies  in  a  case  involving  lower  level  craft jobs  reasoned  as follows:  "Al-
though  somewhat constrained,  the  rating process here  was still  principally subjective.
We have  in the past condemned  the use of such nebulous  standards.  Where, as here,
subjective evaluations are used in the very process of test validation, a similar potential
for abuse  exists."  Rogers v. International  Paper  Co.,  5Io F.2d  1340,  1350  (8th  Cir.)
(citations omitted),  vacated on other grounds and remanded, 423 U.S.  809  (1975);  see
also United States v.  City of Chicago, 549  F.2d 415,  433 & n.24  (7th Cir.) (supervisors'
efficiency  ratings  rejected  because  procedures  for  obtaining  ratings not  sufficient  to
ensure  that they  were  a  good  measure  of job  performance),  cert. denied, 434  U.S.
875  (i977);  Watkins  v.  Scott  Paper  Co.,  530  F.2d  i159, 1188-go  (5th Cir.)  (ruling
inadequate  a  criterion-related  validity  study  because  raters  were  instructed  only  to
judge  which employee  performed better, a standard subject to supervisory  bias),  cert.
denied, 429 U.S.  86x  (1976);  League  of United Latin  Am.  Citizens v.  City of Santa
Ana, 41o F. Supp.  873,  905-06  (C.D. Cal.  1976) (validation study using performance
ratings as criterion measures rejected,  in  part because of strong evidence of racial  bias
against Mexican-Americans).
222 See,  e.g.,  MANAGERIAL  BEHAVIOR,  snpra  note  27,  at  101-26,  473-74;  R.
GUION,  supra note  27,  at 9o-91,  117-18;  cf. Ash  &  Kroeker,  supra note  132,  at 485
("[T]he  criterion  remains  the  weak  link  in  the  chain  [of  test  validation].").  See
generally Dunnette  & Borman,  supra note  143,  at 486  (noting extensive  writing  about
the "criterion  problem");  Guion,  supra note  214,  at 205-06 (referring  to the "tired  old
discussions of the  'criterion problem').
223 Guion,  supra note  135,  at 815;  see also M.  MINER  & J.  MINER,  supra note
142,  at  96 (recognizing  potential  for  bias  in  using  performance  ratings  as  criterion
measures); Dunnette & Borman,  supra note  143,  at 489-90  (noting the need for  much
work  in  developing  bias-free  performance-rating  systems);  Hamner,  Kim,  Baird  &
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He  argues  that it  is  "impossible  to  tell  whether  an  observed
ethnic  difference  is  evidence  of bias  or simply  descriptive." 224
Courts have a vital role to play in scrutinizing  the adequacy
of criteria  measures.  Employers  who  are persuaded  that their
selection schemes are sound may want to prove that hypothesis
by the least expensive  means  possible.  Given  the  difficulty of
developing  criterion  measures  for  upper  level  jobs,  even  the
good  faith  employer  will  be tempted to seize  on  some existing
measure,  whatever  its  problems,  and  hope  that some  appar-
ently persuasive  correlation  can  be  produced.
Nor  can  the  courts  assume  that  the  experts  will  develop
appropriate  criteria  measures.  The  testing  literature  contains
reports of numerous validity studies in which  correlations were
calculated  and  validity claimed  on  the  basis of  measures  that
seem  obviously  suspect,  with  little  or  no  discussion  of  the
problems involved. 225  A 1977  review of the validity studies  of
assessment centers illustrates some of the problems involved. 226
The authors  question the value  of these studies,  which consis-
tently  purported  to  demonstrate  validity.  They  note  the  ten-
dency to use criteria such as salary  or promotions,  which "may
have  less  to do  with  managerial  effectiveness  than  with man-
agerial  adaptation  and  survival." 227  The  authors  point  out
that  this  approach  to  criteria  measures  tends  simply  to
perpetuate  the  status  quo:
"If we  are, indeed,  embarked  on a venture which will lead us
to pick  people  who  can  get  good ratings,  especially  from  big
shots,  what  are  the implications  for progress  in  business  and
societal  endeavor?  How  to  succeed  in  business  by satisfying
the  guardians  of the  status  quo?"  . . . If  we  wish  to  move
away  from the  status  quo,  then,  we  need  criteria  other  than
advancement. 228
Bigoness,  supra note  188,  at  709-10  (criterion  measures  may  be  infected  with  the
same  bias  as the predictor).
224  Guion,  supra note  21o,  at S16.
22S See generally M.  MINER  & J. MINER,  supra note  142,  at  94,  96 (performance
ratings  are typically  used  to arrive  at criterion measures,  despite  recognized  potential
for bias  in use of such  ratings).
226 Klimoski  & Strickland,  supra note  144.
227 Id. at 355.
228 Id.  at  358  (quoting Wallace,  How High  the  Validity?,  27  PERSONNEL  PSY-
CHOLOGY  397,  404  (I974)).  The  authors  discuss  the  possibility  that  the  assessment
center  operates simply as a "policy-capturing"  device - as a means of describing  how
and  why  people  are  advanced  in  a  particular  organization.  Id.  at 358-6o;  see  also
MANAGERIAL  BEHAVIOR,  supra note  27,  at io-ii, 125-26  (commenting on the status
quo orientation of the criterion measures  typically  used in managerial validity studies);
Hinrichs,  supra note  144,  at 6oo (much research  is needed  to develop accurate measure
of performance,  since assessment  centers  are  generally  predictive of achievement).
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The  danger  is  that  courts  will  accept  the  quick-and-dirty
validation  studies  that  seem  to  have  become  popular.  One
common  response  to the  civil  rights attack  on the  use of selec-
tion devices  that exclude  blacks  has consisted simply of efforts
to  demonstrate  validity,  rather  than  serious  attempts  to  eval-
uate their  usefulness.  Because  available  measures  of job  suc-
cess  often  bear  a  remarkable  resemblance  to  the  challenged
predictor,  positive  correlations  between  test performance  and
performance  on  the  criterion  measure  may  well  be  demon-
strated  and  validity claimed.  A  number  of  courts  have  been
persuaded  that  this  kind  of demonstration  proves  something.
The  Supreme  Court  in  Washington v.  Davis 229  found  signifi-
cant  a  relationship  between  scores  on  the  entry  level  test  for
policemen  and scores  on examinations  given during  a training
program  for  the  same  policemen.  In  United States v.  South
Carolina, 230  the  district  court  found  persuasive  a correlation
between  scores  on  the  challenged  National  Teacher  Exami-
nation  (NTE) and  scores  in  a  teacher  training  program  that
the  candidates  had been  engaged  in  prior to taking  the  NTE;
the  Supreme  Court  affirmed  summarily.  In neither  case  was
there reason to think that the training program test scores bore
any  relationship  to job  performance.  In both  cases,  all  that
was shown was  that people  who  did well  on one  test did well
on another  very  similar  test.
Accepting  such  evidence  as  proof  of  validity  is  far  worse
than  simply  telling  upper  level  employers  that  they  will  be
subject  to  a  looser  standard.  The  message  conveyed  is  not
simply  that blacks  are to  be  excluded,  but that they  are to  be
excluded  because they have  been  proved less capable  of doing
good  work.  To  the  extent  the  proof is  phony, the  message  is
both  harmful  and unfair.
Proper  validation  may  seem  too  demanding  a process.  If
every  measure  on  which  blacks  do  poorly  must  be  justified,
whether it be a predictor or criterion measure,  where  does the
process  stop?  The  point,  however,  is  not that  courts  should
demand  the  impossible  in  the  way  of  demonstrably valid  cri-
teria measures or that  they should strike down  as unlawful  all
employment  schemes that cannot be proved  valid according  to
the  strictest  technical  standards.  Rather,  courts  should  de-
mand  validation  and  should  look  hard  at studies  purporting
to  prove  validity.  In  the process,  they  will learn  much  about
why blacks do poorly in particular selection schemes  and about
229 426  U.S.  229  (1976).
2o 445  F.  Supp.  1094  (D.S.C.  i977),  aff d  mere.  sub norn.  National  Educ.  Ass'n
v.  South  Carolina,  434  U.S.  1026  (1978).
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the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  employer  justifications  for
those schemes.  In lower level job cases, such investigation has
often led courts to the conclusion that the employment  schemes
at  issue  cannot  be  justified.  It  is  unlikely  that  courts  have
been  fooled  by  the  experts'  jargon.  It  is  likely  instead  that
investigation  has  shown  the  courts  the  real  irrationalities  of
the  employment systems at issue and the  extent  to which  they
simply reflect the values and biases of those already inside the
system.
3.  Duty to  Explore and Adopt Less Discriminatory Alter-
natives of Equivalent Validity. - Proof of the  validity  of  an
employment  scheme  that  has  an  adverse  racial  impact  does
not end  the  inquiry.  Traditional  title  VII  standards  demand
that the  employer opt for any available  alternative system that
has  a  lesser  impact,  as  long  as  it  also  serves  the  employer's
job  needs. 231  Validity  simply  means  that  a  given  selection
device  is  a  better  predictor  of  successful  performance  than  a
random  selection  process:  there  may  be  several  valid systems
for  predicting  performance  in  any given  job,  and  any  one  of
them  is  likely  to  measure  only  certain  of the  characteristics
that  determine  job  success.  The  problem  is  that the  charac-
teristics  measured  by  one  test may  be  highly  correlated  with
race,  while  those  measured  by another  may not.232
Recognition  of the  less-discriminatory-alternative  doctrine
231  See, e.g.,  Albemarle  Paper  Co.  v.  Moody,  422  U.S.  405,  425  (I975);  Robinson
v.  Lorillard  Corp.,  444 F.2d  791,  798  n.7  (4th Cir.),  cert. dismissed, 404  U.S.  ioo6
(1971);  Crockett  v.  Green,  388  F.  Supp.  912,  92o (E.D.  Wis.  1975),  affd, 534  F.2d
715  (7th Cir.  1976).  The  Uniform  Guidelines  provide that, if  the  employer is shown
an  alternative  selection  method  that  appears  to  have  substantial  validity  and  less
adverse  impact,  he must investigate  its potential.  If two methods  have substantially
equal  validity but one has  a  less discriminatory result,  the  employer  must choose  the
latter.  Uniform  Guidelines,  supra note  13,  §  6o7.3(B).
232  The  issues  involved  in  an  exploration  of  less  discriminatory  alternatives  are
different from those involved  in the "differential  validity" and "fairness" inquiries that
have  been  the  subject  of much  debate  during  the past  decade.  Differential  validity
exists  when  the validity coefficient  for one group  differs  from that for another  group.
Thus, a test might be a good predictor of performance for whites,  but a poor predictor
of performance  for  blacks.  Differential  validity was virtually dismissed as nonexistent
in  the early  197o's,  but the  controversy  over its existence  has been reopened  in recent
years.
Fairness  inquiries  ask  a  different question:  Does  a  test systematically  overpredict
or  underpredict  the performance  of  a group?  A  test  may  be  equally  valid  for  two
groups,  but  unfair because  one group's  performance  is systematically  underpredicted
in relation  to  the  other's.  The  traditional concern  in  fairness  inquiries was  that tests
might unfairly underpredict  black achievement,  but recent  studies suggest that this is
not the case.  See Cole, Bias in  Testing, 36 AM.  PSYCHOLOGIST  1O67,  5O69-70 (1981).
Less-discriminatory-alternative  analysis assumes  that a given test is valid and  fair,
and  asks  whether there  is  any other  valid  and fair  test that will  have a less adverse
impact.
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on the upper level is vital.  Although present selection  methods
are  often  hard  to  prove  valid,  employers  and  courts  may  re-
main  convinced  that traditional  selection  devices  serve  some
useful  purposes.  If  inquiry  is  focused  solely  on  whether  an
employer's  current methods  are  valid,  the  conclusion  in  many
cases  is likely  to be  that the  commonsense  case  for validity  is
strong  enough  to  justify  their  continued  use.  It  is  therefore
important  to  realize  that even  a  valid  employment  scheme  is
not justified  under  title  VII  if less  discriminatory  alternatives
exist that are  likely to be equally  valid.
The  potential  of this  approach  can  be  illustrated  by  con-
sidering  a law  firm's  system  for  selecting  associates.  Assume
that the  law  firm  makes  choices  among  applicants  primarily
on  the  basis  of  law  school  attended  and  law  school  grades.
The  firm  would  presumably  defend  the  job-relatedness  of its
selection system on the ground that there is significant evidence
that  law  school  grades  measure  abilities  relevant  to  future
performance  as a lawyer.  It  would  advance  similar common-
sense  arguments  to justify quality of law school  attended as  a
selection  criterion.  While  these  arguments  do  not  establish
validity,  a court  might be  tempted to conclude  that the firm's
selection  process  is  valid,  because  it  is  a  commonplace  that
grades and the quality of prior schooling bear some  relation to
abilities  important  to future  performance  as  a  lawyer  and  be-
cause  law firms routinely rely on  these  criteria.
A  less-discriminatory-alternative  approach  requires  the
court  to  consider  the  likelihood  that  there  are  equally  valid
alternative  systems  that  have  a  less  discriminatory  impact.
High grades  and attendance  at prestigious  law schools  are,  at
best, imperfect predictors of performance  as a lawyer.  Grades,
for example,  are  designed  to  measure  abilities  that constitute
a  very  small  segment  of  the  range  of  abilities  involved  in
effective  lawyering.  Alternative  selection  schemes  might mea-
sure  additional  attributes  of  at least  equal  importance.  The
firm  might,  for  example,  develop  an  assessment  system  that
gave  far  less  weight to  law  school  examinations  and more  to
performance  on long-term  written  projects,  trial and appellate
advocacy  skills,  ability to  work well  with colleagues  on  coop-
erative  projects,  and  qualities  of aggressiveness,  energy,  and
dedication to  work.
There  are  probably  many  less  discriminatory  alternatives
to many  of our traditional  selection  systems.  Over  the years,
experts have developed numerous  alternative selection methods
that have  a less  adverse  racial  impact and  that seem  likely to
be  at least as valid as  traditional  methods.  For example,  they
have  suggested  substituting  job-sample  performance  tests  for
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traditional  paper-and-pencil  tests  as  predictors for  lower  level
jobs.
23 3  They  have  substituted  tests  based  on  preparation
manuals  for traditional  aptitude  tests,  and  found  a reduction
in  adverse  impact.  The  new  tests,  supported  by content  va-
lidity  studies,  were  designed  to  measure  only  knowledge  ob-
tained  from materials  that candidates would  read during  their
training and probationary  periods.  The theory  is that aptitude
tests  measure  learning  skills  and  have  an  adverse  impact  on
minorities  who  have  received  inadequate  training  in  such
skills.  Tests based on preparation manuals,  on the other hand,
allow  motivation  to  influence  test  performance.  Testing  ex-
perts  have  also  developed  assessment  center  techniques  that
have  been  praised  as  improvements  over  traditional  manage-
ment-level  selection  and that  have  been  reported  to  have,  in
many  instances,  a less  adverse  racial impact. 234
Courts looking at lower level employment systems  have felt
a distance that  enabled them  to  imagine  the  possibility of less
discriminatory  alternatives.  They  have  struck down  prior ex-
perience  requirements,  for  example,  finding that  performance
tests  or  on-the-job  training  programs  are  less  discriminatory
alternatives that serve the employer's  purposes equally  well. 235
In upper level cases,  courts must try to distance  themselves
from  the selection  systems with  which they are  most familiar,
so  that they  can  be  similarly receptive  to  alternative  ways  of
doing  things.  Plaintiffs  should  explore  alternative  selection
devices,  rather than focusing simply on the validity  of existing
devices.  And  employers  should  realize  that  such  alternatives
present opportunities  for potentially  useful  innovation. 236
There  is  no  question  that  many  upper  level  selection  sys-
tems  appear  to  make  some  sort  of  sense.  There  is  serious
233 See,  e.g., Schmidt,  Greenthal,  Hunter,  Berner & Seaton, Job Sample v.  Paper-
and-Pencil Trades and Technical Tests: Adverse Impact and Examinee Attitudes, 30
PERSONNEL  PSYCHOLOGY  187  (1977).
234 See,  e.g.,  Byham,  Assessment  Centers for Spotting Future Managers, HARV.
Bus. REV.,  July-Aug.  197O,  at  15o.
235  See,  e.g.,  Crockett  v.  Green,  388  F.  Supp.  912  (E.D.  Wis.  1975),  affd,  534
F.2d  715  (7th  Cir.  1976);  see also Bush  v.  Lone  Star  Steel  Co.,  373  F.  Supp.  526,
539-40  (E.D. Tex.  1974)  (merger of  black and  white  seniority  lines  ordered,  with a
provision  that the  company  could  test skill  and  ability  by  a trial  or break-in  period
of no less  than five  days).
236 Educational  experts had for decades  condemned  the civil service testing system
challenged  in Chance  v.  Board  of Examiners,  458  F.2d  1167  (2d  Cir.  1972),  on  the
ground  that it  was  largely  responsible  for perpetuating  the  mediocre  quality  of the
school  system's  supervisory  staff.  Educational  experts  had  also  long  argued  that
greater  reliance  should  be  placed on  assessment  of  on-the-job  performance  than  on
written  examinations.  As  a  result of various  consent  decrees  negotiated  in  Chance,
on-the-job  performance  became  a  major  part of  the licensing  process  for the  school
system's  supervisors.
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question  whether  upper  level  employers  have  begun  to  think
imaginatively  about  alternative  selection  devices  that  might
have a lesser  racial impact but serve their  purposes  as  well  or
better.
V.  CONCLUSION
The courts  are divided in their approach  to the upper level
title VII  cases  that have arisen  with increasing frequency  dur-
ing recent  years.  Some  have  struggled  to apply  the  doctrines
developed in lower level  cases - doctrines that give real mean-
ing  to  title  VII.  Others  have  granted  upper  level  employers
effective  immunity  from  title VII  challenge.
Courts  reluctant  to  subject  upper  level  employers  to  the
heavy  burdens  of justification  that  title  VII  has  traditionally
imposed  should  at least  face  up  to the  issue  whether  a differ-
ential  standard  is justified.  Rational  inquiry  is  not advanced
when  courts  manipulate  procedural  and  substantive  doctrines
and  pretend  not  to  see  that  racial  exclusion  is  taking  place.
Moreover,  putting  the  stamp  of judicial  approval  on  racially
exclusionary systems  is  seriously unjust if in fact the  "finding"
that the  systems  are  job  related  is  based  simply  on  judges'
views  that  systems  with  which  they  are  personally  familiar
make sense.
The  argument  of  this  Article  is  that  traditional  title  VII
standards should in fact be applied:  employers should be forced
to demonstrate  the  necessity for  racially  exclusionary  policies.
This  requirement  might  well  lead  to  the  discovery  that  many
traditional  selection  systems  cannot  be  justified  by  concerns
with high quality performance  - that these systems have often
been  designed  to serve  a variety  of factors  having  nothing  to
do  with  merit.
Such  a  revelation  might  force  us  to  consider  imaginative
alternatives  to  traditional  selection  methods  - alternatives
that we should consider if our only concern  is quality, but that
we have failed to consider because of the tendency of those who
are "in" to perpetuate  the systems that got them there.
Another  result  might  be  increased  pressure  for  quota  or
racially  proportionate  hiring  among  those  satisfying  certain
minimum  qualifications.  This pressure  would  be  in large part
the consequence  of careful  scrutiny of upper level  employment
systems.  For it  will  probably  be  difficult  to  demonstrate  the
job-relatedness  and  business  necessity  of many  of these  selec-
tion  systems,  in  large  part because  it is  difficult  to determine
what good performance  is  and how to  measure it.  Employers
in cases involving  business  managers,  lawyers,  doctors,  teach-
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ers,  and  the  like  will  find  it  difficult  to  say  what  they  are
looking for,  beyond a level of minimum competence,  and how
they  know  when  they  have  found  it.  Moreover,  value  judg-
ments  inevitably infect such  evaluations.  Is  the  best business
manager one  who  simply maximizes  production,  or should  we
be  looking for  business  managers  who  in  addition  create  sat-
isfying working environments?  Is the best school  principal one
who  possess  advanced  academic  degrees,  or one who  will seek
to  learn  about  and  to  fulfill  the  needs  of  the  community  the
school  serves?  Is the  best doctor  one  who  will  excel  at  state-
of-the-art  surgical  procedures,  or one  who  will  provide  badly
needed  health  care  to  poor  families  in  unglamorous  commu-
nities?  To the extent that such value judgments are inevitable,
to  the  extent  that  employers  cannot  say  what makes  for  the
ideal job-incumbent,  to the  extent that those in  power  almost
inevitably create selection  devices  and define jobs in ways that
are  self-serving  and  self-perpetuating,  it  is  hard  to justify  se-
lection  devices  with  a racially  exclusionary  impact.  Selection
on a racially proportionate basis seems an appropriate solution.
Ethnic  minorities  would  then  be  represented  in  positions  in
which  they  could  make  the  essentially  political  judgments
about  how  our  major  social  institutions  should  operate  and
how jobs carrying significant power  to influence society should
look.
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